AMS · Amadeus IT Group SA
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read from Amadeus IT Group SA’s ESEF annual report, in EUR. The narrative — what the business does, its risks, what changed this year — is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. The filed annual report →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the ESEF filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2019–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| €5.6B | €2.2B | €2.7B | €4.5B | €5.4B | €6.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 74% | 87% | 81% | 75% | 76% | 75% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| €1.5B | (€771M) | (€83M) | €963M | €1.4B | €1.6B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 26.5% | −35.5% | −3.1% | 21.5% | 26.0% | 26.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| €1.1B | (€625M) | (€142M) | €664M | €1.1B | €1.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 22% | — | — | 24% | 18% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| €1.8B | €33M | €636M | €1.4B | €1.8B | €2.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| €757M | €829M | €682M | €678M | €680M | €700M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (€68M) | (€171M) | €97M | €99M | (€3M) | €193M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| €94M | €43M | €44M | €40M | €61M | €73M | CapexCapex |
| 1.7% | 2.0% | 1.6% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| €1.7B | (€10M) | €592M | €1.4B | €1.7B | €2.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 30.7% | −0.5% | 22.2% | 31.2% | 31.9% | 33.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| €1.7B | (€10M) | €592M | €1.4B | €1.7B | €2.1B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 30.7% | −0.5% | 22.2% | 31.2% | 31.9% | 33.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| €506M | €241M | €0 | €0 | €333M | €542M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 29% | -17% | -4% | 14% | 25% | 25% | Return on equityROE |
| 16% | −23% | −4% | 14% | 18% | 14% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| €564M | €1.6B | €1.1B | €1.4B | €1.0B | €1.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| €530M | €430M | €442M | €597M | €704M | €844M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| €530M | €430M | €442M | €597M | €704M | €844M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| €1.4B | €3.3B | €2.6B | €3.1B | €2.4B | €2.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| €3.0B | €2.6B | €2.0B | €3.0B | €2.5B | €3.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.5× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| €3.7B | €3.5B | €3.7B | €3.8B | €3.7B | €4.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| €10.4B | €11.8B | €11.2B | €11.7B | €10.8B | €11.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| 35.1× | -10.0× | -0.9× | 10.7× | 16.8× | 16.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| €3.8B | €3.8B | €3.7B | €4.6B | €4.5B | €5.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 431M | 447M | 445M | 449M | 447M | 437M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| €12.91 | €4.87 | €6.00 | €9.99 | €12.17 | €14.07 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| €2.58 | €-1.40 | €-0.32 | €1.48 | €2.50 | €2.87 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| €3.96 | €-0.02 | €1.33 | €3.12 | €3.88 | €4.75 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| €3.96 | €-0.02 | €1.33 | €3.12 | €3.88 | €4.75 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| €1.17 | €0.54 | €0.00 | €0.00 | €0.74 | €1.24 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| €0.22 | €0.10 | €0.10 | €0.09 | €0.14 | €0.17 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| €8.80 | €8.41 | €8.42 | €10.21 | €10.03 | €11.60 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.7%/yr | +1.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.7%/yr | +3.7%/yr |
| EPS | +2.2%/yr | +2.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +1.1%/yr | +1.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −5.1%/yr | −5.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.7%/yr | +5.7%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned €1.3B of profit into €2.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | €1.3B | €1.1B | €664M | (€142M) | (€625M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +€700M | +€680M | +€678M | +€682M | +€829M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +€193M | −€3M | +€99M | +€97M | −€171M |
| Cash from operations | €2.1B | €1.8B | €1.4B | €636M | €33M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −€73M | −€61M | −€40M | −€44M | −€43M |
| Owner earnings | €2.1B | €1.7B | €1.4B | €592M | (€10M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 34% | 32% | 31% | 22% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in the reporting currency.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 16.2×ComfortableOperating income €1.6B ÷ interest expense €101M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- High through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -0%–34%; latest €2.1B = operating cash €2.1B − maintenance capex €73MIndustry peers: median 25%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 31% median across 6 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops €2.1B ÷ net income €1.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks €542M ÷ Owner Earnings €2.1B
What this means
Of €2.1B Owner Earnings, €542M (26%) went back to shareholders, €542M dividends, €0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.10×HarvestingCapex €73M ÷ depreciation €700M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €6.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.85×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt —Debt ≤ working capital · —
What this means
The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +779%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €2.32/share (latest year €2.87), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €11.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −4% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 25% lately, median 21% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −35.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.2%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2019–2024
Over the record, the business generated €7.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested€354M · 5%
- Dividends€1.6B · 21%
- Retained (debt / cash)€5.9B · 75%
- Returned to owners€1.6B
22% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €1.6B as dividends and €0 as buybacks.
- Net change in share count1.2%
The diluted count rose from 431M to 437M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record€1.24/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained55%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (€1.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew €973M, so each retained €1 added about 0.55 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Amadeus IT Group SA is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2024.
None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above. You bring the price, in the reporting currency.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Amadeus IT Group SA has delivered.
Through the cycle, Amadeus IT Group SA earns about €1.9B on its 31.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 33.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings €2.1B on 437M diluted shares; net cash €1.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.