Owner Scorecard


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9022 · Central Japan Railway (JR Central)

Railroads Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Central Japan Railway (JR Central)’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 9022) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.76T¥1.82T¥1.88T¥1.84T¥823.5B¥935.1B¥1.40T¥1.71T¥1.83T¥2.01TRevenueRevenue
11%20%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥619.6B¥662.0B¥709.8B¥656.2B(¥184.8B)¥1.7B¥374.5B¥607.4B¥702.8B¥830.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
35.3%36.3%37.8%35.6%−22.4%0.2%26.7%35.5%38.4%41.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥392.9B¥395.5B¥438.7B¥397.9B(¥201.6B)(¥51.9B)¥219.4B¥384.4B¥458.4B¥552.9BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥580.6B¥609.6B¥600.3B¥595.2B(¥169.4B)¥71.7B¥486.7B¥672.9B¥624.5B¥748.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥225.4B¥216.0B¥211.3B¥214.5B¥199.4B¥207.0B¥219.6B¥216.4B¥208.0B¥205.9BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥37.7B)(¥1.9B)(¥49.7B)(¥17.2B)(¥167.2B)(¥83.4B)¥47.7B¥72.1B(¥41.9B)(¥10.6B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥305.2B¥280.4B¥365.4B¥424.9B¥470.2B¥450.6B¥427.2B¥391.3B¥452.6B¥493.3BCapexCapex
17.4%15.4%19.5%23.0%57.1%48.2%30.5%22.9%24.7%24.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥275.4B¥329.2B¥234.9B¥170.4B(¥639.5B)(¥378.8B)¥59.5B¥281.6B¥172.0B¥254.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.7%18.1%12.5%9.2%−77.7%−40.5%4.3%16.5%9.4%12.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥275.4B¥329.2B¥234.9B¥170.4B(¥639.5B)(¥378.8B)¥59.5B¥281.6B¥172.0B¥254.8BFree cash flowFCF
15.7%18.1%12.5%9.2%−77.7%−40.5%4.3%16.5%9.4%12.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥25.6B¥27.6B¥27.6B¥29.6B¥27.6B¥25.6B¥25.6B¥27.6B¥29.6B¥31.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥2M¥21.4B¥0¥0¥0¥0¥1M¥0¥110.0BBuybacksBuybacks
13%14%14%12%-3%0%6%10%10%11%ROICROIC
14%13%13%10%-6%-1%6%9%10%11%Return on equityROE
13%12%12%10%−6%−2%5%8%10%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥414.6B¥782.5B¥751.6B¥1.11T¥1.11T¥619.5B¥710.5B¥821.7B¥592.6B¥393.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥54.3B¥55.8B¥58.1B¥48.2B¥54.2B¥54.6B¥66.3B¥78.2B¥90.0B¥98.8BReceivablesReceiv.
¥36.7B¥38.1B¥46.4B¥43.9B¥41.9B¥34.4B¥37.3B¥41.9B¥41.8B¥54.3BInventoryInvent.
¥74.1B¥81.2B¥76.3B¥78.8B¥70.1B¥76.0B¥79.5B¥85.3B¥83.4B¥92.7BAccounts payablePayables
¥16.9B¥12.7B¥28.1B¥13.3B¥26.0B¥13.0B¥24.1B¥34.8B¥48.4B¥60.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥2.19T¥3.80T¥3.63T¥3.38T¥3.02T¥2.68T¥2.71T¥2.79T¥1.94T¥1.67TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥555.4B¥602.8B¥650.3B¥625.7B¥824.1B¥737.3B¥729.5B¥798.7B¥782.3B¥932.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.9×6.3×5.6×5.4×3.7×3.6×3.7×3.5×2.5×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥7.05T¥8.91T¥9.30T¥9.60T¥9.60T¥9.45T¥9.51T¥9.94T¥10.32T¥10.88TTotal assetsAssets
¥1.37T¥1.33T¥1.34T¥1.34T¥1.43T¥1.45T¥1.46T¥1.37T¥1.31T¥1.31TTotal debtDebt
¥952.6B¥552.2B¥584.0B¥222.2B¥320.4B¥826.5B¥746.7B¥543.5B¥715.5B¥914.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
27.2×15.4×15.7×14.7×-4.2×0.0×8.3×13.4×15.4×18.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥2.73T¥3.08T¥3.51T¥3.81T¥3.59T¥3.61T¥3.81T¥4.22T¥4.49T¥4.90TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.03B1.03B1.03B1.03B1.03B1.03B1.03B1.03B1.03B1.00BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1705.81¥1768.97¥1823.43¥1790.92¥799.53¥907.90¥1359.50¥1660.59¥1778.49¥2003.86Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥381.47¥383.98¥425.94¥386.29¥-195.68¥-50.42¥213.03¥373.21¥445.07¥552.22EPS (diluted)EPS
¥267.39¥319.58¥228.03¥165.41¥-620.91¥-367.77¥57.78¥273.41¥166.98¥254.54Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥267.39¥319.58¥228.03¥165.41¥-620.91¥-367.77¥57.78¥273.41¥166.98¥254.54Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥24.86¥26.78¥26.78¥28.69¥26.78¥24.86¥24.86¥26.78¥28.69¥31.23Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥296.26¥272.26¥354.80¥412.48¥456.49¥437.43¥414.75¥379.87¥439.38¥492.76Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥2647.31¥2994.89¥3405.89¥3698.81¥3484.14¥3504.13¥3696.22¥4100.66¥4361.01¥4897.09Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.8%/yr+20.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−0.5%/yr
EPS+4.2%/yr
Dividends / share+2.6%/yr+3.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.8%/yr+1.5%/yr
Book value / share+7.1%/yr+7.0%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥552.9B of profit but ¥254.8B of owner earnings: ¥298.0B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income¥552.9B
Owner earnings¥254.8B · 13% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥552.9B¥458.4B¥384.4B¥219.4B(¥51.9B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥205.9B+¥208.0B+¥216.4B+¥219.6B+¥207.0B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥10.6B−¥41.9B+¥72.1B+¥47.7B−¥83.4B
Cash from operations¥748.2B¥624.5B¥672.9B¥486.7B¥71.7B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥493.3B−¥452.6B−¥391.3B−¥427.2B−¥450.6B
Owner earnings¥254.8B¥172.0B¥281.6B¥59.5B(¥378.8B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%9%16%4%-41%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥830.2B ÷ interest expense ¥46.0B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥914.6B · 1.1× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash ¥370.6B + ST investments ¥22.9B − debt ¥1.31T
    What this means

    Netting ¥393.5B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.31T of debt leaves ¥914.6B owed, about 1.1× a year's operating profit (1.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -3%–14%; 11% latest = NOPAT ¥655.8B ÷ invested capital ¥5.84T
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -78%–18%; latest ¥254.8B = operating cash ¥748.2B − maintenance capex ¥493.3B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥748.2B ÷ net income ¥552.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥141.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥254.8B
    What this means

    Of ¥254.8B Owner Earnings, ¥141.3B (55%) went back to shareholders, ¥31.3B dividends, ¥110.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.40×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥493.3B ÷ depreciation ¥205.9B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 36% → 38% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 36% early, 38% lately, median 36%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −22.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥4.82T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥4.06T · 84%
  • Dividends¥277.5B · 6%
  • Buybacks¥131.4B · 3%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥350.6B · 7%
  • Returned to owners¥408.9B

    54% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥277.5B as dividends and ¥131.4B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥131.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−2.8%

    The diluted count fell from 1030M to 1001M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥31.23/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−2%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥2.58T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥43.7B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Central Japan Railway (JR Central) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?12.9% vs 15.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 15.4% early in the record and 12.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 8% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥91.0B to ¥153.1B while revenue grew 14%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 8% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Central Japan Railway (JR Central) has delivered.

Central Japan Railway (JR Central)’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Central Japan Railway (JR Central) earns about ¥219.6B on its 10.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥254.8B on 1001M diluted shares; net debt ¥914.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 9021 its page in the Manual 9064 →

Industry order: ← 9021 the Railroads chapter CNI →