← Japan catalog ← 9201 Manual 9432 → ← 9201 Airlines AAL →
9202 · ANA Holdings
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from ANA Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 9202) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.77T | ¥1.97T | ¥2.06T | ¥1.97T | ¥728.7B | ¥1.02T | ¥1.71T | ¥2.06T | ¥2.26T | ¥2.54T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 20% | −37% | — | — | — | 18% | 18% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 17% | 27% | — | — | — | 10% | 10% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥145.5B | ¥164.5B | ¥165.0B | ¥60.8B | (¥464.8B) | (¥173.1B) | ¥120.0B | ¥207.9B | ¥196.6B | ¥217.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.2% | 8.3% | 8.0% | 3.1% | −63.8% | −17.0% | 7.0% | 10.1% | 8.7% | 8.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥98.8B | ¥143.9B | ¥110.8B | ¥27.7B | (¥404.6B) | (¥143.6B) | ¥89.5B | ¥157.1B | ¥153.0B | ¥169.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥237.1B | ¥316.0B | ¥296.1B | ¥130.2B | (¥270.4B) | (¥76.4B) | ¥449.8B | ¥420.6B | ¥373.0B | ¥443.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥140.4B | ¥150.4B | ¥159.5B | ¥175.7B | ¥176.4B | ¥157.5B | ¥148.3B | ¥142.3B | ¥148.7B | ¥169.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥2.1B) | ¥21.7B | ¥25.8B | (¥73.2B) | (¥42.2B) | (¥90.3B) | ¥212.1B | ¥121.2B | ¥71.3B | ¥105.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥224.9B | ¥265.5B | ¥336.8B | ¥317.6B | ¥134.2B | ¥120.6B | ¥93.5B | ¥202.1B | ¥216.9B | ¥215.0B | CapexCapex |
| 12.7% | 13.5% | 16.4% | 16.1% | 18.4% | 11.8% | 5.5% | 9.8% | 9.6% | 8.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥96.7B | ¥165.6B | ¥136.6B | (¥45.6B) | (¥404.6B) | (¥197.0B) | ¥356.4B | ¥278.3B | ¥224.4B | ¥274.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.5% | 8.4% | 6.6% | −2.3% | −55.5% | −19.3% | 20.9% | 13.5% | 9.9% | 10.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥12.2B | ¥50.5B | (¥40.7B) | (¥187.4B) | (¥404.6B) | (¥197.0B) | ¥356.4B | ¥218.6B | ¥156.2B | ¥228.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.7% | 2.6% | −2.0% | −9.5% | −55.5% | −19.3% | 20.9% | 10.6% | 6.9% | 9.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥17.5B | ¥21.0B | ¥20.1B | ¥25.1B | — | — | — | — | ¥23.5B | ¥28.2B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥31M | ¥70.2B | ¥41M | ¥453M | ¥13M | ¥16M | ¥15M | ¥9.5B | ¥39M | ¥63.1B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 9% | 9% | 8% | 3% | -17% | -8% | 8% | 12% | 11% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 11% | 14% | 10% | 3% | -42% | -18% | 10% | 15% | 14% | 12% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 12% | 8% | 0% | — | — | — | — | 12% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥309.1B | ¥270.5B | ¥211.8B | ¥265.1B | ¥871.3B | ¥621.0B | ¥1.11T | ¥1.00T | ¥1.62T | ¥1.44T | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥666.7B | ¥723.5B | ¥700.2B | ¥571.2B | ¥1.23T | ¥1.29T | ¥1.55T | ¥1.70T | ¥1.69T | ¥1.89T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥572.6B | ¥648.1B | ¥685.9B | ¥530.5B | ¥503.4B | ¥687.9B | ¥883.4B | ¥1.04T | ¥1.28T | ¥1.23T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 2.4× | 1.9× | 1.8× | 1.6× | 1.3× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥1.0B | ¥55.3B | ¥51.1B | ¥24.5B | ¥22.3B | ¥20.2B | ¥18.1B | ¥16.0B | ¥14.0B | ¥12.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥2.31T | ¥2.56T | ¥2.69T | ¥2.56T | ¥3.21T | ¥3.22T | ¥3.37T | ¥3.57T | ¥3.62T | ¥3.96T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥729.9B | ¥658.4B | ¥648.6B | ¥702.9B | ¥1.52T | ¥1.46T | ¥1.39T | ¥1.26T | ¥1.20T | ¥1.02T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥420.8B | ¥387.9B | ¥436.8B | ¥437.7B | ¥644.1B | ¥839.1B | ¥274.4B | ¥261.5B | (¥425.4B) | (¥418.8B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 14.8× | 19.0× | 23.6× | 9.7× | -27.8× | -6.8× | 4.8× | 8.9× | 8.4× | 9.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥924.2B | ¥1.00T | ¥1.11T | ¥1.07T | ¥960.7B | ¥803.4B | ¥870.4B | ¥1.05T | ¥1.07T | ¥1.36T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 352M | 348M | 348M | 348M | 484M | 484M | 484M | 484M | 484M | 484M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥5020.04 | ¥5657.99 | ¥5906.23 | ¥5664.92 | ¥1504.63 | ¥2106.83 | ¥3525.72 | ¥4245.21 | ¥4670.42 | ¥5243.17 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥281.04 | ¥412.88 | ¥317.87 | ¥79.35 | ¥-835.49 | ¥-296.57 | ¥184.76 | ¥324.38 | ¥315.98 | ¥349.12 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥275.08 | ¥475.20 | ¥391.99 | ¥-130.76 | ¥-835.47 | ¥-406.79 | ¥735.86 | ¥574.67 | ¥463.30 | ¥566.70 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥34.68 | ¥144.86 | ¥-116.67 | ¥-537.84 | ¥-835.47 | ¥-406.79 | ¥735.86 | ¥451.29 | ¥322.48 | ¥471.68 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥49.74 | ¥60.32 | ¥57.63 | ¥72.04 | — | — | — | — | ¥48.57 | ¥58.27 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥639.54 | ¥761.93 | ¥966.45 | ¥911.35 | ¥277.05 | ¥249.00 | ¥192.96 | ¥417.24 | ¥447.78 | ¥444.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥2628.17 | ¥2871.04 | ¥3183.12 | ¥3066.48 | ¥1983.71 | ¥1658.94 | ¥1797.24 | ¥2173.53 | ¥2212.15 | ¥2805.72 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.5%/yr | +28.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.4%/yr | — |
| EPS | +2.4%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +1.8%/yr | +20.0%/yr (1-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −4.0%/yr | +9.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +0.7%/yr | +7.2%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥274.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥169.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥46.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥228.4B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥169.1B | ¥153.0B | ¥157.1B | ¥89.5B | (¥143.6B) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥169.0B | +¥148.7B | +¥142.3B | +¥148.3B | +¥157.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥105.4B | +¥71.3B | +¥121.2B | +¥212.1B | −¥90.3B |
| Cash from operations | ¥443.5B | ¥373.0B | ¥420.6B | ¥449.8B | (¥76.4B) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥169.0B | −¥148.7B | −¥142.3B | −¥93.5B | −¥120.6B |
| Owner earnings | ¥274.4B | ¥224.4B | ¥278.3B | ¥356.4B | (¥197.0B) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥46.0B | −¥68.2B | −¥59.8B | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥228.4B | ¥156.2B | ¥218.6B | ¥356.4B | (¥197.0B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 11% | 10% | 14% | 21% | -19% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥169.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥46.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income ¥217.4B ÷ interest expense ¥22.6B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +¥418.8BNet cashCash ¥736.4B + ST investments ¥704.2B − debt ¥1.02T
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥418.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -17%–12%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥171.8B ÷ invested capital ¥1.64TIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -56%–21%; latest ¥274.4B = operating cash ¥443.5B − maintenance capex ¥169.0BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥46.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥228.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥443.5B ÷ net income ¥169.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ¥91.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥274.4B
What this means
Of ¥274.4B Owner Earnings, ¥91.3B (33%) went back to shareholders, ¥28.2B dividends, ¥63.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.27×ExpandingCapex ¥215.0B ÷ depreciation ¥169.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 9% lately, median 8%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −63.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥2.32T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥2.13T · 92%
- Dividends¥135.4B · 6%
- Buybacks¥143.4B · 6%
- Returned to owners¥278.9B
31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥135.4B as dividends and ¥143.4B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥86.4B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥86.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥729.9B to ¥1.02T.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥143.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count37.7%
The diluted count rose from 352M to 484M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record¥58.27/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained103%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥122.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥126.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 1.03 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why ANA Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.7%
Diluted shares grew 37.7% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent ¥143.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ANA Holdings has delivered.
ANA Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, ANA Holdings earns about ¥190.9B on its 7.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥228.4B on 484M diluted shares; net cash ¥418.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥215.0B) runs well above depreciation (¥169.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥274.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 9201 its page in the Manual 9432 →
Industry order: ← 9201 the Airlines chapter AAL →