Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 9201 Manual 9432 → ← 9201 Airlines AAL →

9202 · ANA Holdings

Airlines Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from ANA Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 9202) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.77T¥1.97T¥2.06T¥1.97T¥728.7B¥1.02T¥1.71T¥2.06T¥2.26T¥2.54TRevenueRevenue
20%−37%18%18%Gross marginGross mgn
17%27%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥145.5B¥164.5B¥165.0B¥60.8B(¥464.8B)(¥173.1B)¥120.0B¥207.9B¥196.6B¥217.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.2%8.3%8.0%3.1%−63.8%−17.0%7.0%10.1%8.7%8.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥98.8B¥143.9B¥110.8B¥27.7B(¥404.6B)(¥143.6B)¥89.5B¥157.1B¥153.0B¥169.1BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥237.1B¥316.0B¥296.1B¥130.2B(¥270.4B)(¥76.4B)¥449.8B¥420.6B¥373.0B¥443.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥140.4B¥150.4B¥159.5B¥175.7B¥176.4B¥157.5B¥148.3B¥142.3B¥148.7B¥169.0BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥2.1B)¥21.7B¥25.8B(¥73.2B)(¥42.2B)(¥90.3B)¥212.1B¥121.2B¥71.3B¥105.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥224.9B¥265.5B¥336.8B¥317.6B¥134.2B¥120.6B¥93.5B¥202.1B¥216.9B¥215.0BCapexCapex
12.7%13.5%16.4%16.1%18.4%11.8%5.5%9.8%9.6%8.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥96.7B¥165.6B¥136.6B(¥45.6B)(¥404.6B)(¥197.0B)¥356.4B¥278.3B¥224.4B¥274.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.5%8.4%6.6%−2.3%−55.5%−19.3%20.9%13.5%9.9%10.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥12.2B¥50.5B(¥40.7B)(¥187.4B)(¥404.6B)(¥197.0B)¥356.4B¥218.6B¥156.2B¥228.4BFree cash flowFCF
0.7%2.6%−2.0%−9.5%−55.5%−19.3%20.9%10.6%6.9%9.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥17.5B¥21.0B¥20.1B¥25.1B¥23.5B¥28.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥31M¥70.2B¥41M¥453M¥13M¥16M¥15M¥9.5B¥39M¥63.1BBuybacksBuybacks
9%9%8%3%-17%-8%8%12%11%10%ROICROIC
11%14%10%3%-42%-18%10%15%14%12%Return on equityROE
9%12%8%0%12%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥309.1B¥270.5B¥211.8B¥265.1B¥871.3B¥621.0B¥1.11T¥1.00T¥1.62T¥1.44TCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥666.7B¥723.5B¥700.2B¥571.2B¥1.23T¥1.29T¥1.55T¥1.70T¥1.69T¥1.89TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥572.6B¥648.1B¥685.9B¥530.5B¥503.4B¥687.9B¥883.4B¥1.04T¥1.28T¥1.23TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.1×1.0×1.1×2.4×1.9×1.8×1.6×1.3×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥1.0B¥55.3B¥51.1B¥24.5B¥22.3B¥20.2B¥18.1B¥16.0B¥14.0B¥12.0BGoodwillGoodwill
¥2.31T¥2.56T¥2.69T¥2.56T¥3.21T¥3.22T¥3.37T¥3.57T¥3.62T¥3.96TTotal assetsAssets
¥729.9B¥658.4B¥648.6B¥702.9B¥1.52T¥1.46T¥1.39T¥1.26T¥1.20T¥1.02TTotal debtDebt
¥420.8B¥387.9B¥436.8B¥437.7B¥644.1B¥839.1B¥274.4B¥261.5B(¥425.4B)(¥418.8B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
14.8×19.0×23.6×9.7×-27.8×-6.8×4.8×8.9×8.4×9.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥924.2B¥1.00T¥1.11T¥1.07T¥960.7B¥803.4B¥870.4B¥1.05T¥1.07T¥1.36TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
352M348M348M348M484M484M484M484M484M484MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥5020.04¥5657.99¥5906.23¥5664.92¥1504.63¥2106.83¥3525.72¥4245.21¥4670.42¥5243.17Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥281.04¥412.88¥317.87¥79.35¥-835.49¥-296.57¥184.76¥324.38¥315.98¥349.12EPS (diluted)EPS
¥275.08¥475.20¥391.99¥-130.76¥-835.47¥-406.79¥735.86¥574.67¥463.30¥566.70Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥34.68¥144.86¥-116.67¥-537.84¥-835.47¥-406.79¥735.86¥451.29¥322.48¥471.68Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥49.74¥60.32¥57.63¥72.04¥48.57¥58.27Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥639.54¥761.93¥966.45¥911.35¥277.05¥249.00¥192.96¥417.24¥447.78¥444.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥2628.17¥2871.04¥3183.12¥3066.48¥1983.71¥1658.94¥1797.24¥2173.53¥2212.15¥2805.72Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.5%/yr+28.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.4%/yr
EPS+2.4%/yr
Dividends / share+1.8%/yr+20.0%/yr (1-yr)
Capital spending / share−4.0%/yr+9.9%/yr
Book value / share+0.7%/yr+7.2%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥274.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥169.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥46.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥228.4B.

Reported net income¥169.1B
Owner earnings¥274.4B · 11% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥169.1B¥153.0B¥157.1B¥89.5B(¥143.6B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥169.0B+¥148.7B+¥142.3B+¥148.3B+¥157.5B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥105.4B+¥71.3B+¥121.2B+¥212.1B−¥90.3B
Cash from operations¥443.5B¥373.0B¥420.6B¥449.8B(¥76.4B)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥169.0B−¥148.7B−¥142.3B−¥93.5B−¥120.6B
Owner earnings¥274.4B¥224.4B¥278.3B¥356.4B(¥197.0B)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥46.0B−¥68.2B−¥59.8B
Free cash flow¥228.4B¥156.2B¥218.6B¥356.4B(¥197.0B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%10%14%21%-19%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥169.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥46.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥217.4B ÷ interest expense ¥22.6B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥736.4B + ST investments ¥704.2B − debt ¥1.02T
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥418.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -17%–12%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥171.8B ÷ invested capital ¥1.64T
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -56%–21%; latest ¥274.4B = operating cash ¥443.5B − maintenance capex ¥169.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥46.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥228.4B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥443.5B ÷ net income ¥169.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥91.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥274.4B
    What this means

    Of ¥274.4B Owner Earnings, ¥91.3B (33%) went back to shareholders, ¥28.2B dividends, ¥63.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.27×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥215.0B ÷ depreciation ¥169.0B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 9% lately, median 8%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −63.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥2.32T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥2.13T · 92%
  • Dividends¥135.4B · 6%
  • Buybacks¥143.4B · 6%
  • Returned to owners¥278.9B

    31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥135.4B as dividends and ¥143.4B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥86.4B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥86.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥729.9B to ¥1.02T.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥143.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count37.7%

    The diluted count rose from 352M to 484M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record¥58.27/sh

    Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained103%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥122.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥126.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 1.03 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ANA Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.7%

    Diluted shares grew 37.7% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent ¥143.4B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ANA Holdings has delivered.

ANA Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, ANA Holdings earns about ¥190.9B on its 7.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+33%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+22%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥228.4B on 484M diluted shares; net cash ¥418.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥215.0B) runs well above depreciation (¥169.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥274.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 9201 its page in the Manual 9432 →

Industry order: ← 9201 the Airlines chapter AAL →