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ALVOW, Alvotech
We are a vertically integrated biotechnology company focused solely on the development and manufacture of biosimilar medicines for patients worldwide.
A biosimilar is a biological medicine made with living cells, taken from plants, animals or bacteria, that is highly similar to and has no clinically meaningful differences from an existing approved biological, or reference product.
Many patient, policy, industry and regulatory organizations share our view that the availability of quality, affordable biosimilars is critical to the long-term sustainability of health systems and medical innovation globally.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 14% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −388%) on a 23% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 81% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −65%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 3 regions, the largest Europe at 52%.
- Europe52%$307M
- United States41%$241M
- Rest of World6%$38M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $67M | $37M | $83M | $91M | $490M | $586M | $586M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | 23% | −76% | 62% | 60% | 60% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($138M) | ($235M) | ($346M) | ($355M) | $70M | $78M | $78M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −206.5% | −640.3% | −417.3% | −388.1% | 14.2% | 13.3% | 13.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($170M) | ($102M) | ($514M) | ($552M) | ($232M) | $28M | $28M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($74M) | ($228M) | ($312M) | ($312M) | ($237M) | ($50M) | ($50M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $19M | $24M | $23M | $26M | $31M | $38M | $38M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $77M | ($151M) | $178M | $214M | ($36M) | ($116M) | ($116M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7M | $20M | $38M | $33M | $54M | $64M | $64M | CapexCapex |
| 11.2% | 55.6% | 45.6% | 36.3% | 11.0% | 11.0% | 11.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($82M) | ($249M) | ($336M) | ($338M) | ($268M) | ($88M) | ($88M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −122.8% | −676.1% | −404.1% | −369.9% | −54.8% | −15.0% | −15.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($82M) | ($249M) | ($350M) | ($345M) | ($291M) | ($115M) | ($115M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −122.8% | −676.1% | −421.9% | −377.8% | −59.3% | −19.6% | −19.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | -76% | -68% | -62% | — | 5% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $32M | $18M | $66M | $11M | $51M | $172M | $172M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $29M | $33M | $16M | $160M | $70M | $16M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $39M | $71M | $74M | $128M | $220M | $220M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $29M | $49M | $81M | $67M | $126M | $126M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $40M | $55M | $10M | $221M | $164M | $110M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $120M | $231M | $195M | $455M | $574M | $574M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $112M | $167M | $261M | $193M | $304M | $304M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 1.4× | 0.7× | 2.4× | 1.9× | 1.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $13M | $12M | $12M | $12M | $11M | $13M | $13M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $598M | $828M | $950M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $398M | $765M | $945M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.3B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $381M | $698M | $933M | $984M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -0.9× | -2.0× | -1.8× | -1.3× | 0.2× | 0.5× | 0.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($867M) | ($136M) | ($296M) | ($479M) | ($413M) | ($284M) | ($479M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 93.6M | 111M | 198M | 227M | 268M | 290M | 312M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.71 | $0.33 | $0.42 | $0.40 | $1.83 | $2.02 | $1.88 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.82 | $-0.92 | $-2.60 | $-2.43 | $-0.87 | $0.10 | $0.09 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.87 | $-2.25 | $-1.70 | $-1.49 | $-1.00 | $-0.30 | $-0.28 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.87 | $-2.25 | $-1.77 | $-1.52 | $-1.08 | $-0.40 | $-0.37 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.08 | $0.18 | $0.19 | $0.15 | $0.20 | $0.22 | $0.21 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-9.26 | $-1.23 | $-1.50 | $-2.11 | $-1.54 | $-0.98 | $-1.53 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.79 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +23.3%/yr | +23.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +22.7%/yr | +22.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($88M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $38M it takes just to hold its position. It put $27M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($115M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $28M | ($232M) | ($552M) | ($514M) | ($102M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$38M | +$31M | +$26M | +$23M | +$24M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$116M | −$36M | +$214M | +$178M | −$151M |
| Cash from operations | ($50M) | ($237M) | ($312M) | ($312M) | ($228M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$38M | −$31M | −$26M | −$23M | −$20M |
| Owner earnings | ($88M) | ($268M) | ($338M) | ($336M) | ($249M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$27M | −$22M | −$7M | −$15M | — |
| Free cash flow | ($115M) | ($291M) | ($345M) | ($350M) | ($249M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -15% | -55% | -370% | -404% | -676% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $38M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $27M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $78M ÷ interest expense $149M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.1B · 14.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $172M − debt $1.3B
What this means
Netting $172M of cash and short-term investments against $1.3B of debt leaves $1.1B owed, about 14.2× a year's operating profit (16.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 10 + DIO 341 − DPO 195 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -76%–5%; 6% latest = NOPAT $39M ÷ invested capital $634MIndustry peers: median -40%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -370%Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -676%–-15%; latest ($88M) = operating cash ($50M) − maintenance capex $38MIndustry peers: median -46%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -15% of revenue this year, a -370% median across 6 years. It chose to put $27M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($115M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -1.80×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($50M) ÷ net income $28M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.70×ExpandingCapex $64M ÷ depreciation $38M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $586M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.89×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.3B vs $270M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.81/share (latest year $0.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.53/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −421% → −120% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −421% early to −120% lately, median −388% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 52%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2021 · −640.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Competing products may gain faster or greater market acceptance than our products, if any, and medical advances or rapid technological development by competitors, including increased use of artificial intelligence-based technologies, may result in our product candidates becoming non-competitive or obsolete before we ar…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$172M
- Receivables$16M
- Inventory$220M
- Other current assets$165M
- Debt due within a year$22M
- Accounts payable$126M
- Other current liabilities$155M
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Biotechnology
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BCRXBioCryst Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $875M | 95% | -148.8% | -142% | -128% |
| RGENRepligen Corporation | $738M | 55% | 13.4% | 4% | 12% |
| ALVOWAlvotech | $586M | 41% | -297.3% | -65% | -246% |
| ADMAADMA Biologics Inc | $510M | -13% | -106.6% | -39% | -158% |
| TARSTarsus Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $451M | — | -65.9% | -41% | -46% |
| IMCRImmunocore Holdings plc | $400M | 99% | -23.9% | — | -3% |
| KRYSKrystal Biotech | $389M | — | 22.6% | -21% | 41% |
| TWSTTwist Bioscience Corporation | $377M | 38% | -115.4% | -51% | -92% |
| Group median | — | 48% | -86.3% | -41% | -69% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Alvotech reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Alvotech is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered71%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← ALVO its page in the Manual AMBP →
Industry order: ← ALVO the Biotechnology chapter AMGN →