Owner Scorecard


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AZN, AstraZeneca PLC

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Cyclical

Pam joined AstraZeneca after having spent 18 years with Merck/MSD in Global Manufacturing and Supply Chain and Commercial roles.

Please also see the information above under the headings Item 4.B—"Information on the Company—Business Overview—Development Pipeline as at February 10, 2026" and "—Patent Expiries of Key Marketed Products as at February 10, 2026".

Prior to this role, Sharon served as Senior Vice President, Head of Research and Product Development of Alexion, AstraZeneca Rare Disease having joined in 2013.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
AZN · AstraZeneca PLC
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$58.7B
+8.6% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $58.7B 5-yr avg $48.1B
Gross margin 82% 5-yr avg 77%
Operating margin 23.4% 5-yr avg 14.2%
ROIC 17% 5-yr avg 12%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 80% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 2.8% and 23% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 9 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$23.0B$22.5B$22.1B$24.4B$26.6B$37.4B$44.4B$45.8B$54.1B$58.7B$58.7BRevenueRevenue
82%81%78%80%80%67%72%82%81%82%82%Gross marginGross mgn
$4.9B$3.7B$3.4B$2.9B$5.2B$1.1B$3.8B$8.2B$10.0B$13.7B$13.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
21.3%16.4%15.3%12.0%19.4%2.8%8.5%17.9%18.5%23.4%23.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3.5B$3.0B$2.2B$1.3B$3.2B$112M$3.3B$6.0B$7.0B$10.2B$10.2BNet incomeNet inc.
4%-3%19%19%14%19%18%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.1B$3.6B$2.6B$3.0B$4.8B$6.0B$9.8B$10.3B$11.9B$14.6B$14.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.4B$3.0B$3.8B$3.8B$3.1B$6.5B$5.5B$5.5BDepreciationDeprec.
($1.7B)($2.5B)($3.3B)($2.1B)($1.5B)($679M)$1.0B$4.4B$4.8B$4.3B($1.1B)Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.4B$1.3B$1.0B$979M$961M$1.1B$1.1B$1.4B$1.9B$2.8B$2.8BCapexCapex
6.3%5.9%4.7%4.0%3.6%2.9%2.5%3.0%3.6%4.8%4.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.7B$2.3B$1.6B$2.0B$3.8B$4.9B$8.7B$9.0B$9.9B$11.8B$11.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
11.7%10.0%7.1%8.2%14.4%13.0%19.7%19.6%18.4%20.0%20.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.7B$2.3B$1.6B$2.0B$3.8B$4.9B$8.7B$9.0B$9.9B$11.8B$11.8BFree cash flowFCF
11.7%10.0%7.1%8.2%14.4%13.0%19.7%19.6%18.4%20.0%20.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3.6B$3.5B$3.5B$3.6B$3.6B$3.9B$4.4B$4.5B$4.6B$5.0B$5.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
$149M$81M$521MBuybacksBuybacks
19%14%14%10%16%7%13%13%17%17%ROICROIC
24%20%17%10%20%0%9%15%17%21%21%Return on equityROE
−0%−3%−11%−17%−2%−10%−3%4%6%11%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5.9B$4.6B$5.7B$6.2B$8.0B$6.4B$6.4B$6.0B$5.7B$5.7B$5.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$4.6B$5.0B$5.6B$5.8B$7.0B$9.6B$10.5B$12.1B$13.0B$15.2B$15.2BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.3B$3.0B$2.9B$3.2B$4.0B$9.0B$4.7B$5.4B$5.3B$6.6B$6.6BInventoryInvent.
$10.5B$11.6B$12.8B$14.0B$15.8B$18.9B$19.0B$22.4B$22.5B$25.3B$25.3BAccounts payablePayables
($3.6B)($3.6B)($4.4B)($5.0B)($4.7B)($311M)($3.8B)($4.8B)($4.2B)($3.5B)($3.5B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$13.3B$13.2B$15.6B$15.6B$19.5B$26.2B$22.6B$25.1B$25.8B$28.7B$28.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$15.3B$16.4B$16.3B$18.1B$20.3B$22.6B$26.3B$30.5B$27.9B$30.6B$30.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×0.8×1.0×0.9×1.0×1.2×0.9×0.8×0.9×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$11.7B$11.8B$11.7B$11.7B$11.8B$20.0B$19.8B$20.0B$21.0B$21.2B$21.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$62.5B$63.4B$60.7B$61.4B$66.7B$105.4B$96.5B$101.1B$104.0B$114.1B$114.1BTotal assetsAssets
$14.5B$15.6B$17.4B$15.7B$17.5B$28.1B$23.0B$22.4B$26.5B$24.7B$24.7BTotal debtDebt
$8.6B$11.0B$11.7B$9.5B$9.5B$21.7B$16.6B$16.4B$20.9B$19.0B$19.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.5×2.4×2.4×2.0×4.0×0.8×2.8×5.0×5.7×8.1×8.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$14.9B$15.0B$12.5B$13.1B$15.6B$39.3B$37.0B$39.1B$40.8B$48.7B$48.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.26B1.27B1.27B1.30B1.31B1.42B1.55B1.55B1.55B1.55B1.55BShares out (diluted)Shares
$18.18$17.74$17.43$18.74$20.29$26.39$28.65$29.57$34.89$37.90$37.90Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.77$2.37$1.70$1.03$2.44$0.08$2.12$3.84$4.54$6.60$6.60EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.13$1.78$1.24$1.53$2.93$3.44$5.63$5.80$6.41$7.59$7.59Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.13$1.78$1.24$1.53$2.93$3.44$5.63$5.80$6.41$7.59$7.59Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.82$2.78$2.75$2.76$2.72$2.72$2.82$2.89$2.99$3.21$3.21Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.14$1.05$0.82$0.75$0.73$0.77$0.70$0.88$1.24$1.81$1.81Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.74$11.82$9.84$10.09$11.91$27.69$23.93$25.27$26.31$31.40$31.40Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.5%/yr+13.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+15.1%/yr+21.0%/yr
EPS+10.1%/yr+22.0%/yr
Dividends / share+1.5%/yr+3.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.3%/yr+19.9%/yr
Book value / share+11.5%/yr+21.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.6Bpeak FY2024
ROIC
17%low FY2022
Gross margin
82%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$11.8Bowner earningsvs.$10.2Bnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $10.2B of profit into $11.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$10.2B
Owner earnings$11.8B · 20% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$10.2B$7.0B$6.0B$3.3B$112M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$5.5B+$6.5B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$4.3B+$4.8B+$4.4B+$1.0B−$679M
Cash from operations$14.6B$11.9B$10.3B$9.8B$6.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$2.8B−$1.9B−$1.4B−$1.1B−$1.1B
Owner earnings$11.8B$9.9B$9.0B$8.7B$4.9B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue20%18%20%20%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $13.7B ÷ interest expense $1.7B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $19.0B · 1.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $5.7B + ST investments $30M − debt $24.7B
    What this means

    Netting $5.7B of cash and short-term investments against $24.7B of debt leaves $19.0B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (1.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 94 + DIO 225 − DPO 868 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 7%–19%; 17% latest = NOPAT $11.3B ÷ invested capital $67.7B
    Industry peers: median 19%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 7%–20%; latest $11.8B = operating cash $14.6B − maintenance capex $2.8B
    Industry peers: median 23%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 20% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $14.6B ÷ net income $10.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $5.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $11.8B
    What this means

    Of $11.8B Owner Earnings, $5.5B (47%) went back to shareholders, $5.0B dividends, $521M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.51×
    Harvesting
    Capex $2.8B ÷ depreciation $5.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $58.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.94×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $24.7B vs ($1.9B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +168%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.99/share (latest year $6.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.40/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 18% early to 20% lately, median 16% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 2.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +2.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$28.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$5.7B
  • Receivables$15.2B
  • Inventory$6.6B
  • Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$30.6B
  • Accounts payable$25.3B
  • Other current liabilities$5.3B
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.72×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.9B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Deeper floors
Tangible book value($10.4B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($36.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$26.5B$1.8B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$12Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $70.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$14.0B · 20%
  • Dividends$40.0B · 57%
  • Buybacks$751M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$15.8B · 22%
  • Returned to owners$40.8B

    72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $40.0B as dividends and $751M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $751M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count22.5%

    The diluted count rose from 1265M to 1550M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$3.21/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$59.1B52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity44%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $14.0B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why AstraZeneca PLC is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?22.5%

    Diluted shares grew 22.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $751M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
JNJJohnson & Johnson$94.2B67%23.8%22%23%
LLYEli Lilly and Company$65.2B78%24.0%27%20%
MRKMerck & Company Inc. Common Stock (new)$65.0B70%25.9%19%21%
PFEPfizer Inc.$62.6B75%26.1%11%28%
ABBVAbbVie Inc.$61.2B70%28.0%21%38%
AZNAstraZeneca PLC$58.7B80%17.1%14%14%
BMYBristol-Myers Squibb Company$48.2B72%18.9%12%28%
ABTAbbott Laboratories$44.3B56%15.8%11%17%
Group median71%23.9%16%22%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. AstraZeneca PLC reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what AstraZeneca PLC has delivered.

AstraZeneca PLC’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, AstraZeneca PLC earns about $8.1B on its 13.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 20.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $11.8B on 1550M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $19.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AstraZeneca PLC (AZN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AZN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AZ its page in the Manual AZUL →

Industry order: ← AXSM the Pharmaceuticals chapter BBIO →