Owner Scorecard


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BRKR, Bruker

Life Sciences Tools & Services capital-intensive Serial acquirer

We are a developer, manufacturer, and distributor of high-performance scientific instruments and analytical and diagnostic solutions that enable our customers to explore life and materials at microscopic, molecular and cellular levels.

Many of our products are used to detect, measure and visualize structural characteristics of chemical, biological and industrial material samples.

Our products and solutions address the rapidly evolving needs of a diverse array of customers in life and materials science research, biopharmaceuticals, applied markets, microbiology, in-vitro diagnostics, and nanotechnology.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BRKR · Bruker
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.4B
+2.1% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $2.9B
Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 50%
Operating margin 1.3% 5-yr avg 11.7%
ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 13%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by BSI CALID (35%) and Bsi Nano (32%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 39% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 9 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 47% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.0% to 17% — on a steadier 47% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 29% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 segments, the largest BSI CALID at 35%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • BSI CALID35%$1.2B
  • Bsi Nano32%$1.1B
  • BSI BioSpin26%$879M
  • BEST8%$263M
By geographyEurope Excluding Germany28%United States26%Asia Pacific Excluding China16%China14%Germany9%Other8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.6B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.0B$2.4B$2.5B$3.0B$3.4B$3.4B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
46%46%47%48%47%50%52%51%49%46%45%Gross marginGross mgn
24%24%23%24%24%23%24%25%27%28%28%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%9%9%9%10%9%9%10%11%12%12%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$182M$220M$262M$301M$248M$413M$433M$437M$253M$68M$47MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.3%12.4%13.8%14.5%12.5%17.1%17.1%14.7%7.5%2.0%1.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$154M$79M$180M$197M$158M$277M$297M$427M$113M($9M)($12M)Net incomeNet inc.
13%60%26%29%29%29%28%22%45%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$131M$154M$240M$213M$332M$282M$274M$350M$251M$134M$140MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$54M$64M$65M$76M$80M$89M$89M$115M$184M$220M$228MDepreciationDeprec.
($87M)$900K($16M)($69M)$78M($101M)($139M)($223M)($71M)($98M)($97M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$37M$44M$49M$73M$97M$92M$129M$107M$115M$91M$89MCapexCapex
2.3%2.5%2.6%3.5%4.9%3.8%5.1%3.6%3.4%2.6%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$94M$111M$191M$140M$235M$190M$186M$243M$136M$43M$51MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.8%6.3%10.0%6.8%11.8%7.9%7.3%8.2%4.0%1.3%1.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$94M$111M$191M$140M$235M$190M$145M$243M$136M$43M$51MFree cash flowFCF
5.8%6.3%10.0%6.8%11.8%7.9%5.7%8.2%4.0%1.3%1.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$24M$66M$192M$90M$59M$65M$182M$227M$1.6B$74M$94MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$26M$25M$25M$25M$25M$24M$30M$29M$30M$23M$23MDividends paidDiv. paid
$160M$152M$142M$123M$153M$263M$152M$0$10MBuybacksBuybacks
21%13%21%20%16%24%19%17%4%1%1%ROICROIC
22%11%20%22%16%26%27%31%6%-0%-0%Return on equityROE
19%7%17%19%14%24%24%29%5%−1%−1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$500M$439M$322M$685M$732M$1.2B$646M$488M$183M$299M$133MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$244M$319M$357M$362M$335M$417M$473M$492M$566M$545M$543MReceivablesReceiv.
$440M$486M$510M$577M$692M$710M$800M$968M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BInventoryInvent.
$86M$91M$105M$118M$135M$147M$178M$203M$234M$216M$269MAccounts payablePayables
$598M$715M$762M$821M$893M$980M$1.1B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.4B$1.3B$1.8B$1.9B$2.5B$2.1B$2.2B$2.1B$2.2B$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$525M$525M$599M$646M$792M$939M$914M$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.4×2.6×2.2×2.8×2.4×2.6×2.3×1.8×1.6×1.7×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$131M$170M$276M$293M$320M$340M$458M$583M$1.5B$1.5B$1.6BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.8B$3.0B$3.6B$3.6B$4.2B$5.8B$6.2B$6.1BTotal assetsAssets
$412M$416M$341M$813M$842M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$2.1B$1.9B$1.7BTotal debtDebt
($89M)($24M)$19M$128M$111M$54M$555M$672M$1.9B$1.6B$1.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
13.8×14.3×20.8×18.8×17.2×28.9×26.9×26.6×5.3×1.1×0.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$686M$725M$897M$907M$961M$1.1B$1.1B$1.4B$1.8B$2.5B$2.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%0.6%0.6%0.5%0.8%0.7%1.1%1.0%0.8%0.6%0.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$3M$3M$3M$3M$97M$97MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
162M159M157M157M155M153M149M147M150M152M153MShares out (diluted)Shares
$9.93$11.10$12.06$13.23$12.86$15.81$16.94$20.14$22.52$22.64$22.65Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.95$0.49$1.14$1.26$1.02$1.81$1.99$2.90$0.76$-0.06$-0.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.58$0.70$1.21$0.90$1.52$1.25$1.24$1.65$0.91$0.29$0.34Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.58$0.70$1.21$0.90$1.52$1.25$0.97$1.65$0.91$0.29$0.34Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.16$0.16$0.16$0.16$0.16$0.16$0.20$0.20$0.20$0.15$0.15Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.23$0.27$0.31$0.47$0.63$0.60$0.86$0.73$0.77$0.60$0.58Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.23$4.56$5.70$5.79$6.22$7.00$7.46$9.36$11.91$16.18$16.16Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.6%/yr+12.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−7.5%/yr−28.4%/yr
Dividends / share−0.6%/yr−1.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.3%/yr−1.0%/yr
Book value / share+16.1%/yr+21.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
152Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
1%low FY2025
Gross margin
46%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
35.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$43Mowner earningsvs.($9M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $9M loss into $43M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($9M)$113M$427M$297M$277M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$220M+$184M+$115M+$89M+$89M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$20M+$25M+$31M+$28M+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$98M−$71M−$223M−$139M−$101M
Cash from operations$134M$251M$350M$274M$282M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$91M−$115M−$107M−$89M−$92M
Owner earnings$43M$136M$243M$186M$190M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$40M
Free cash flow$43M$136M$243M$145M$190M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%4%8%7%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer $23M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $68M ÷ interest expense $60M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.6B · 22.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $299M − debt $1.9B
    What this means

    Netting $299M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.6B owed, about 22.8× a year's operating profit (27.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 58 + DIO 215 − DPO 42 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–24%; 1% latest = NOPAT $34M ÷ invested capital $4.0B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–12%; latest $43M = operating cash $134M − maintenance capex $91M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $23M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($9M) · cash from operations $134M

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $33M ÷ Owner Earnings $43M
    What this means

    Of $43M Owner Earnings, $33M (76%) went back to shareholders, $23M dividends, $10M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($20M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.41×
    Harvesting
    Capex $91M ÷ depreciation $220M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.73×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs $933M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +29%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.17/share (latest year $-0.06), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 13% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 8% lately, median 12% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 2.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, technology is subject to rapid advancements and changes, and our competitors may, from time to time, implement newer technologies or more advanced platforms for their services and products, including platforms based on artificial intelligence.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$133M
  • Receivables$543M
  • Inventory$1.1B
  • Other current assets$306M
Current liabilities$1.4B
  • Accounts payable$269M
  • Other current liabilities$1.1B
Current ratio1.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.72×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$749Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($8M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.8B$174M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$589Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$834M · 35%
  • Dividends$262M · 11%
  • Buybacks$1.2B · 49%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$110M · 5%
  • Returned to owners$1.4B

    90% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $262M as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.3B and cash and short-term investments fell $367M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $1.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−5.9%

    The diluted count fell from 162M to 153M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.15/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained2%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($454M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $9M, so each retained $1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.4B39% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity63%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $834M of capital spent building

$109M written down across 5 years (2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Frank H. Laukien, Ph.D.$5.6M$14.3M$190M
2022Frank H. Laukien, Ph.D.$5.1M$1.9M$186M
2023Frank H. Laukien, Ph.D.$5.9M$6.3M$243M
2024Frank H. Laukien, Ph.D.$5.5M$3.2M$136M
2025Frank H. Laukien, Ph.D.$4.7M$3.5M$43M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership27.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$20M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 30% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Bruker is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?4.5% vs 7.4%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.4% early in the record and 4.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$412M → $1.7B

    Debt rose from $412M to $1.7B while owner earnings went from about $132M to $141M — about 3.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 12 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $173M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AVTRAvantor Inc.$6.6B34%10.0%7%9%
COHRCoherent Corp.$5.8B38%11.0%8%6%
MKSIMKS Instruments$3.9B45%15.6%8%13%
STSensata Technologies Holding plc$3.7B33%15.8%8%12%
BRKRBruker$3.4B48%13.2%18%7%
VNTVontier Corporation Common Stock$3.1B44%18.2%17%14%
RVTYRevvity Inc.$2.9B68%12.5%6%12%
ITRIItron Inc.$2.4B32%5.2%6%4%
Group median41%12.8%8%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Bruker has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Bruker earns about $242M on its 7.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $51M on 152M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2025-07-29; net debt $1.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Bruker (BRKR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BRKR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BRK-B its page in the Manual BRKRP →

Industry order: ← BNR the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter BRKRP →