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FRHC, Freedom Holding Corp.
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 17%, above 12% in 6 of 10 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →100% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- Kazakhstan84%$1.8B
- Armenia8%$182M
- Cyprus7%$154M
- Other1%$14M
- United States0%$3M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $0 | $55M | $74M | $83M | $347M | $690M | $799M | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | ($6M) | $15M | $12M | $16M | $45M | $86M | — | — | — | $86M | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| ($578K) | $19M | $7M | $25M | $150M | $227M | $205M | $379M | $76M | $153M | $153M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 2% | 16% | 17% | 13% | 14% | 17% | 14% | 27% | 32% | 32% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| -6.7% | 5.8% | 2.0% | 5.5% | 7.1% | 7.0% | 4.0% | 4.6% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 1.2% | Return on assetsROA |
| -1% | 15% | 6% | 19% | 54% | 41% | 26% | 33% | 6% | 10% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| -1% | 16% | 6% | 20% | 56% | 42% | 28% | 36% | 7% | 11% | 11% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $9M | $330M | $351M | $454M | $2.1B | $3.2B | $5.1B | $8.3B | $9.9B | $13.2B | $13.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $1.9B | $2.3B | $4.3B | $7.1B | $7.1B | DepositsDeposits |
| — | $3M | $3M | $3M | $8M | $6M | $14M | $53M | $49M | $51M | $51M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $44M | $127M | $118M | $129M | $277M | $554M | $777M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 280M | 33.4M | 58.2M | 58.3M | 58.4M | 59.4M | 59.5M | 59.4M | 60.5M | 61.1M | 61.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-0.00 | $0.58 | $0.12 | $0.43 | $2.56 | $3.83 | $3.45 | $6.39 | $1.26 | $2.51 | $2.51 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.16 | $3.80 | $2.02 | $2.22 | $4.75 | $9.32 | $13.06 | $19.60 | $20.24 | $24.37 | $24.37 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $0.16 | $3.71 | $1.90 | $2.11 | $4.55 | $9.14 | $12.53 | $17.91 | $18.53 | $22.33 | $22.33 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/8.39 into 2018 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.74 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | — | +43.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −22.1%/yr |
| EPS | — | −0.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | — | +162.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +75.2%/yr | +38.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 10%AdequateNet income $153M ÷ equity $1.5BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- ModestNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $51M − intangibles $73M)Industry peers: median 15%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 72%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 11.3%Well capitalizedEquity $1.5B ÷ assets $13.2B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 54%Mostly deposit-fundedDeposits $7.1B ÷ assets $13.2B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The market for AI and high-performance computing is rapidly evolving and highly competitive.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2017Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$966M
- Accounts payable$698M
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Timur Turlov | $302k | $302k | $528M |
| 2022 | Timur Turlov | $1.1M | $1.1M | ($409M) |
| 2023 | Timur Turlov | $1.2M | $1.2M | ($956M) |
| 2024 | Timur Turlov | $8.5M | $8.5M | ($1.1B) |
| 2025 | Timur Turlov | $7.5M | $7.5M | $1.7B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$68M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSMorgan Stanley | $70.6B | 11% | 13% | 72% | 0.6% |
| GSGoldman Sachs Group Inc. (The) | $58.3B | 10% | 10% | 65% | 0.4% |
| SCHWCharles Schwab Corporation (The) | $23.9B | 13% | 18% | — | 1.9% |
| RJFRaymond James Financial Inc. | $15.9B | 16% | 18% | 82% | 2.1% |
| SFStifel Financial | $6.3B | 12% | 17% | — | — |
| FRHCFreedom Holding Corp. | $2.2B | 17% | 18% | — | 1.5% |
| OPYOppenheimer Holdings Inc. | $1.6B | 7% | 9% | — | — |
| Group median | — | 12% | 17% | — | 1.5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookA bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Freedom Holding Corp.’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered35%/yr’21→’26
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $1.4B on 61M shares, a 18% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
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