Owner Scorecard


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HY, Hyster-Yale Inc.

Farm & Heavy Equipment capital-intensive Cyclical

Hyster-Yale Maximal also designs and produces specialized products in the port equipment and rough terrain forklift markets.

The Company's solutions include attachments, parts, fleet management services, technology and energy solutions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HY · Hyster-Yale Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.8B
−12.5% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.8B 5-yr avg $3.8B
Gross margin 18% 5-yr avg 16%
Operating margin −1.9% 5-yr avg 0.8%
ROIC −5% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg −1%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Americas (75%) and EMEA (15%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 17% and operating margin about 1.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −5.0% and 5.7% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Americas is 75% of revenue, with EMEA the other meaningful segment at 15%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Americas75%$2.8B
  • EMEA15%$570M
  • Bolzoni9%$333M
  • JAPIC5%$184M
By geographyUnited States67%EMEA18%Other15%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.6B$2.9B$3.2B$3.3B$2.8B$3.1B$3.5B$4.1B$4.3B$3.8B$3.8BRevenueRevenue
17%17%16%16%17%12%12%19%21%17%18%Gross marginGross mgn
15%15%14%15%15%15%13%14%15%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
4%4%3%4%4%4%3%3%3%4%4%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$33M$74M$39M$54M$50M($152M)($39M)$209M$245M($22M)($71M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.3%2.6%1.2%1.6%1.8%−5.0%−1.1%5.1%5.7%−0.6%−1.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$43M$49M$35M$36M$37M($173M)($74M)$126M$142M($60M)($99M)Net incomeNet inc.
48%6%24%9%30%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($49M)$165M$68M$77M$167M($254M)$41M$151M$171M$86M$90MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$39M$43M$44M$43M$43M$46M$43M$45M$48M$46M$46MDepreciationDeprec.
($136M)$65M($17M)($11M)$86M($131M)$65M($50M)($43M)$93M$134MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$43M$41M$39M$50M$52M$44M$29M$35M$48M$63M$62MCapexCapex
1.7%1.4%1.2%1.5%1.8%1.4%0.8%0.9%1.1%1.7%1.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($92M)$124M$29M$27M$115M($298M)$12M$115M$123M$40M$44MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−3.6%4.3%0.9%0.8%4.1%−9.7%0.3%2.8%2.9%1.1%1.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($92M)$124M$29M$27M$115M($298M)$12M$115M$123M$24M$28MFree cash flowFCF
−3.6%4.3%0.9%0.8%4.1%−9.7%0.3%2.8%2.9%0.6%0.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$116M$1M$78M$0$0$0$0$0$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$19M$20M$20M$21M$21M$22M$22M$22M$24M$25M$26MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$0$14M$5MBuybacksBuybacks
5%6%5%5%6%-15%-4%18%20%-2%-5%ROICROIC
9%9%7%7%6%-48%-36%32%30%-13%-23%Return on equityROE
5%5%3%3%3%−54%−47%27%25%−18%−29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$43M$230M$88M$67M$154M$66M$59M$79M$97M$123M$84MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$375M$453M$466M$468M$412M$457M$524M$498M$488M$490M$471MReceivablesReceiv.
$352M$412M$534M$560M$509M$781M$800M$816M$754M$634M$644MInventoryInvent.
$242M$386M$416M$402M$412M$517M$586M$524M$448M$396M$400MAccounts payablePayables
$485M$479M$584M$627M$510M$721M$737M$790M$795M$728M$715MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$810M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$577M$692M$776M$817M$756M$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$993MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.6×1.5×1.4×1.5×1.2×1.1×1.2×1.4×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$51M$59M$108M$107M$115M$57M$51M$53M$55M$56M$55MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0BTotal assetsAssets
$211M$291M$302M$287M$289M$519M$553M$494M$441M$716M$727MTotal debtDebt
$168M$61M$214M$220M$136M$453M$494M$415M$344M$593M$643MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.9×5.1×2.4×2.7×3.6×-9.8×-1.4×5.6×7.2×-0.7×-2.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$464M$566M$527M$544M$617M$357M$204M$390M$475M$472M$430MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.3%0.2%0.2%0.0%0.1%0.2%0.7%0.5%0.2%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
16.4M16.5M16.6M16.7M16.8M16.8M16.9M17.4M17.7M17.7M17.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$156.43$174.71$191.49$196.81$167.40$182.88$209.95$236.89$243.26$213.32$211.51Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.61$2.94$2.09$2.14$2.21$-10.29$-4.38$7.24$8.04$-3.40$-5.57EPS (diluted)EPS
$-5.58$7.49$1.73$1.61$6.86$-17.71$0.70$6.63$6.94$2.28$2.44Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-5.58$7.49$1.73$1.61$6.86$-17.71$0.70$6.63$6.94$1.34$1.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.17$1.20$1.23$1.26$1.27$1.28$1.29$1.28$1.36$1.44$1.44Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.60$2.48$2.34$2.97$3.08$2.63$1.70$2.04$2.70$3.54$3.46Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$28.23$34.24$31.77$32.54$36.72$21.23$12.09$22.43$26.83$26.71$24.13Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.5%/yr+5.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−19.8%/yr
Dividends / share+2.3%/yr+2.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.5%/yr+2.8%/yr
Book value / share−0.6%/yr−6.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • EMEA-19.5%
    “EMEA revenues decreased during 2025 compared with 2024 primarily due to lower volumes for higher-value core counterbalanced trucks which reflects a market shift toward lower-intensity trucks, especially within counterbalanced trucks standard or value configurations, leading to reduced shipment volumes for traditional models.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
18Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
−2%low FY2021
Gross margin
17%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
14.7×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$40Mowner earningsvs.($60M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $40M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $46M it takes just to hold its position. It put $17M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $24M.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($60M)$142M$126M($74M)($173M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$46M+$48M+$45M+$43M+$46M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$8M+$24M+$29M+$6M+$4M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$93M−$43M−$50M+$65M−$131M
Cash from operations$86M$171M$151M$41M($254M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$46M−$48M−$35M−$29M−$44M
Owner earnings$40M$123M$115M$12M($298M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$17M
Free cash flow$24M$123M$115M$12M($298M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%3%3%0%-10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $46M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $17M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $33M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($22M) ÷ interest expense $31M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $123M − debt $716M
    What this means

    Netting $123M of cash and short-term investments against $716M of debt leaves $593M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $2M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $591M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 47 + DIO 74 − DPO 46 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -15%–20%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($17M) ÷ invested capital $1.1B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $40M = operating cash $86M − maintenance capex $46M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $33M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($60M) · cash from operations $86M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $30M ÷ Owner Earnings $40M
    What this means

    Of $40M Owner Earnings, $30M (74%) went back to shareholders, $25M dividends, $5M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($8M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.36×
    Expanding
    Capex $63M ÷ depreciation $46M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.34×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $716M vs $345M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +65%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.89/share (latest year $-3.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $26.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 2% early, 3% lately, median 1%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 27%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +20%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 20% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −5.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.8%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Additionally, if the Company is unable to match or surpass advances of artificial intelligence that our competitors implement for their products or for internal operations, our competitive position could be impacted.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$82M
  • Receivables$471M
  • Inventory$644M
  • Other current assets$108M
Current liabilities$993M
  • Debt due within a year$242M
  • Accounts payable$400M
  • Other current liabilities$351M
Current ratio1.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.67×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$312Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$242M due · $82M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−12.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$345Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($202M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$875M$148M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$50Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $622M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$443M · 71%
  • Dividends$217M · 35%
  • Buybacks$19M · 3%
  • Returned to owners$235M

    120% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $217M as dividends and $19M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$56M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $56M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $211M to $727M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$41.16

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $19M, about $41.16 each.

  • Net change in share count8.5%

    The diluted count rose from 16M to 18M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.44/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 2% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$88M4% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity12%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$200Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $443M of capital spent building

$56M written down across 1 year (2021): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 28% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021For Mr. R. Prasad:$2.6M$2.7M($298M)
2022For Mr. R. Prasad:$5.4M$5.0M$12M
2023For Mr. R. Prasad:$10.0M$9.3M$115M
2024For Mr. R. Prasad:$8.1M$8.0M$123M
2025For Mr. R. Prasad:$4.4M$4.1M$40M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership24.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$8M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Hyster-Yale Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?8.5%

    Diluted shares grew 8.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $19M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Farm & Heavy Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TEXTerex$5.4B20%8.6%11%5%
WFRDWeatherford International plc$4.9B56%3.2%5%5%
NVTnVent Electric$3.9B39%15.1%8%15%
JBTJBT Marel$3.8B35%8.6%11%5%
HYHyster-Yale Inc.$3.8B17%1.5%5%1%
DCIDonaldson$3.7B34%13.6%21%10%
DNOWDNOW Inc.$2.8B20%-0.5%-1%6%
MTWManitowoc Company Inc. (The)$2.2B18%2.4%3%-2%
Group median27%5.9%7%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hyster-Yale Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Hyster-Yale Inc. earns about $37M on its 1.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $28M on 18M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $643M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($62M) runs well above depreciation ($46M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $44M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hyster-Yale Inc. (HY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HXL its page in the Manual HYLN →

Industry order: ← GBX the Farm & Heavy Equipment chapter HYLN →