Owner Scorecard


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LKFN, Lakeland Financial Corporation

Banks financial

Lakeland Financial Corporation is a bank holding company headquartered in Warsaw, Indiana that provides, through its wholly owned subsidiary Lake City Bank and together with Lakeland Financial, a broad array of financial products and services throughout its Northern and Central Indiana markets.

Lakeland Financial Corporation offers commercial and consumer banking services, as well as trust and wealth management, brokerage, and treasury management commercial services.

Lakeland Financial Corporation serves a diverse customer base, including commercial customers across a wide variety of industries including, among others, commercial real estate, manufacturing, agriculture, construction, retail, wholesale, finance and insurance, accommodation and food services, and health care.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LKFN · Lakeland Financial Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$269M
+6.1% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $269M 5-yr avg $247M
Return on equity 14% 5-yr avg 15%
Return on tangible equity 14% 5-yr avg 15%
Efficiency ratio 49% 5-yr avg 49%
Equity / assets 10.9% 5-yr avg 10.1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has hovered around the cost of equity (median 14%, above 12% in 10 of 10 years). It runs at a 49% efficiency ratio, lean. A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
$151M$172M$192M$200M$210M$223M$245M$247M$254M$269MRevenueRevenue
$118M$136M$151M$155M$163M$178M$203M$197M$197M$221MNet interest incomeNet int.
$33M$36M$40M$45M$47M$45M$42M$50M$57M$48MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$1M$3M$6M$3M$15M$1MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$52M$57M$80M$87M$84M$96M$104M$94M$93M$103MNet incomeNet inc.
33%36%19%19%19%18%17%15%16%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.2%1.2%1.6%1.8%1.4%1.5%1.6%1.4%1.4%1.5%Return on assetsROA
12%12%15%15%13%14%18%14%14%14%Return on equityROE
8%8%11%10%8%9%11%7%6%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
12%12%16%15%13%14%18%15%14%14%Return on tangible equityROTCE
48%46%45%45%43%47%45%53%49%49%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$4.3B$4.7B$4.9B$4.9B$5.8B$6.6B$6.4B$6.5B$6.7B$7.0BTotal assetsAssets
$3.6B$4.0B$4.0B$4.1B$5.0B$5.7B$5.5B$5.7B$5.9B$6.0BDepositsDeposits
$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5MGoodwillGoodwill
$427M$469M$522M$598M$657M$705M$569M$650M$684M$762MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
25.5M25.7M25.7M25.8M25.6M25.6M25.7M25.7M25.8M25.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.05$2.23$3.13$3.38$3.30$3.74$4.04$3.65$3.63$4.01EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.71$0.83$0.98$1.15$1.20$1.35$1.59$1.83$1.91$1.99Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$16.77$18.26$20.27$23.22$25.69$27.51$22.12$25.26$26.54$29.55Book value / shareBVPS
$16.57$18.06$20.08$23.02$25.50$27.32$21.93$25.06$26.34$29.36Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.4%/yr+4.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.1%/yr+5.8%/yr
EPS+7.8%/yr+4.0%/yr
Dividends / share+12.1%/yr+10.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.2%/yr+14.0%/yr
Book value / share+6.5%/yr+2.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
26Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$269Mlow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Strong
    Net income $103M ÷ equity $762M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Solid
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $5M − intangibles $0)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Low cost ratio (<58%)
    Noninterest expense $132M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 64%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 10.9%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $762M ÷ assets $7.0B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $6.0B ÷ assets $7.0B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 0%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $1M ÷ net interest income $221M
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Many of our larger competitors have substantially greater resources to invest in technological improvements, such as artificial intelligence.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$9M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Credit & receivables as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
CPFCentral Pacific Financial Corp New$293M11%12%64%3.0%
CTBICommunity Trust Bancorp Inc.$283M11%12%56%3.2%
CCNECNB Financial Corporation$282M10%12%64%3.1%
FMNBFarmers National Banc Corp.$280M12%14%61%3.1%
LKFNLakeland Financial Corporation$269M14%14%46%3.0%
THFFFirst Financial Corporation$262M9%11%61%3.4%
CCBGCapital City Bank Group$254M9%12%74%3.0%
ORRFOrrstown Financial Services Inc.$252M9%10%76%3.0%
Group median10%12%62%3.0%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Lakeland Financial Corporation’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered2%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity14%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $757M on 25M shares, a 14% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lakeland Financial Corporation (LKFN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LKFN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LIVN its page in the Manual LKQ →

Industry order: ← KRNY the Banks chapter LOB →