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MNKD, MannKind Corporation

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Distress / turnaround

We are a biopharmaceutical company dedicated to transforming chronic disease care through innovative, patient-centric solutions.

With deep expertise in drug-device combinations, we aim to deliver therapies designed to fit seamlessly into daily life.

Our cardiometabolic business is currently comprised of three commercial products: Afrezza (insulin human) Inhalation Powder; Furoscix (furosemide injection); and the V-Go wearable insulin delivery device: Afrezza is an ultra rapid-acting inhaled insulin indicated to improve glycemic control in adults with diabetes.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MNKD · MannKind Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$349M

+22.2% YoY · 40% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $361M 5-yr avg $202M

Operating margin 4.1% 5-yr avg −17.1%

Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg −28%

Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg −35%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Royalty (37%) and Products (33%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 38% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −64%) on a 78% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 10% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Royalty at 37%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Royalty37%$128M
Products33%$114M
License and Service31%$107M
Services1%$4M
Manufacturing Services0%$2M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$175M	$12M	$28M	$63M	$65M	$75M	$100M	$199M	$286M	$349M	$361M	RevenueRevenue
—	−47%	30%	68%	77%	78%	84%	—	—	—	—	Gross marginGross mgn
27%	638%	286%	118%	91%	103%	92%	47%	33%	41%	48%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%	120%	31%	11%	10%	16%	20%	16%	16%	19%	20%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$67M	($108M)	($77M)	($45M)	($48M)	($47M)	($64M)	$9M	$73M	$39M	$15M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
38.5%	−921.1%	−274.9%	−70.7%	−73.5%	−62.3%	−64.3%	4.4%	25.4%	11.1%	4.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$126M	($117M)	($87M)	($52M)	($57M)	($81M)	($87M)	($12M)	$28M	$6M	($24M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($78M)	($65M)	($38M)	($88M)	($28M)	($62M)	($81M)	$34M	$43M	$18M	$19M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$2M	$3M	$972K	$2M	$2M	$3M	$5M	$7M	$12M	$17M	DepreciationDeprec.
($211M)	$46M	$40M	($44M)	$20M	$5M	($10M)	$24M	($14M)	($24M)	$1M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1M	—	$354K	$3M	$801K	$11M	$8M	$42M	$10M	$5M	$6M	CapexCapex
0.7%	—	1.3%	4.1%	1.2%	15.2%	7.6%	21.3%	3.4%	1.3%	1.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($79M)	—	($38M)	($89M)	($29M)	($64M)	($84M)	$30M	$35M	$14M	$13M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−45.3%	—	−136.7%	−141.9%	−44.4%	−84.4%	−84.2%	14.9%	12.3%	3.9%	3.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($79M)	—	($38M)	($91M)	($29M)	($73M)	($88M)	($8M)	$33M	$14M	$13M	Free cash flowFCF
−45.3%	—	−136.7%	−144.4%	−44.4%	−97.0%	−88.5%	−4.2%	11.5%	3.9%	3.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	—	$15M	—	—	$348M	$348M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
											Balance sheet
$23M	$44M	$71M	$50M	$67M	$204M	$171M	$295M	$197M	$171M	$134M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$302K	$3M	$4M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$17M	$15M	$12M	$38M	$28M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$2M	$3M	$4M	$4M	$5M	$7M	$22M	$29M	$28M	$35M	$49M	InventoryInvent.
$3M	$7M	$5M	$5M	$6M	$7M	$11M	$10M	$7M	$9M	$16M	Accounts payablePayables
($630K)	($2M)	$2M	$3M	$4M	$5M	$28M	$34M	$33M	$65M	$61M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$77M	$57M	$82M	$61M	$79M	$219M	$235M	$373M	$268M	$292M	$251M	Current assetsCur. assets
$92M	$88M	$75M	$66M	$74M	$48M	$67M	$104M	$82M	$171M	$135M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×	0.7×	1.1×	0.9×	1.1×	4.5×	3.5×	3.6×	3.3×	1.7×	1.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	—	$2M	$2M	$2M	$68M	$68M	GoodwillGoodwill
$107M	$85M	$108M	$94M	$109M	$321M	$295M	$475M	$394M	$792M	$744M	Total assetsAssets
$28M	$24M	$102M	$119M	$122M	$281M	$273M	$269M	$36M	$355M	$364M	Total debtDebt
$5M	($20M)	$31M	$69M	$55M	$77M	$103M	($26M)	($161M)	$183M	$230M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	-3.1×	-4.3×	0.6×	6.1×	2.8×	0.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($184M)	($215M)	($175M)	($191M)	($180M)	($209M)	($251M)	($246M)	($79M)	($51M)	($59M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.9%	41.3%	24.6%	9.8%	10.0%	16.2%	13.5%	8.9%	7.5%	6.9%	7.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
92.1M	104M	144M	196M	223M	249M	257M	267M	284M	314M	308M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.90	$0.11	$0.19	$0.32	$0.29	$0.30	$0.39	$0.75	$1.01	$1.11	$1.17	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.36	$-1.13	$-0.60	$-0.27	$-0.26	$-0.32	$-0.34	$-0.04	$0.10	$0.02	$-0.08	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.86	—	$-0.26	$-0.46	$-0.13	$-0.26	$-0.33	$0.11	$0.12	$0.04	$0.04	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.86	—	$-0.26	$-0.47	$-0.13	$-0.29	$-0.34	$-0.03	$0.12	$0.04	$0.04	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01	—	$0.00	$0.01	$0.00	$0.05	$0.03	$0.16	$0.03	$0.01	$0.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-1.99	$-2.06	$-1.21	$-0.97	$-0.81	$-0.84	$-0.97	$-0.92	$-0.28	$-0.16	$-0.19	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−5.8%/yr	+30.6%/yr
EPS	−37.9%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+1.8%/yr	+32.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Royalty+25.2%
“Royalty revenue from UT increased by $25.8 million, or 25%, for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to the prior year due to UT's increase in net revenue from sales of Tyvaso DPI.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

314Mpeak FY2025

Gross margin

84%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

13.4×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$14Mowner earningsvs.$6Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2023FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $6M of profit into $14M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$6M

Owner earnings$14M · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$6M	$28M	($12M)	($87M)	($81M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$12M	+$7M	+$5M	+$3M	+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$24M	+$21M	+$18M	+$13M	+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$24M	−$14M	+$24M	−$10M	+$5M
Cash from operations	$18M	$43M	$34M	($81M)	($62M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$5M	−$7M	−$5M	−$3M	−$2M
Owner earnings	$14M	$35M	$30M	($84M)	($64M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$2M	−$38M	−$4M	−$9M
Free cash flow	$14M	$33M	($8M)	($88M)	($73M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	12%	15%	-84%	-84%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer ($11M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.8×

Adequate

Operating income $39M ÷ interest expense $14M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $183M · 4.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $75M + ST investments $96M − debt $355M

What this means
Netting $171M of cash and short-term investments against $355M of debt leaves $183M owed, about 4.7× a year's operating profit (9.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 398d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 40 + DIO 481 − DPO 123 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median -81%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $14M = operating cash $18M − maintenance capex $5M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -45%)

Industry peers: median -48%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a -45% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves ($11M).
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.11×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $18M ÷ net income $6M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.37×

Harvesting

Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $12M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $349M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.70×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $355M vs $121M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.02/share (latest year $0.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.17/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin −386% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −386% early to 14% lately, median −64% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2017 · −921.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If we are unable to use generative AI, it could make our business less efficient and result in competitive disadvantages.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$251M

Cash & short-term investments$134M
Receivables$28M
Inventory$49M
Other current assets$40M

Current liabilities$135M

Debt due within a year$45M
Accounts payable$16M
Other current liabilities$73M

Current ratio1.87×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.50×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.99×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$117Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$45M due · $134M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.1× → 1.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($132M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($552M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$376M$12M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$50Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$73M9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$363Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $81M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Michael E. Castagna	$4.0M	$7.3M	($64M)
2022	Michael E. Castagna	$3.9M	$9.7M	($84M)
2023	Michael E. Castagna	$7.1M	$97k	$30M
2024	Michael E. Castagna	$9.5M	$22.8M	$35M
2025	Michael E. Castagna	$9.3M	$752k	$14M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 62% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MannKind Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$28M → $364M
Debt rose from $28M to $364M while owner earnings went from about ($69M) to $26M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 21% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $3M to $77M while revenue grew 106%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 21% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
INVAInnoviva Inc.	$411M	—	85.6%	44%	63%
ARDXArdelyx Inc.	$407M	87%	-138.7%	-82%	-232%
ESPREsperion Therapeutics Inc.	$403M	—	-62.8%	—	-48%
ARQTArcutis Biotherapeutics Inc.	$376M	90%	-234.9%	-56%	-236%
AVIRAtea Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$351M	—	-51.5%	-80%	-38%
MNKDMannKind Corporation	$349M	72%	-63.3%	—	-45%
CRMDCorMedix Inc.	$312M	8%	-8961.5%	-202%	-7330%
EOLSEvolus Inc.	$297M	68%	-44.0%	-142%	-34%
Group median	—	72%	-63.0%	—	-46%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MannKind Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($13M) Net of stock comp (−$25M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($15M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024−58%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $13M on 309M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $230M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6M) runs well above depreciation ($17M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $15M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MNKD against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MannKind Corporation (MNKD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MNKD, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MMSI its page in the Manual MNR →

Industry order: ← MIRM the Pharmaceuticals chapter MREO →