Owner Scorecard


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ROP, Roper Technologies Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments asset-light Serial acquirer

Roper Technologies Inc. is a diversified technology company.

All currency amounts are in millions unless specified Our Business Roper Technologies, Inc.

We operate market leading businesses that design and develop vertical software and technology enabled products for a variety of defensible niche markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ROP · Roper Technologies Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.9B
+12.3% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.1B 5-yr avg $6.3B
Gross margin 69% 5-yr avg 70%
Operating margin 28.1% 5-yr avg 27.8%
ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Application Software (57%), Technology Enabled Products (23%) and Network Software (20%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 90% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 10 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 69% and operating margin about 28% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has held in a narrow 26%–28% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Read this kind of business on the installed base and the upgrade cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Application Software at 57%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Application Software57%$4.5B
  • Technology Enabled Products23%$1.8B
  • Network Software20%$1.6B
By geographyUnited States87%Europe7%Canada4%Rest of the world2%Asia1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.8B$4.6B$5.2B$4.7B$4.0B$4.8B$5.4B$6.2B$7.0B$7.9B$8.1BRevenueRevenue
62%62%63%66%70%70%70%70%69%69%69%Gross marginGross mgn
34%36%36%38%43%43%41%41%41%41%41%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%6%7%8%10%10%10%10%11%11%11%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$2.0B$2.2B$2.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
27.8%26.3%26.9%28.1%26.9%25.7%28.4%28.2%28.4%28.3%28.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$659M$972M$944M$1.8B$950M$1.2B$4.5B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.7BNet incomeNet inc.
30%6%21%19%16%16%6%21%21%21%20%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$964M$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$2.0B$735M$2.0B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$241M$345M$367M$409M$492M$616M$650M$755M$813M$898M$899MDepreciationDeprec.
($14M)($165M)($15M)($816M)($25M)$120M($4.6B)($228M)($115M)($61M)($190M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$37M$49M$49M$57MCapexCapex
1.0%1.1%0.9%0.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$927M$1.2B$1.4B$2.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
24.4%25.7%26.6%31.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$927M$1.2B$1.4B$2.5BFree cash flowFCF
24.4%25.7%26.6%31.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3.7B$154M$1.3B$2.4B$6.0B$217M$4.3B$2.1B$3.6B$3.3B$3.2BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$121M$143M$170M$192M$214M$236M$262M$290M$322M$355M$364MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$500MBuybacksBuybacks
7%10%9%8%5%5%7%6%6%6%6%ROICROIC
11%14%12%19%9%10%28%8%8%8%9%Return on equityROE
9%12%10%17%7%8%27%6%7%6%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$757M$671M$364M$710M$308M$352M$793M$214M$188M$297M$383MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$620M$642M$701M$792M$746M$688M$725M$830M$885M$1.0B$877MReceivablesReceiv.
$182M$205M$191M$199M$165M$69M$111M$119M$121M$142M$145MInventoryInvent.
$152M$171M$165M$162M$178M$178MAccounts payablePayables
$650M$676M$726M$828M$733M$757M$836M$949M$1.0B$1.1B$844MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.8B$1.8B$1.6B$2.0B$1.8B$2.4B$1.9B$1.5B$1.5B$1.9B$1.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.4B$2.0B$1.4B$2.4B$2.4B$3.1B$2.9B$3.0B$3.8B$3.7B$3.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×0.9×1.1×0.8×0.7×0.8×0.7×0.5×0.4×0.5×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$8.6B$8.8B$9.3B$10.4B$13.3B$139M$15.9B$17.1B$19.3B$21.3B$21.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$14.3B$14.3B$15.2B$18.1B$24.0B$23.7B$27.0B$28.2B$31.3B$34.6B$34.6BTotal assetsAssets
$6.2B$5.2B$5.0B$5.3B$9.6B$8.0B$6.7B$6.4B$7.7B$9.4B$10.5BTotal debtDebt
$5.5B$4.5B$4.6B$4.6B$9.3B$7.6B$5.9B$6.1B$7.5B$9.1B$10.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
9.4×6.7×7.7×7.1×5.0×5.3×7.9×10.6×7.7×6.9×6.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$5.8B$6.9B$7.7B$9.5B$10.5B$11.6B$16.0B$17.4B$18.9B$19.9B$18.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
2.1%1.8%2.6%2.1%2.7%2.5%2.2%2.0%2.1%2.1%2.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
103M104M104M105M106M107M107M107M108M108M105MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.97$44.52$49.72$44.98$38.05$45.39$50.30$57.52$65.18$73.04$77.58Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.43$9.39$9.05$16.82$8.98$10.82$42.55$12.89$14.35$14.20$16.39EPS (diluted)EPS
$9.04$11.46$13.23$24.35Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$9.04$11.46$13.23$24.35Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.18$1.38$1.63$1.82$2.03$2.22$2.46$2.70$2.98$3.28$3.48Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.36$0.47$0.47$0.55Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$56.48$66.31$74.12$90.31$99.15$108.58$150.17$162.43$174.70$183.75$179.90Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.9%/yr+13.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+21.0%/yr (2-yr)+21.0%/yr (2-yr)
EPS+9.2%/yr+9.6%/yr
Dividends / share+12.0%/yr+10.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.7%/yr (2-yr)+13.7%/yr (2-yr)
Book value / share+14.0%/yr+13.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
108Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
6%low FY2020
Gross margin
69%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.3×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.4Bowner earningsvs.$944Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2018 the business turned $944M of profit into $1.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$944M
Owner earnings$1.4B · 27% of revenue
FY2018FY2017FY2016
Reported net income$944M$972M$659M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$367M+$345M+$241M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$134M+$83M+$79M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$15M−$165M−$14M
Cash from operations$1.4B$1.2B$964M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$49M−$49M−$37M
Owner earnings$1.4B$1.2B$927M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue27%26%24%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $134M), owner earnings is nearer $1.2B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $2.2B ÷ interest expense $325M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.1B · 4.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $297M − debt $9.4B
    What this means

    Netting $297M of cash and short-term investments against $9.4B of debt leaves $9.1B owed, about 4.1× a year's operating profit (4.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 46 + DIO 21 − DPO 27 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–10%; 6% latest = NOPAT $1.8B ÷ invested capital $28.9B
    Industry peers: median -20%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    3-yr median margin, range 24%–27%; latest $2.5B = operating cash $2.5B − maintenance capex $49M
    Industry peers: median -13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $166M of SBC) leaves $2.3B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.5B ÷ net income $1.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $855M ÷ Owner Earnings $2.5B
    What this means

    Of $2.5B Owner Earnings, $855M (34%) went back to shareholders, $355M dividends, $500M buybacks. Net of $166M stock comp, the real buyback was about $334M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.05×
    Harvesting
    Capex $49M ÷ depreciation $898M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.52×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $9.4B vs ($1.8B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +74%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $14.76/share (latest year $15.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $197.01/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 27% → 28% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 27% early, 28% lately, median 28%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 25.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.6%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“The rapid pace of AI advancement may make it difficult to maintain competitive advantages, and AI capabilities could quickly become commoditized, reducing our ability to differentiate our offerings.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$383M
  • Receivables$877M
  • Inventory$145M
  • Other current assets$507M
Current liabilities$3.6B
  • Debt due within a year$716M
  • Accounts payable$178M
  • Other current liabilities$2.7B
Current ratio0.53×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.49×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.7B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$716M due · $383M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($12.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($13.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$10.7B$234M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$706M
'27$1.6B
'28$1.3B
'29$1.2B
'30$1.1B
later$3.5B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$706Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.6Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$9.4Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$383M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$2.5B
Together, against $706M due next year4.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $2.9B against the $706M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 4.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$31.1B90% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$27.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $135M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Net income
2021L. Neil Hunn$21.5M$34.6M$1.2B
2022L. Neil Hunn$21.9M$8.4M$4.5B
2023L. Neil Hunn$41.3M$58.8M$1.4B
2024L. Neil Hunn$23.7M$14.6M$1.5B
2025L. Neil Hunn$26.2M$3.9M$1.5B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio260:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$166M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Roper Technologies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$6.2B → $10.5B

    Debt rose from $6.2B to $10.5B while owner earnings went from about $1.2B to $1.2B — about 5.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
NOCNorthrop Grumman Corporation$42.0B71%11.4%16%8%
ROPRoper Technologies Inc.$7.9B69%28.0%6%26%
IRTCiRhythm Technologies$747M70%-25.5%-29%-13%
TCMDTactile Systems Technology Inc.$330M71%4.3%9%3%
HTFLHeartflow Inc.$176M75%-48.7%-20%-58%
NNNextNav Inc.$5M40%-1657.1%-157%-1066%
Group median70%-10.6%-7%-5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Roper Technologies Inc. has delivered.

Roper Technologies Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Roper Technologies Inc. earns about $2.1B on its 26.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 31.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2016+22%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2.5B on 101M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $10.1B. The if-converted diluted count is 105M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($57M) runs well above depreciation ($899M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $2.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Roper Technologies Inc. (ROP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ROP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ROOT its page in the Manual ROST →

Industry order: ← ROK the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter SANM →