Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← SRTA Manual SSD → ← SRCE Banks STBA →

SSB, SouthState

Banks financial

SouthState Securities are complementary to the Bank's correspondent banking and capital markets businesses and provide additional opportunities to the Bank's client base.

Through the Bank, we operate a correspondent banking and capital markets service division for over 1,200 small and medium sized community financial institutions, credit unions, and money managers throughout the United States.

Based primarily in Atlanta, Georgia and Birmingham, Alabama, this division earns commissions on fixed income security sales, fees from hedging services, loan brokerage fees and consulting fees for services related to these activities.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SSB · SouthState
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.7B
+56.1% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.7B 5-yr avg $1.8B
Return on equity 9% 5-yr avg 9%
Return on tangible equity 14% 5-yr avg 15%
Efficiency ratio 57% 5-yr avg 59%
Equity / assets 13.5% 5-yr avg 12.3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 9%, above 12% in only 0 of 10 years). It runs at a 57% efficiency ratio, lean. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
$446M$549M$659M$648M$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$2.7BRevenueRevenue
$325M$409M$513M$504M$826M$1.0B$1.3B$1.5B$1.4B$2.3BNet interest incomeNet int.
$121M$140M$146M$144M$311M$354M$309M$287M$302M$378MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$7M$12M$90M($152M)$31MCredit-loss provisionProvision
$101M$88M$179M$186M$121M$476M$496M$494M$535M$799MNet incomeNet inc.
34%48%20%19%21%22%22%24%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.1%0.6%1.2%1.2%0.3%1.1%1.1%1.1%1.2%1.2%Return on assetsROA
9%4%8%8%3%10%10%9%9%9%Return on equityROE
6%2%5%5%0%7%7%6%6%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
13%7%14%14%4%15%16%14%14%14%Return on tangible equityROTCE
64%67%64%62%70%68%57%57%58%57%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$8.9B$14.5B$14.7B$15.9B$37.8B$41.8B$43.9B$44.9B$46.4B$67.2BTotal assetsAssets
$7.3B$11.5B$11.6B$12.2B$30.7B$35.1B$36.4B$37.0B$38.1B$55.1BDepositsDeposits
$338M$1000M$1.0B$1.0B$1.6B$1.6B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$3.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$4.6B$4.8B$5.1B$5.5B$5.9B$9.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
24.2M29.9M36.8M34.8M55.1M70.9M75.2M76.5M76.8M101MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.18$2.93$4.86$5.36$2.19$6.71$6.60$6.46$6.97$7.87EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.21$1.29$1.37$1.66$1.78$1.91$1.95$2.04$2.12$2.28Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$46.85$77.16$64.34$68.20$84.41$67.75$67.50$72.35$76.74$89.25Book value / shareBVPS
$31.23$41.29$35.36$37.94$53.05$43.64$40.37$46.04$50.82$54.96Tangible book / shareTBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.58 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.1%/yr+5.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−6.1%/yr−22.6%/yr
EPS+7.3%/yr+29.1%/yr
Dividends / share+7.3%/yr+5.0%/yr
Capital spending / share−4.7%/yr+17.6%/yr
Book value / share+7.4%/yr+1.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
101Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$2.7Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $799M ÷ equity $9.1B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Solid
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $3.1B − intangibles $386M)
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Low cost ratio (<58%)
    Noninterest expense $1.5B ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 60%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 13.5%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $9.1B ÷ assets $67.2B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $55.1B ÷ assets $67.2B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 1%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $31M ÷ net interest income $2.3B
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Technological changes, including artificial intelligence and online and mobile banking, have the potential of disrupting our business model, and we may have fewer resources than many competitors to invest in technological improvements.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$58M
'27$59M
'28$60M
'29$60M
'30$58M
later$507M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$58Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$802Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$525Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$55M
Lease obligations (present value)$525M
Total fixed claims on the business$581M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $581M, of which the leases are 90%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$5.3M$6.0M$387M
2022$5.4M$6.4M$1.7B
2023$5.2M$6.0M$519M
2024$6.2M$7.7M$476M
2025$7.6M$8.3M$267M
2025$7.6M$8.3M$267M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio91:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$37M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
WALWestern Alliance Bancorporation$3.5B15%17%45%3.3%
BPOPPopular Inc.$3.2B11%13%61%3.3%
EWBCEast West Bancorp$2.9B15%16%44%3.2%
WTFCWintrust Financial$2.7B10%12%63%2.9%
SSBSouthState$2.7B9%14%63%3.1%
COLBColumbia Banking System$2.3B8%13%60%3.4%
CBSHCommerce Bancshares$1.8B15%16%57%3.1%
HWCHancock Whitney$1.5B10%14%62%3.0%
Group median11%14%60%3.1%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what SouthState’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered2%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity14%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $5.6B on 98M shares, a 14% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "SouthState (SSB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SSB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SRTA its page in the Manual SSD →

Industry order: ← SRCE the Banks chapter STBA →