Share count
130Mpeak FY2025
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WBTN, WEBTOON Entertainment Inc.
WEBTOON is a global storytelling platform where a vibrant community of creators and users discover, create and share new content.
Our community connected 27 million creators with approximately 157 million monthly active users in over 150 countries around the world. 1 Our Platform Our creators, users and content drive a powerful community flywheel.
By creating and publishing new and diverse content, creators on our platform help drive the scale of our user base.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.4B
+2.5% YoY · 9% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 4-yr avg $1.3B
Revenue $321M −1.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −2.5% yr-ago −8.2%
Net income ($9M) yr-ago ($22M)
Net margin −2.7% yr-ago −6.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Paid Content (79%), Advertising (12%) and IP Adaptations (9%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −7.5% through the cycle on a 23% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Paid Content is 79% of revenue, with Advertising the other meaningful line at 12%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Paid Content79%$1.1B
- Advertising12%$164M
- IP Adaptations9%$131M
By geographyJapan49%South Korea38%Rest of World13%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 25% | 23% | 25% | 23% | 24% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 19% | 16% | 25% | 19% | 18% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($115M) | ($36M) | ($101M) | ($64M) | ($45M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −10.6% | −2.8% | −7.5% | −4.6% | −3.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($130M) | ($116M) | ($144M) | ($346M) | ($333M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($141M) | $15M | $18M | $11M | $18M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $35M | $38M | $40M | $35M | $35M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($45M) | $90M | $34M | $280M | $285M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $10M | $2M | $8M | $10M | CapexCapex |
| 0.2% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.6% | 0.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($143M) | $5M | $15M | $4M | $8M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −13.3% | 0.4% | 1.1% | 0.3% | 0.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($143M) | $5M | $15M | $4M | $8M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −13.3% | 0.4% | 1.1% | 0.3% | 0.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $0 | $0 | $148K | $148K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| -8% | -3% | -9% | -9% | -6% | ROICROIC |
| -9% | -9% | -10% | -30% | -28% | Return on equityROE |
| −9% | −9% | −10% | −30% | −28% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $280M | $232M | $572M | $582M | $595M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $172M | $169M | $177M | $183M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $127M | $127M | $137M | $138M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $44M | $42M | $40M | $45M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $493M | $836M | $831M | $851M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $316M | $313M | $319M | $313M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 2.7× | 2.6× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $884M | $779M | $665M | $337M | $331M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $95K | $0 | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($232M) | ($572M) | — | ($595M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -135.9× | -460.2× | -2237.8× | -1134.1× | -632.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.0% | 0.3% | 6.5% | 3.0% | 2.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | $63M | $70M | $336M | $336M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||
| 107M | 110M | 119M | 130M | 134M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.14 | $11.71 | $11.31 | $10.62 | $10.31 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.22 | $-1.06 | $-1.21 | $-2.66 | $-2.49 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.35 | $0.04 | $0.13 | $0.03 | $0.06 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.35 | $0.04 | $0.13 | $0.03 | $0.06 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.09 | $0.02 | $0.06 | $0.08 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.79 | $11.41 | $12.35 | $8.99 | $8.82 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.6%/yr | +1.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +32.2%/yr | +32.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −13.3%/yr | −13.3%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−9%low FY2024
Gross margin
23%low FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$4Mowner earningsvs.($346M)net incomelow FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2023FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $346M loss into $4M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($346M) | ($144M) | ($116M) | ($130M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$35M | +$40M | +$38M | +$35M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$42M | +$87M | +$3M | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$280M | +$34M | +$90M | −$45M |
| Cash from operations | $11M | $18M | $15M | ($141M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$8M | −$2M | −$10M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $4M | $15M | $5M | ($143M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 1% | 0% | -13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $42M), owner earnings is nearer ($38M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have previously identified material weaknesses in our internal controls, all of which have been remediated as of December 31, 2025, as described in Item 9A.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1134.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($64M) ÷ interest expense $56K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $582M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $582M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -9%–-3%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($50M) ÷ invested capital $589MIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $4M = operating cash $11M − maintenance capex $8M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median 0%)Industry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $42M of SBC) leaves ($38M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($346M) · cash from operations $11M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.22×HarvestingCapex $8M ÷ depreciation $35M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.61×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $513M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.49/share (latest year $-2.56), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −7% → −6% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −7% early, −6% lately, median −7%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −10.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +6.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$851M
- Cash & short-term investments$595M
- Receivables$183M
- Other current assets$73M
Current liabilities$313M
- Accounts payable$138M
- Other current liabilities$175M
Current ratio2.72×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio—inventory untagged this quarter, so withheld rather than shown equal to the current ratio
Cash ratio1.90×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$538Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$696Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$492MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$20M$20M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$95Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$495M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity29%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$148Kover 4 years buying other businesses, against $23M of capital spent building
$469M written down across 3 years (2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership5.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$42M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Publishing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NWSNews Corporation | $8.5B | — | 3.3% | 2% | 7% |
| CMPRCimpress plc Ordinary Shares (Ireland) | $3.4B | 49% | 4.6% | 8% | 7% |
| TDAYUSA TODAY Co. Inc. | $2.3B | 40% | 2.9% | -2% | 2% |
| MHMcGraw Hill Inc. | $2.1B | — | 13.2% | 7% | 12% |
| WBTNWEBTOON Entertainment Inc. | $1.4B | 24% | -6.0% | -8% | 0% |
| DJCODaily Journal Corp. (S.C.) | $88M | — | 0.6% | -0% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 40% | 3.1% | 1% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what WEBTOON Entertainment Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, WEBTOON Entertainment Inc. earns about $4M on its 0.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−12%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $8M on 135M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $595M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($35M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $10M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "WEBTOON Entertainment Inc. (WBTN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WBTN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← WBS its page in the Manual WCC →
Industry order: ← TDAY the Publishing chapter WLY →