Owner Scorecard


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WDFC, WD-40 Co.

Chemicals consumer brand

Our four Strategic Enablers include: 1. ensuring a people-first mindset where we can attract, develop and engage outstanding employees; 2. building a sustainable business for the future; 3. achieving operational excellence in supply chain; and 4. driving productivity through enhanced systems.

WD-40 Company is a global marketing organization dedicated to creating positive lasting memories by developing and selling products that solve problems in workshops, factories and homes around the world.

For more than four decades, we sold only one product, WD-40 Multi-Use Product, a multi-purpose maintenance product which acts as a lubricant, rust preventative, penetrant and moisture displacer.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
WDFC · WD-40 Co.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$620M
+5.0% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $675M 5-yr avg $551M
Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 53%
Operating margin 17.5% 5-yr avg 17.0%
ROIC 26% 5-yr avg 27%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Americas (47%), EIMEA (38%) and Asia-Pacific (15%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 18% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has held in a narrow 16%–20% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 27%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Americas at 47%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Americas47%$291M
  • EIMEA38%$236M
  • Asia-Pacific15%$93M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

Most recent quarterly filing 10-Q filed Jul 9, 2026 Source at SEC EDGAR →

Revenue up 24.3% year over year; operating income up 47.4%

figures computed from the filing's XBRL

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$381M$381M$409M$423M$408M$488M$519M$537M$591M$620M$675MRevenueRevenue
56%56%55%55%55%54%49%51%53%55%56%Gross marginGross mgn
31%30%30%29%30%30%27%29%31%32%32%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%2%2%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$71M$76M$79M$82M$77M$89M$87M$90M$96M$104M$118MOperating incomeOp. inc.
18.7%19.9%19.2%19.5%18.9%18.2%16.8%16.7%16.3%16.7%17.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$53M$53M$65M$56M$61M$70M$67M$66M$70M$91M$89MNet incomeNet inc.
28%29%13%31%20%19%20%23%24%10%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$65M$56M$65M$63M$73M$85M$3M$98M$92M$88M$85MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$6M$7M$8M$8M$8M$7M$8M$8M$9M$8M$10MDepreciationDeprec.
$3M($8M)($12M)($5M)($1M)($2M)($80M)$18M$6M($19M)($22M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M$20M$12M$13M$19M$15M$8M$7M$4M$5M$5MCapexCapex
1.1%5.3%3.0%3.1%4.7%3.1%1.6%1.3%0.7%0.7%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$61M$49M$57M$55M$65M$78M($6M)$92M$88M$83M$79MOwner earningsOwner earn.
16.0%12.8%14.0%13.1%15.9%15.9%−1.1%17.0%14.9%13.5%11.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$61M$35M$52M$50M$53M$70M($6M)$92M$88M$83M$79MFree cash flowFCF
16.0%9.3%12.8%11.7%13.1%14.3%−1.1%17.0%14.9%13.5%11.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$6M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$24M$27M$30M$33M$36M$38M$42M$45M$47M$50M$53MDividends paidDiv. paid
$32M$31M$23M$30M$17M$0$29M$10M$8M$12MBuybacksBuybacks
24%21%35%29%29%31%24%25%26%31%26%ROICROIC
37%38%42%38%38%35%36%31%30%34%32%Return on equityROE
21%19%23%16%15%16%13%10%10%15%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$109M$117M$49M$27M$56M$86M$38M$48M$47M$58M$59MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$65M$64M$69M$73M$81M$90M$90M$98M$117M$121M$150MReceivablesReceiv.
$32M$35M$37M$41M$41M$56M$104M$87M$79M$80M$81MInventoryInvent.
$19M$21M$19M$19M$22M$33M$33M$31M$36M$38M$36MAccounts payablePayables
$78M$79M$86M$95M$100M$112M$161M$154M$161M$163M$195MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$209M$225M$168M$148M$185M$241M$250M$249M$255M$285M$305MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$59M$75M$86M$75M$60M$86M$111M$89M$104M$102M$115MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×3.0×2.0×2.0×3.1×2.8×2.3×2.8×2.5×2.8×2.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$96M$96M$96M$95M$96M$96M$95M$96M$97M$97M$98MGoodwillGoodwill
$340M$370M$317M$303M$363M$430M$434M$438M$449M$476M$500MTotal assetsAssets
$122M$154M$86M$81M$114M$116M$146M$121M$95M$87M$134MTotal debtDebt
$13M$37M$37M$54M$57M$30M$108M$72M$48M$29M$75MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
41.9×29.4×18.6×32.4×31.7×37.1×31.8×16.0×22.5×30.2×42.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$140M$139M$155M$145M$160M$200M$189M$210M$231M$268M$279MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%1.1%1.0%1.1%1.3%2.0%1.3%1.2%1.1%1.2%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
14.4M14.1M14.0M13.8M13.7M13.7M13.7M13.6M13.6M13.6M13.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
$26.47$26.94$29.26$30.61$29.78$35.54$37.88$39.49$43.49$45.70$49.93Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.66$3.75$4.67$4.04$4.43$5.11$4.92$4.85$5.13$6.71$6.60EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.24$3.46$4.08$4.00$4.74$5.66$-0.42$6.73$6.47$6.15$5.88Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.24$2.51$3.76$3.58$3.89$5.07$-0.42$6.73$6.47$6.15$5.88Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.65$1.90$2.12$2.38$2.63$2.78$3.07$3.28$3.48$3.70$3.93Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.30$1.43$0.88$0.96$1.41$1.10$0.61$0.51$0.31$0.33$0.39Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.76$9.87$11.14$10.52$11.69$14.59$13.77$15.45$16.98$19.77$20.63Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.3%/yr+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.2%/yr+5.4%/yr
EPS+7.0%/yr+8.7%/yr
Dividends / share+9.4%/yr+7.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.1%/yr−25.0%/yr
Book value / share+8.2%/yr+11.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Americas+3.1%
    “Americas Sales – Fiscal Year Ended – August 31, 2025 Compared to August 31, 2024 Net sales in the Americas segment increased from period to period, highlighted by the following: •WD-40 Multi-Use Product sales increased $8.0 million, or 4%, primarily due to increases in Latin America and U.S. of $6.2 million and $2.4 million, respectively.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • EIMEA+7.0%
    “EIMEA Sales – Fiscal Year Ended – August 31, 2025 Compared to August 31, 2024 Net sales increased in the EIMEA segment from period to period, highlighted by the following: •WD-40 Multi-Use Product sales increased $13.2 million, or 8%, primarily due to higher sales volume across nearly all regions.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Asia-Pacific+6.1%
    “Asia-Pacific Sales – Fiscal Year Ended – August 31, 2025 Compared to August 31, 2024 Net sales in the Asia-Pacific segment increased from period to period, highlighted by the following: •WD-40 Multi-Use Product sales increased $3.8 million, or 6%, primarily due to sales increases in China and Asia distributor markets of $2.1 million and $1.1 million, respectively.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
14Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
31%low FY2017
Gross margin
55%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.3×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$83Mowner earningsvs.$91Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $91M of profit but $83M of owner earnings: $8M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$91M
Owner earnings$83M · 13% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$91M$70M$66M$67M$70M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$8M+$9M+$8M+$8M+$7M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$7M+$7M+$6M+$7M+$10M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$19M+$6M+$18M−$80M−$2M
Cash from operations$88M$92M$98M$3M$85M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$5M−$4M−$7M−$8M−$7M
Owner earnings$83M$88M$92M($6M)$78M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$8M
Free cash flow$83M$88M$92M($6M)$70M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue13%15%17%-1%16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer $76M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $104M ÷ interest expense $3M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $76M · 0.7× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $58M + ST investments $219K − debt $134M
    What this means

    Netting $58M of cash and short-term investments against $134M of debt leaves $76M owed, about 0.7× a year's operating profit (1.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 71 + DIO 105 − DPO 50 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 21%–35%; 27% latest = NOPAT $93M ÷ invested capital $344M
    Industry peers: median -50%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 27% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1%–17%; latest $83M = operating cash $88M − maintenance capex $5M
    Industry peers: median -44%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves $76M.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $88M ÷ net income $91M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $63M ÷ Owner Earnings $83M
    What this means

    Of $83M Owner Earnings, $63M (75%) went back to shareholders, $50M dividends, $12M buybacks. Net of $7M stock comp, the real buyback was about $5M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.55×
    Harvesting
    Capex $5M ÷ depreciation $8M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $620M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.79×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $134M vs $183M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +33%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.63/share (latest year $6.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $19.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to 17% lately, median 18% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 16.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$305M
  • Cash & short-term investments$59M
  • Receivables$150M
  • Inventory$81M
  • Other current assets$14M
Current liabilities$115M
  • Debt due within a year$15M
  • Accounts payable$36M
  • Other current liabilities$64M
Current ratio2.65×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.95×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.52×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$190Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$15M due · $59M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+24.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$177Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$84MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$114M$14M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $687M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$108M · 16%
  • Dividends$371M · 54%
  • Buybacks$192M · 28%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$15M · 2%
  • Returned to owners$564M

    91% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $371M as dividends and $192M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$215.06

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $60M, about $215.06 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $186.59 (2023) to $245.05 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $210.42 ($29M).

  • Net change in share count−6.0%

    The diluted count fell from 14M to 14M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.70/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 9% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained36%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($88M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $32M, so each retained $1 added about 0.36 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$100M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity36%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$6Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $108M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Garry O. Ridge$3.7M$4.2M$78M
2022Garry O. Ridge$3.6M$3.5M($6M)
2023Steven A. Brass$2.5M$2.7M$92M
2024Steven A. Brass$3.7M$5.0M$88M
2025Steven A. Brass$4.3M$1.5M$83M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio38:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$7M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why WD-40 Co. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 34% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $96M to $231M while revenue grew 77%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 34% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KNSAKiniksa Pharmaceuticals International, PLC$678M88%-9.3%-6%5%
RAREUltragenyx$673M100%-154.9%-92%-113%
AXSMAxsome Therapeutics Inc.$638M99%-79.2%-44%
WDFCWD-40 Co.$620M55%18.5%27%14%
TGTXTG Therapeutics Inc.$616M88%-29896.1%-572%-23443%
OPKOPKO Health Inc.$607M34%-18.8%-8%-13%
INSMInsmed Incorporated$606M77%-202.3%-138%-182%
CPRXCatalyst Pharmaceuticals Inc.$589M86%35.9%48%37%
Group median87%-49.0%-8%-28%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what WD-40 Co. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, WD-40 Co. earns about $89M on its 14.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+24%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $79M on 13M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-07-02; net debt $75M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($5M) runs well above depreciation ($10M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $80M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "WD-40 Co. (WDFC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WDFC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WDC its page in the Manual WEAV →

Industry order: ← VVV the Chemicals chapter WLK →