Owner Scorecard


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4911 · Shiseido

Household & personal care Consumer & brand IFRS
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Shiseido’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 4911) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥850.3B¥1.01T¥1.09T¥1.13T¥920.9B¥1.01T¥1.07T¥973.0B¥990.6B¥970.0BRevenueRevenue
77%74%76%77%Gross marginGross mgn
67%72%76%75%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%3%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥36.8B¥80.4B¥108.3B¥113.8B¥15.0B¥100.6B¥46.6B¥28.1B¥7.6B(¥28.8B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
4.3%8.0%9.9%10.1%1.6%10.0%4.4%2.9%0.8%−3.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥32.1B¥22.7B¥61.4B¥73.6B(¥11.7B)¥46.9B¥34.2B¥21.7B(¥10.8B)(¥40.7B)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥59.1B¥95.4B¥92.6B¥75.6B¥64.0B¥134.2B¥46.7B¥89.0B¥48.4B¥109.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥34.5B¥39.6B¥42.0B¥55.7B¥60.4B¥76.1B¥75.7B¥75.5B¥75.7B¥71.7BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥7.5B)¥33.0B(¥10.8B)(¥53.7B)¥15.3B¥11.3B(¥63.2B)(¥8.2B)(¥16.4B)¥78.8BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥31.4B¥36.0B¥80.6B¥92.2B¥56.4B¥75.3B¥36.3B¥26.7B¥24.9B¥25.3BCapexCapex
3.7%3.6%7.4%8.1%6.1%7.5%3.4%2.7%2.5%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥27.8B¥59.4B¥12.0B(¥16.6B)¥7.7B¥59.0B¥10.4B¥62.3B¥23.5B¥84.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.3%5.9%1.1%−1.5%0.8%5.8%1.0%6.4%2.4%8.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥27.8B¥59.4B¥12.0B(¥16.6B)¥7.7B¥59.0B¥10.4B¥62.3B¥23.5B¥84.6BFree cash flowFCF
3.3%5.9%1.1%−1.5%0.8%5.8%1.0%6.4%2.4%8.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥8.2B¥9.0B¥13.9B¥22.0B¥20.0B¥16.0B¥22.0B¥41.9B¥24.0B¥12.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥6M¥17M¥2.4B¥22M¥12M¥23M¥9M¥8M¥1.0B¥2MBuybacksBuybacks
7%17%20%14%2%12%5%3%1%-3%ROICROIC
8%5%13%15%-2%9%6%4%-2%-7%Return on equityROE
6%3%10%10%−7%6%2%−3%−6%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥113.1B¥156.8B¥111.8B¥97.5B¥157.3B¥156.5B¥119.0B¥104.7B¥98.5B¥91.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥136.8B¥162.1B¥166.5B¥172.9B¥144.7B¥158.8B¥182.1B¥149.7B¥154.3B¥163.3BReceivablesReceiv.
¥115.7B¥130.0B¥149.8B¥181.1B¥170.0B¥16.0B¥14.0B¥10.8B¥10.2B¥9.4BInventoryInvent.
¥51.1B¥49.1B¥56.9B¥31.3B¥21.2B¥203.7B¥203.8B¥178.5B¥152.2B¥141.6BAccounts payablePayables
¥201.4B¥242.9B¥259.4B¥322.7B¥293.6B(¥28.9B)(¥7.7B)(¥18.0B)¥12.3B¥31.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥431.9B¥526.2B¥483.0B¥532.6B¥514.8B¥512.9B¥524.2B¥470.0B¥477.8B¥471.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥246.7B¥291.4B¥339.9B¥464.3B¥353.0B¥231.4B¥222.4B¥240.8B¥291.6B¥211.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.8×1.4×1.1×1.5×2.2×2.4×2.0×1.6×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥59.8B¥12.2B¥12.6B¥64.5B¥54.4B¥50.4B¥57.9B¥62.1B¥108.0B¥58.8BGoodwillGoodwill
¥934.6B¥949.4B¥1.01T¥1.22T¥1.20T¥1.30T¥1.31T¥1.26T¥1.33T¥1.27TTotal assetsAssets
¥120.6B¥81.5B¥75.8B¥248.1B¥324.3B¥305.8B¥297.2B¥281.0B¥363.2B¥323.2BTotal debtDebt
¥7.5B(¥75.4B)(¥36.0B)¥150.6B¥167.0B¥149.3B¥178.2B¥176.3B¥264.7B¥231.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
45.2×81.2×140.9×49.7×6.7×26.3×12.8×3.7×1.2×-4.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥413.9B¥445.9B¥468.5B¥504.1B¥472.6B¥540.7B¥604.3B¥618.7B¥632.5B¥600.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
400M400M400M400M400M400M400M400M400M400MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2125.76¥2512.66¥2737.06¥2828.87¥2302.22¥2524.91¥2668.39¥2432.59¥2476.47¥2424.98Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥80.25¥56.87¥153.51¥183.91¥-29.15¥117.27¥85.50¥54.37¥-27.03¥-101.70EPS (diluted)EPS
¥69.41¥148.44¥29.95¥-41.60¥19.21¥147.41¥26.11¥155.81¥58.86¥211.48Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥69.41¥148.44¥29.95¥-41.60¥19.21¥147.41¥26.11¥155.81¥58.86¥211.48Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥20.54¥22.44¥34.85¥55.07¥49.92¥39.97¥54.92¥104.77¥59.95¥30.01Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥78.42¥90.04¥201.49¥230.50¥140.90¥188.22¥90.72¥66.76¥62.15¥63.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1034.67¥1114.68¥1171.15¥1260.23¥1181.53¥1351.74¥1510.65¥1546.87¥1581.18¥1501.89Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.5%/yr+1.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.2%/yr+61.6%/yr
Dividends / share+4.3%/yr−9.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.4%/yr−14.8%/yr
Book value / share+4.2%/yr+4.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a ¥40.7B loss into ¥84.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income(¥40.7B)(¥10.8B)¥21.7B¥34.2B¥46.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥71.7B+¥75.7B+¥75.5B+¥75.7B+¥76.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥78.8B−¥16.4B−¥8.2B−¥63.2B+¥11.3B
Cash from operations¥109.9B¥48.4B¥89.0B¥46.7B¥134.2B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥25.3B−¥24.9B−¥26.7B−¥36.3B−¥75.3B
Owner earnings¥84.6B¥23.5B¥62.3B¥10.4B¥59.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%2%6%1%6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income (¥28.8B) ÷ interest expense ¥6.3B
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash ¥91.8B − debt ¥323.2B
    What this means

    Netting ¥91.8B of cash and short-term investments against ¥323.2B of debt leaves ¥231.3B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 61 + DIO 15 − DPO 228 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -3%–20%; -3% latest = NOPAT (¥22.7B) ÷ invested capital ¥832.1B
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest ¥84.6B = operating cash ¥109.9B − maintenance capex ¥25.3B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 36%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income (¥40.7B) · cash from operations ¥109.9B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥12.0B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥84.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥84.6B Owner Earnings, ¥12.0B (14%) went back to shareholders, ¥12.0B dividends, ¥2M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.35×
    Harvesting
    Capex ¥25.3B ÷ depreciation ¥71.7B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to 0% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −3.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥815.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥485.0B · 60%
  • Dividends¥189.0B · 23%
  • Buybacks¥3.6B · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥137.5B · 17%
  • Returned to owners¥192.6B

    58% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥189.0B as dividends and ¥3.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥202.6B and cash and short-term investments fell ¥21.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥3.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (400M to 400M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥30.01/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained64%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥37.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥23.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.64 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Shiseido is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥120.6B → ¥323.2B

    Debt rose from ¥120.6B to ¥323.2B while owner earnings went from about ¥33.0B to ¥56.8B — about 3.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shiseido has delivered.

Shiseido’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Shiseido earns about ¥27.4B on its 2.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥84.6B on 400M diluted shares; net debt ¥231.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 4902 its page in the Manual 5019 →

Industry order: ← 4452 the Personal Care Products chapter CL →