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8802 · Mitsubishi Estate
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Mitsubishi Estate’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 8802) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.13T | ¥1.19T | ¥1.26T | ¥1.30T | ¥1.21T | ¥1.35T | ¥1.38T | ¥1.50T | ¥1.58T | ¥1.75T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 7% | 8% | — | — | — | 7% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥192.5B | ¥213.0B | ¥229.2B | ¥240.8B | ¥224.4B | ¥279.0B | ¥296.7B | ¥278.6B | ¥309.2B | ¥329.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 17.1% | 17.8% | 18.1% | 18.5% | 18.6% | 20.7% | 21.5% | 18.5% | 19.6% | 18.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥102.7B | ¥120.4B | ¥134.6B | ¥148.5B | ¥135.7B | ¥155.2B | ¥165.3B | ¥168.4B | ¥189.4B | ¥222.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥168.5B | ¥293.3B | ¥346.0B | ¥341.8B | ¥207.4B | ¥280.1B | ¥269.9B | ¥307.2B | ¥324.1B | ¥508.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥76.0B | ¥77.5B | ¥80.3B | ¥84.9B | ¥89.1B | ¥91.6B | ¥93.5B | ¥98.3B | ¥101.3B | ¥108.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥10.1B) | ¥95.3B | ¥131.0B | ¥108.4B | (¥17.3B) | ¥33.3B | ¥11.1B | ¥40.5B | ¥33.5B | ¥178.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥274.7B | ¥286.5B | ¥283.3B | ¥331.7B | ¥315.8B | ¥328.6B | ¥286.3B | ¥451.4B | ¥443.6B | ¥524.7B | CapexCapex |
| 24.4% | 24.0% | 22.4% | 25.5% | 26.1% | 24.3% | 20.8% | 30.0% | 28.1% | 30.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥92.6B | ¥215.8B | ¥265.6B | ¥256.8B | ¥118.3B | ¥188.5B | ¥176.5B | ¥208.9B | ¥222.9B | ¥400.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 8.2% | 18.1% | 21.0% | 19.7% | 9.8% | 14.0% | 12.8% | 13.9% | 14.1% | 23.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (¥106.2B) | ¥6.8B | ¥62.6B | ¥10.0B | (¥108.4B) | (¥48.5B) | (¥16.4B) | (¥144.2B) | (¥119.5B) | (¥15.8B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −9.4% | 0.6% | 5.0% | 0.8% | −9.0% | −3.6% | −1.2% | −9.6% | −7.6% | −0.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥25.1B | ¥31.9B | ¥37.8B | ¥44.1B | ¥40.1B | ¥46.8B | ¥51.6B | ¥50.0B | ¥51.6B | ¥55.5B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥104M | ¥26M | ¥18M | ¥100.0B | ¥17M | ¥30.0B | ¥45.8B | ¥54.3B | ¥50.0B | ¥130.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 4% | 4% | 4% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| 6% | 6% | 7% | 13% | 11% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 12% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | 5% | 5% | 9% | 8% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 9% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥243.3B | ¥286.9B | ¥179.3B | ¥220.7B | ¥176.9B | ¥234.2B | ¥225.8B | ¥276.0B | ¥262.8B | ¥287.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥1.08T | ¥1.22T | ¥1.07T | ¥1.12T | ¥1.16T | ¥1.36T | ¥1.62T | ¥1.95T | ¥2.13T | ¥2.28T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥586.6B | ¥665.1B | ¥688.9B | ¥664.0B | ¥662.4B | ¥631.0B | ¥855.3B | ¥871.4B | ¥913.0B | ¥1.18T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 1.8× | 2.2× | 1.9× | 2.2× | 2.3× | 1.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥5.48T | ¥5.80T | ¥5.77T | ¥5.86T | ¥6.07T | ¥6.49T | ¥6.87T | ¥7.58T | ¥8.00T | ¥8.57T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥2.39T | ¥2.48T | ¥2.32T | ¥2.43T | ¥2.52T | ¥2.74T | ¥2.87T | ¥3.14T | ¥3.34T | ¥3.58T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥2.15T | ¥2.19T | ¥2.14T | ¥2.21T | ¥2.35T | ¥2.50T | ¥2.64T | ¥2.86T | ¥3.07T | ¥3.29T | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 8.5× | 9.2× | 9.8× | 10.9× | 10.4× | 13.4× | 11.9× | 7.7× | 6.5× | 6.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥1.77T | ¥1.88T | ¥1.96T | ¥1.16T | ¥1.26T | ¥2.24T | ¥2.38T | ¥2.62T | ¥1.57T | ¥1.61T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.39B | 1.39B | 1.39B | 1.39B | 1.39B | 1.39B | 1.32B | 1.32B | 1.25B | 1.22B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥809.25 | ¥858.47 | ¥908.16 | ¥936.04 | ¥867.94 | ¥969.82 | ¥1040.43 | ¥1136.22 | ¥1263.00 | ¥1434.52 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥73.83 | ¥86.59 | ¥96.77 | ¥106.71 | ¥97.50 | ¥111.52 | ¥124.85 | ¥127.19 | ¥151.38 | ¥182.80 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥66.55 | ¥155.15 | ¥190.95 | ¥184.61 | ¥85.03 | ¥135.47 | ¥133.25 | ¥157.78 | ¥178.17 | ¥329.34 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥-76.34 | ¥4.91 | ¥45.04 | ¥7.22 | ¥-77.89 | ¥-34.86 | ¥-12.37 | ¥-108.85 | ¥-95.52 | ¥-12.99 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥18.06 | ¥22.94 | ¥27.15 | ¥31.70 | ¥28.83 | ¥33.63 | ¥38.95 | ¥37.79 | ¥41.23 | ¥45.57 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥197.52 | ¥205.98 | ¥203.67 | ¥238.45 | ¥226.97 | ¥236.15 | ¥216.19 | ¥340.86 | ¥354.64 | ¥431.09 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥1270.93 | ¥1350.98 | ¥1406.94 | ¥836.52 | ¥905.53 | ¥1607.23 | ¥1797.15 | ¥1981.89 | ¥1257.73 | ¥1325.76 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.6%/yr | +10.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +19.4%/yr | +31.1%/yr |
| EPS | +10.6%/yr | +13.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.8%/yr | +9.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.1%/yr | +13.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | +0.5%/yr | +7.9%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥400.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥108.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥416.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥15.8B).
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥222.5B | ¥189.4B | ¥168.4B | ¥165.3B | ¥155.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥108.0B | +¥101.3B | +¥98.3B | +¥93.5B | +¥91.6B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥178.4B | +¥33.5B | +¥40.5B | +¥11.1B | +¥33.3B |
| Cash from operations | ¥508.9B | ¥324.1B | ¥307.2B | ¥269.9B | ¥280.1B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥108.0B | −¥101.3B | −¥98.3B | −¥93.5B | −¥91.6B |
| Owner earnings | ¥400.9B | ¥222.9B | ¥208.9B | ¥176.5B | ¥188.5B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥416.7B | −¥342.3B | −¥353.1B | −¥192.8B | −¥237.0B |
| Free cash flow | (¥15.8B) | (¥119.5B) | (¥144.2B) | (¥16.4B) | (¥48.5B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 23% | 14% | 14% | 13% | 14% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥108.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥416.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income ¥329.7B ÷ interest expense ¥55.1B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥3.29T · 10.0× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥280.1B + ST investments ¥7.0B − debt ¥3.58T
What this means
Netting ¥287.1B of cash and short-term investments against ¥3.58T of debt leaves ¥3.29T owed, about 10.0× a year's operating profit (10.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 4%–6%; 5% latest = NOPAT ¥260.5B ÷ invested capital ¥4.92TIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–23%; latest ¥400.9B = operating cash ¥508.9B − maintenance capex ¥108.0BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥416.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥15.8B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥508.9B ÷ net income ¥222.5B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥185.5B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥400.9B
What this means
Of ¥400.9B Owner Earnings, ¥185.5B (46%) went back to shareholders, ¥55.5B dividends, ¥130.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 4.86×ExpandingCapex ¥524.7B ÷ depreciation ¥108.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 18% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 18% early, 19% lately, median 19%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · 17.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −1.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥3.05T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥3.53T · 116%
- Dividends¥434.5B · 14%
- Buybacks¥410.3B · 13%
- Returned to owners¥844.8B
39% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥434.5B as dividends and ¥410.3B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥1.32T
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥1.32T beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥2.39T to ¥3.58T.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥410.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−12.5%
The diluted count fell from 1391M to 1217M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥45.57/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥697.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥86.2B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Mitsubishi Estate is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Mitsubishi Estate has delivered.
Mitsubishi Estate’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Mitsubishi Estate earns about ¥245.1B on its 14.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow (¥15.8B) on 1217M diluted shares; net debt ¥3.29T. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥524.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥108.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥400.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 8801 its page in the Manual 8804 →
Industry order: ← 8801 the Real Estate Development & Services chapter 8804 →