Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 8801 Manual 8804 → ← 8801 Real Estate Development & Services 8804 →

8802 · Mitsubishi Estate

Real estate Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Mitsubishi Estate’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 8802) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.13T¥1.19T¥1.26T¥1.30T¥1.21T¥1.35T¥1.38T¥1.50T¥1.58T¥1.75TRevenueRevenue
7%8%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥192.5B¥213.0B¥229.2B¥240.8B¥224.4B¥279.0B¥296.7B¥278.6B¥309.2B¥329.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.1%17.8%18.1%18.5%18.6%20.7%21.5%18.5%19.6%18.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥102.7B¥120.4B¥134.6B¥148.5B¥135.7B¥155.2B¥165.3B¥168.4B¥189.4B¥222.5BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥168.5B¥293.3B¥346.0B¥341.8B¥207.4B¥280.1B¥269.9B¥307.2B¥324.1B¥508.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥76.0B¥77.5B¥80.3B¥84.9B¥89.1B¥91.6B¥93.5B¥98.3B¥101.3B¥108.0BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥10.1B)¥95.3B¥131.0B¥108.4B(¥17.3B)¥33.3B¥11.1B¥40.5B¥33.5B¥178.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥274.7B¥286.5B¥283.3B¥331.7B¥315.8B¥328.6B¥286.3B¥451.4B¥443.6B¥524.7BCapexCapex
24.4%24.0%22.4%25.5%26.1%24.3%20.8%30.0%28.1%30.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥92.6B¥215.8B¥265.6B¥256.8B¥118.3B¥188.5B¥176.5B¥208.9B¥222.9B¥400.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.2%18.1%21.0%19.7%9.8%14.0%12.8%13.9%14.1%23.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
(¥106.2B)¥6.8B¥62.6B¥10.0B(¥108.4B)(¥48.5B)(¥16.4B)(¥144.2B)(¥119.5B)(¥15.8B)Free cash flowFCF
−9.4%0.6%5.0%0.8%−9.0%−3.6%−1.2%−9.6%−7.6%−0.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥25.1B¥31.9B¥37.8B¥44.1B¥40.1B¥46.8B¥51.6B¥50.0B¥51.6B¥55.5BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥104M¥26M¥18M¥100.0B¥17M¥30.0B¥45.8B¥54.3B¥50.0B¥130.0BBuybacksBuybacks
4%4%4%6%5%5%5%4%5%5%ROICROIC
6%6%7%13%11%7%7%6%12%14%Return on equityROE
4%5%5%9%8%5%5%5%9%10%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥243.3B¥286.9B¥179.3B¥220.7B¥176.9B¥234.2B¥225.8B¥276.0B¥262.8B¥287.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥1.08T¥1.22T¥1.07T¥1.12T¥1.16T¥1.36T¥1.62T¥1.95T¥2.13T¥2.28TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥586.6B¥665.1B¥688.9B¥664.0B¥662.4B¥631.0B¥855.3B¥871.4B¥913.0B¥1.18TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.8×1.6×1.7×1.8×2.2×1.9×2.2×2.3×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥5.48T¥5.80T¥5.77T¥5.86T¥6.07T¥6.49T¥6.87T¥7.58T¥8.00T¥8.57TTotal assetsAssets
¥2.39T¥2.48T¥2.32T¥2.43T¥2.52T¥2.74T¥2.87T¥3.14T¥3.34T¥3.58TTotal debtDebt
¥2.15T¥2.19T¥2.14T¥2.21T¥2.35T¥2.50T¥2.64T¥2.86T¥3.07T¥3.29TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
8.5×9.2×9.8×10.9×10.4×13.4×11.9×7.7×6.5×6.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥1.77T¥1.88T¥1.96T¥1.16T¥1.26T¥2.24T¥2.38T¥2.62T¥1.57T¥1.61TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.39B1.39B1.39B1.39B1.39B1.39B1.32B1.32B1.25B1.22BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥809.25¥858.47¥908.16¥936.04¥867.94¥969.82¥1040.43¥1136.22¥1263.00¥1434.52Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥73.83¥86.59¥96.77¥106.71¥97.50¥111.52¥124.85¥127.19¥151.38¥182.80EPS (diluted)EPS
¥66.55¥155.15¥190.95¥184.61¥85.03¥135.47¥133.25¥157.78¥178.17¥329.34Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥-76.34¥4.91¥45.04¥7.22¥-77.89¥-34.86¥-12.37¥-108.85¥-95.52¥-12.99Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥18.06¥22.94¥27.15¥31.70¥28.83¥33.63¥38.95¥37.79¥41.23¥45.57Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥197.52¥205.98¥203.67¥238.45¥226.97¥236.15¥216.19¥340.86¥354.64¥431.09Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1270.93¥1350.98¥1406.94¥836.52¥905.53¥1607.23¥1797.15¥1981.89¥1257.73¥1325.76Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.6%/yr+10.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+19.4%/yr+31.1%/yr
EPS+10.6%/yr+13.4%/yr
Dividends / share+10.8%/yr+9.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.1%/yr+13.7%/yr
Book value / share+0.5%/yr+7.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥400.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥108.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥416.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥15.8B).

Reported net income¥222.5B
Owner earnings¥400.9B · 23% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥222.5B¥189.4B¥168.4B¥165.3B¥155.2B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥108.0B+¥101.3B+¥98.3B+¥93.5B+¥91.6B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥178.4B+¥33.5B+¥40.5B+¥11.1B+¥33.3B
Cash from operations¥508.9B¥324.1B¥307.2B¥269.9B¥280.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥108.0B−¥101.3B−¥98.3B−¥93.5B−¥91.6B
Owner earnings¥400.9B¥222.9B¥208.9B¥176.5B¥188.5B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥416.7B−¥342.3B−¥353.1B−¥192.8B−¥237.0B
Free cash flow(¥15.8B)(¥119.5B)(¥144.2B)(¥16.4B)(¥48.5B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue23%14%14%13%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥108.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥416.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥329.7B ÷ interest expense ¥55.1B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥3.29T · 10.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥280.1B + ST investments ¥7.0B − debt ¥3.58T
    What this means

    Netting ¥287.1B of cash and short-term investments against ¥3.58T of debt leaves ¥3.29T owed, about 10.0× a year's operating profit (10.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–6%; 5% latest = NOPAT ¥260.5B ÷ invested capital ¥4.92T
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–23%; latest ¥400.9B = operating cash ¥508.9B − maintenance capex ¥108.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥416.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥15.8B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥508.9B ÷ net income ¥222.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥185.5B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥400.9B
    What this means

    Of ¥400.9B Owner Earnings, ¥185.5B (46%) went back to shareholders, ¥55.5B dividends, ¥130.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 4.86×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥524.7B ÷ depreciation ¥108.0B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 18% early, 19% lately, median 19%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 17.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥3.05T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥3.53T · 116%
  • Dividends¥434.5B · 14%
  • Buybacks¥410.3B · 13%
  • Returned to owners¥844.8B

    39% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥434.5B as dividends and ¥410.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥1.32T

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥1.32T beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥2.39T to ¥3.58T.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥410.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−12.5%

    The diluted count fell from 1391M to 1217M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥45.57/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥697.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥86.2B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Mitsubishi Estate is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Mitsubishi Estate has delivered.

Mitsubishi Estate’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Mitsubishi Estate earns about ¥245.1B on its 14.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥15.8B) on 1217M diluted shares; net debt ¥3.29T. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥524.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥108.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥400.9B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 8801 its page in the Manual 8804 →

Industry order: ← 8801 the Real Estate Development & Services chapter 8804 →