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9147 · Nippon Express Holdings
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Nippon Express Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 9147) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| ¥2.62T | ¥2.24T | ¥2.58T | ¥2.57T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | 9% | 9% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | 6% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥155.5B | ¥60.1B | ¥49.1B | ¥51.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.9% | 2.7% | 1.9% | 2.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥108.3B | ¥37.0B | ¥31.7B | ¥2.7B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ¥295.2B | ¥185.7B | ¥227.9B | ¥208.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥141.5B | ¥152.6B | ¥183.4B | ¥191.8B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥45.4B | (¥3.9B) | ¥12.7B | ¥14.2B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥44.0B | ¥52.7B | ¥57.7B | ¥68.2B | CapexCapex |
| 1.7% | 2.4% | 2.2% | 2.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥251.2B | ¥133.0B | ¥170.2B | ¥140.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.6% | 5.9% | 6.6% | 5.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥251.2B | ¥133.0B | ¥170.2B | ¥140.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.6% | 5.9% | 6.6% | 5.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥36.2B | ¥26.7B | ¥26.2B | ¥26.5B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥10.0B | ¥10.0B | ¥10.7B | ¥50.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 4% | 3% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| 14% | 5% | 4% | 0% | Return on equityROE |
| 10% | 1% | 1% | −3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| ¥276.7B | ¥315.1B | ¥251.3B | ¥283.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥497.7B | ¥424.1B | ¥520.3B | ¥558.6B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥257.3B | ¥214.0B | ¥268.4B | ¥293.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥240.4B | ¥210.0B | ¥251.9B | ¥265.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥907.8B | ¥896.3B | ¥934.9B | ¥1.03T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥49.8B | ¥15.6B | ¥71.8B | ¥52.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 18.2× | 57.5× | 13.0× | 19.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥2.2B | ¥5.7B | ¥87.8B | ¥64.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥2.08T | ¥2.11T | ¥2.30T | ¥2.41T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥631.7B | ¥734.4B | ¥795.9B | ¥878.8B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥355.0B | ¥419.3B | ¥544.6B | ¥595.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 33.0× | 9.6× | 4.9× | 3.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥756.5B | ¥800.1B | ¥853.9B | ¥829.5B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||
| 272M | 272M | 261M | 243M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥9634.59 | ¥8237.81 | ¥9876.03 | ¥10595.99 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥398.52 | ¥136.31 | ¥121.58 | ¥11.08 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥924.25 | ¥489.31 | ¥652.05 | ¥577.98 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥924.25 | ¥489.31 | ¥652.05 | ¥577.98 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥133.16 | ¥98.10 | ¥100.38 | ¥109.13 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥161.87 | ¥193.94 | ¥220.99 | ¥280.71 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥2783.37 | ¥2943.59 | ¥3271.84 | ¥3413.54 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2025 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.2%/yr | +3.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | −14.5%/yr | −14.5%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | −69.7%/yr | −69.7%/yr (3-yr) |
| Dividends / share | −6.4%/yr | −6.4%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +20.1%/yr | +20.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +7.0%/yr | +7.0%/yr (3-yr) |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned ¥2.7B of profit into ¥140.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥2.7B | ¥31.7B | ¥37.0B | ¥108.3B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥191.8B | +¥183.4B | +¥152.6B | +¥141.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥14.2B | +¥12.7B | −¥3.9B | +¥45.4B |
| Cash from operations | ¥208.7B | ¥227.9B | ¥185.7B | ¥295.2B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥68.2B | −¥57.7B | −¥52.7B | −¥44.0B |
| Owner earnings | ¥140.4B | ¥170.2B | ¥133.0B | ¥251.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 5% | 7% | 6% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income ¥51.5B ÷ interest expense ¥16.5B
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥595.4B · 11.6× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥283.4B − debt ¥878.8B
What this means
Netting ¥283.4B of cash and short-term investments against ¥878.8B of debt leaves ¥595.4B owed, about 11.6× a year's operating profit (17.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range 3%–11%; 3% latest = NOPAT ¥40.7B ÷ invested capital ¥1.42TIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle4-yr median margin, range 5%–10%; latest ¥140.4B = operating cash ¥208.7B − maintenance capex ¥68.2BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 4 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 77.48×Cash-backedCash from ops ¥208.7B ÷ net income ¥2.7B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥76.5B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥140.4B
What this means
Of ¥140.4B Owner Earnings, ¥76.5B (54%) went back to shareholders, ¥26.5B dividends, ¥50.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.36×HarvestingCapex ¥68.2B ÷ depreciation ¥191.8B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 4
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 2% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 4% early to 2% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −7%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 7% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 1.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥917.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested¥222.6B · 24%
- Dividends¥115.6B · 13%
- Buybacks¥80.8B · 9%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥498.5B · 54%
- Returned to owners¥196.4B
28% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥115.6B as dividends and ¥80.8B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥247.2B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥6.7B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥80.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−10.6%
The diluted count fell from 272M to 243M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥109.13/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Nippon Express Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.0% vs 7.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.8% early in the record and 6.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥631.7B → ¥878.8B
Debt rose from ¥631.7B to ¥878.8B while owner earnings went from about ¥184.8B to ¥147.9B — about 3.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nippon Express Holdings has delivered.
Through the cycle, Nippon Express Holdings earns about ¥161.5B on its 6.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ¥140.4B on 243M diluted shares; net debt ¥595.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 9107 its page in the Manual 9201 →
Industry order: ← 9064 the Trucking & Logistics chapter ARCB →