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9468 · Kadokawa
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Kadokawa’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 9468) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥205.7B | ¥206.8B | ¥208.6B | ¥204.7B | ¥209.9B | ¥221.2B | ¥255.4B | ¥258.1B | ¥277.9B | ¥282.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 32% | 35% | — | — | — | 36% | 34% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 28% | 29% | — | — | — | 30% | 31% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥8.4B | ¥3.1B | ¥2.7B | ¥8.1B | ¥13.6B | ¥18.5B | ¥25.9B | ¥18.5B | ¥16.7B | ¥8.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.1% | 1.5% | 1.3% | 4.0% | 6.5% | 8.4% | 10.2% | 7.1% | 6.0% | 2.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥5.8B | ¥1.0B | (¥4.1B) | ¥8.1B | ¥9.6B | ¥14.1B | ¥12.7B | ¥11.4B | ¥7.4B | ¥1.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥12.0B | ¥1.6B | ¥5.9B | ¥16.5B | ¥15.6B | ¥21.7B | ¥17.5B | ¥8.3B | ¥13.8B | ¥3.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥5.3B | ¥6.0B | ¥6.4B | ¥4.8B | ¥4.5B | ¥5.7B | ¥6.0B | ¥6.7B | ¥7.7B | ¥8.7B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥943M | (¥5.5B) | ¥3.6B | ¥3.6B | ¥1.5B | ¥1.9B | (¥1.1B) | (¥9.8B) | (¥3.7B) | (¥8.6B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥3.7B | ¥13.3B | ¥10.5B | ¥12.6B | ¥17.0B | ¥2.2B | ¥2.8B | ¥3.1B | ¥6.6B | ¥2.7B | CapexCapex |
| 1.8% | 6.4% | 5.0% | 6.2% | 8.1% | 1.0% | 1.1% | 1.2% | 2.4% | 1.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥8.3B | (¥4.4B) | (¥505M) | ¥11.7B | ¥11.1B | ¥19.5B | ¥14.7B | ¥5.2B | ¥7.2B | ¥689M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.0% | −2.1% | −0.2% | 5.7% | 5.3% | 8.8% | 5.8% | 2.0% | 2.6% | 0.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥8.3B | (¥11.7B) | (¥4.6B) | ¥3.9B | (¥1.4B) | ¥19.5B | ¥14.7B | ¥5.2B | ¥7.2B | ¥689M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 4.0% | −5.7% | −2.2% | 1.9% | −0.7% | 8.8% | 5.8% | 2.0% | 2.6% | 0.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥1.4B | ¥1.4B | ¥1.3B | ¥1.3B | ¥1.9B | ¥3.3B | ¥4.2B | ¥4.3B | ¥4.1B | ¥4.4B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥1.2B | ¥3.0B | ¥3.0B | ¥3.0B | ¥15M | ¥12M | ¥1.3B | ¥20.0B | ¥0 | ¥2.9B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 8% | 2% | 2% | 5% | 8% | 10% | 13% | 9% | 10% | 4% | ROICROIC |
| 5% | 1% | -4% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 6% | 5% | 3% | 1% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | −0% | −5% | 7% | 7% | 6% | 4% | 3% | 1% | −1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥91.1B | ¥67.4B | ¥56.1B | ¥38.2B | ¥55.9B | ¥97.6B | ¥131.4B | ¥79.8B | ¥130.5B | ¥91.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥40.2B | ¥44.7B | ¥47.5B | ¥39.1B | ¥42.6B | ¥26.9B | ¥48.7B | ¥61.0B | ¥67.8B | ¥76.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥16.8B | ¥17.3B | ¥19.3B | ¥19.0B | ¥20.8B | ¥23.9B | ¥25.6B | ¥30.5B | ¥34.8B | ¥41.9B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥25.9B | ¥26.6B | ¥27.4B | ¥24.6B | ¥25.3B | ¥26.6B | ¥29.2B | ¥34.1B | ¥35.4B | ¥37.6B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥31.2B | ¥35.4B | ¥39.4B | ¥33.5B | ¥38.1B | ¥24.2B | ¥45.0B | ¥57.5B | ¥67.1B | ¥80.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥174.9B | ¥155.3B | ¥149.0B | ¥143.9B | ¥153.9B | ¥205.6B | ¥264.0B | ¥221.4B | ¥272.4B | ¥258.4B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥61.2B | ¥74.3B | ¥65.3B | ¥65.2B | ¥79.3B | ¥77.9B | ¥128.9B | ¥97.4B | ¥117.0B | ¥111.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.9× | 2.1× | 2.3× | 2.2× | 1.9× | 2.6× | 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥925M | ¥1.1B | ¥551M | ¥456M | ¥362M | ¥429M | ¥684M | ¥1.7B | ¥5.3B | ¥5.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥246.9B | ¥239.9B | ¥240.1B | ¥243.0B | ¥269.6B | ¥325.3B | ¥382.9B | ¥340.3B | ¥410.0B | ¥394.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥67.6B | ¥65.4B | ¥65.5B | ¥65.5B | ¥65.5B | ¥65.3B | ¥65.3B | ¥25.3B | ¥26.7B | ¥10.9B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥23.6B) | (¥2.0B) | ¥9.4B | ¥27.4B | ¥9.6B | (¥32.3B) | (¥66.1B) | (¥54.5B) | (¥103.8B) | (¥80.7B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 85.9× | 31.8× | 27.9× | 83.4× | 132.3× | 185.2× | 210.8× | 292.9× | 208.1× | 96.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥111.7B | ¥109.1B | ¥103.4B | ¥99.9B | ¥117.7B | ¥175.7B | ¥223.2B | ¥212.6B | ¥231.1B | ¥229.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 142M | 142M | 142M | 142M | 142M | 142M | 142M | 142M | 149M | 149M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1450.92 | ¥1458.45 | ¥1471.29 | ¥1443.41 | ¥1480.75 | ¥1560.18 | ¥1801.54 | ¥1820.44 | ¥1865.33 | ¥1898.84 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥40.67 | ¥7.32 | ¥-28.81 | ¥57.12 | ¥67.60 | ¥99.29 | ¥89.42 | ¥80.29 | ¥49.61 | ¥8.58 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥58.62 | ¥-31.32 | ¥-3.56 | ¥82.72 | ¥78.46 | ¥137.51 | ¥103.74 | ¥36.46 | ¥48.34 | ¥4.62 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥58.62 | ¥-82.53 | ¥-32.59 | ¥27.61 | ¥-10.18 | ¥137.51 | ¥103.74 | ¥36.46 | ¥48.34 | ¥4.62 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥9.72 | ¥9.81 | ¥9.51 | ¥9.15 | ¥13.32 | ¥23.20 | ¥29.90 | ¥30.00 | ¥27.28 | ¥29.72 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥25.79 | ¥93.88 | ¥73.95 | ¥88.87 | ¥120.11 | ¥15.59 | ¥19.80 | ¥22.06 | ¥44.56 | ¥18.36 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥787.99 | ¥769.68 | ¥729.36 | ¥704.58 | ¥830.27 | ¥1239.49 | ¥1574.02 | ¥1499.22 | ¥1551.31 | ¥1538.83 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.0%/yr | +5.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −24.6%/yr | −43.2%/yr |
| EPS | −15.9%/yr | −33.8%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +13.2%/yr | +17.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −3.7%/yr | −31.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.7%/yr | +13.1%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥1.3B of profit but ¥689M of owner earnings: ¥589M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥1.3B | ¥7.4B | ¥11.4B | ¥12.7B | ¥14.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥8.7B | +¥7.7B | +¥6.7B | +¥6.0B | +¥5.7B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +¥2.0B | +¥2.4B | — | — | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥8.6B | −¥3.7B | −¥9.8B | −¥1.1B | +¥1.9B |
| Cash from operations | ¥3.4B | ¥13.8B | ¥8.3B | ¥17.5B | ¥21.7B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥2.7B | −¥6.6B | −¥3.1B | −¥2.8B | −¥2.2B |
| Owner earnings | ¥689M | ¥7.2B | ¥5.2B | ¥14.7B | ¥19.5B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 3% | 2% | 6% | 9% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less ¥2.0B), owner earnings is nearer (¥1.3B).
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 96.5×ComfortableOperating income ¥8.1B ÷ interest expense ¥84M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash ¥90.8B + ST investments ¥829M − debt ¥10.9B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥80.7B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 98 + DIO 82 − DPO 74 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–13%; 4% latest = NOPAT ¥6.4B ÷ invested capital ¥149.4BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest ¥689M = operating cash ¥3.4B − maintenance capex ¥2.7B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)Industry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less ¥2.0B of SBC) leaves (¥1.3B).
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥3.4B ÷ net income ¥1.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥7.4B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥689M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥689M of Owner Earnings, ¥7.4B (1069%) went back to shareholders, ¥4.4B dividends, ¥2.9B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of ¥2.0B stock comp, the real buyback was about ¥906M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.31×HarvestingCapex ¥2.7B ÷ depreciation ¥8.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 5% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 18%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2019 · 1.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥116.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥74.6B · 64%
- Dividends¥27.6B · 24%
- Buybacks¥34.5B · 30%
- Returned to owners¥62.0B
84% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥27.6B as dividends and ¥34.5B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥20.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥20.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥34.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count5.1%
The diluted count rose from 142M to 149M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record¥29.72/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kadokawa is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.1%
Diluted shares grew 5.1% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent ¥34.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?28% → 42% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from ¥57.0B to ¥117.9B while revenue grew 38%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (28% of revenue then, 42% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kadokawa has delivered.
Through the cycle, Kadokawa earns about ¥9.4B on its 3.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ¥689M on 149M diluted shares; net cash ¥80.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 9434 its page in the Manual 9501 →
Industry order: the Publishing chapter DJCO →