Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← ACGLN Manual ACHC → ← ACGLN Insurance — Property & Casualty ACIC →

ACGLO, Arch Capital Group Ltd.

In October 2001, Arch Capital launched an underwriting initiative to meet current and future demand in the global insurance and reinsurance markets that included the recruitment of new management teams and an equity capital infusion of $763.2 million, which created a strong capital base that was unencumbered by significant pre-2002 risks.

Since then, we have attracted a proven management team with extensive industry experience and continued to build our global underwriting platform for our insurance, reinsurance and mortgage insurance businesses.

Our insurance underwriting platform initially consisted of our Bermuda and U.S. operations, followed by the establishment of our United Kingdom-based carrier, Arch Insurance (UK) Limited ("Arch Insurance (U.K.)") in 2004 and Canadian operations in 2005.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ACGLO · Arch Capital Group Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$19.9B
+14.3% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $19.8B 5-yr avg $14.0B
Combined ratio 85% 5-yr avg 86%
Loss ratio 53% 5-yr avg 54%
Return on equity 20% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
It underwrites at a profit, about a 85% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 15% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 13% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.4× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$4.5B$5.6B$5.5B$6.9B$8.5B$9.2B$9.7B$13.6B$17.4B$19.9B$19.8BRevenueRevenue
$3.9B$4.8B$5.2B$5.8B$7.0B$8.1B$9.7B$12.4B$15.1B$17.1B$16.9BPremiums earnedPremiums
$693M$619M$758M$1.6B$1.4B$2.2B$1.5B$4.4B$4.3B$4.4B$4.9BNet incomeNet inc.
4%17%13%9%7%6%5%8%15%13%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.4B$1.1B$1.6B$2.0B$2.9B$3.4B$3.8B$5.7B$6.7B$6.2B$5.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.4B$1.1B$1.5B$2.0B$2.8B$3.4B$3.8B$5.7B$6.6B$6.1B$5.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
≈ 93%≈ 101%≈ 88%≈ 88%≈ 99%≈ 88%≈ 84%≈ 82%≈ 86%≈ 88%≈ 85%Combined ratioCombined
56%61%55%54%67%57%52%50%55%55%53%Loss ratioLoss
8%7%8%14%11%16%11%24%21%18%20%Return on equityROE
8%7%8%14%11%16%11%24%21%18%20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$10.2B$11.4B$11.9B$13.9B$16.5B$17.8B$20.0B$22.8B$29.4B$33.5B$34.1BFloat (reserves)Float
$29.4B$32.1B$32.2B$37.9B$43.3B$45.1B$48.0B$58.9B$70.9B$79.2B$81.4BTotal assetsAssets
$1.5B$2.1B$1.6B$1.7B$2.8B$2.6B$855M$917M$979M$993M$2.6BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$8.3B$9.2B$9.4B$11.5B$13.1B$13.5B$12.9B$18.4B$20.8B$24.2B$24.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
374M418M413M412M410M400M378M379M382M376M360MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.85$1.48$1.84$3.98$3.43$5.39$3.91$11.73$11.29$11.70$13.54EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.64$2.57$3.70$4.88$6.94$8.45$9.97$15.04$17.34$16.30$16.29Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$22.06$22.01$22.86$27.93$31.95$33.84$34.19$48.45$54.53$64.39$67.24Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+18.0%/yr+20.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+18.1%/yr+18.6%/yr
EPS+22.7%/yr+27.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+12.4%/yr+3.8%/yr
Book value / share+12.6%/yr+15.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
376Mpeak FY2017
Revenue
$19.9Blow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Combined ratio ≈ 88%
    Underwriting profit
    Total benefits, losses and expenses $14.9B ÷ premiums earned $17.1B
    Industry peers: median 124%
    What this means

    The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.

  • Strong
    Net income $4.4B ÷ equity $24.2B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.

The float

  • 1.4× equity
    Loss and claim reserves $33.5B, 1.4× equity
    What this means

    Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    Net investment income wasn't found.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our information technology systems and our pace of adoption of new technologies, including AI, may not be adequate to meet the demands of our customers or impact negatively our ability to compete with our peers.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$9.3M$16.3M$3.4B
2022$12.1M$20.6M$3.8B
2023$13.1M$21.6M$5.7B
2024$31.8M$34.4M$6.6B
2024$9.4M$17.7M$6.6B
2025$14.6M$27.5M$6.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$148M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty

The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueCombined ratioLoss ratioROE
HIGThe Hartford Insurance Group Inc.$28.4B107%68%13%
AIGAmerican International Group$28.0B124%76%3%
ACGLOArch Capital Group Ltd.$19.9B88%55%13%
LLoews Corp.$18.5B149%76%6%
EGEverest Group$17.7B100%70%9%
MKLMarkel Group Inc.$15.5B59%9%
CNACNA Financial Corporation$15.0B127%76%8%
WRBW.R. Berkley$14.7B62%14%
Group median115%69%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Arch Capital Group Ltd.’s record justifies.

$
The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered16%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity14%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $23.0B on 349M shares, a 14% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Arch Capital Group Ltd. (ACGLO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ACGLO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ACGLN its page in the Manual ACHC →

Industry order: ← ACGLN the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter ACIC →