Owner Scorecard


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ADEA, Adeia Inc.

Media & Broadcasting capital-intensive Cyclical

Adeia Inc. is a leading IP licensing platform in the consumer and entertainment space, with an extensive portfolio of media and semiconductor intellectual property and approximately 13,750 media and semiconductor patent assets worldwide.

In order to serve an increasingly connected world, we invent, develop, and license fundamental innovations that enhance billions of devices and shape the way millions of people explore and experience entertainment.

Our inventions are key enabling technologies that drive how consumers interact with entertainment and devices at home and on the go around the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ADEA · Adeia Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$443M
+17.9% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $460M 5-yr avg $408M
Operating margin 40.6% 5-yr avg 34.8%
ROIC 18% 5-yr avg 12%
Owner-earnings margin 34% 5-yr avg 45%
Free cash flow margin 34% 5-yr avg 45%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 34% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −25% and 52% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Stock-based pay runs about 7.6% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 47% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

18% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States82%$363M
  • Asia13%$56M
  • Canada3%$12M
  • Europe and Middle East2%$10M
  • Other0%$2M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$406M$280M$516M$391M$439M$389M$376M$443M$460MRevenueRevenue
30%42%27%33%31%24%28%27%26%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
26%40%7%10%10%14%16%15%15%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$24M($69M)$267M$119M$153M$136M$129M$175M$187MOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.9%−24.5%51.8%30.4%34.9%35.0%34.2%39.5%40.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($289K)($63M)$147M($55M)($296M)$67M$65M$111M$122MNet incomeNet inc.
16%20%21%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$135M$169M$428M$235M$183M$153M$212M$158M$159MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$115M$107M$175M$227M$17M$2M$2M$2M$2MDepreciationDeprec.
($11M)$94M$67M$5M$409M$66M$119M$10M$272KWorking capital & otherWC & other
$3M$9M$7M$14M$13M$4M$2M$2M$2MCapexCapex
0.8%3.1%1.4%3.6%2.9%1.0%0.5%0.4%0.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$132M$160M$420M$221M$170M$149M$211M$156M$157MOwner earningsOwner earn.
32.5%57.3%81.5%56.4%38.8%38.3%56.0%35.2%34.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$132M$160M$420M$221M$170M$149M$211M$156M$157MFree cash flowFCF
32.5%57.3%81.5%56.4%38.8%38.3%56.0%35.2%34.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$17M$50M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$39M$40M$31M$21M$21M$21M$22M$22M$22MDividends paidDiv. paid
$45M$5M$81M$85M$17M$0$19M$21MBuybacksBuybacks
2%-7%13%5%13%13%13%17%18%ROICROIC
-0%-11%10%-4%-98%19%16%23%26%Return on equityROE
−6%−19%8%−6%−105%13%11%19%21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$114M$75M$170M$80M$115M$84M$110M$137M$116MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$24M$116M$64M$58M$40M$34M$29M$33MReceivablesReceiv.
$100K$10M$5M$9MInventoryInvent.
$5M$13M$448K$9M$10M$8M$5M$6MAccounts payablePayables
$20M$113M$69M$50M$30M$26M$24M$36MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$281M$546M$519M$259M$206M$258M$304M$281MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$48M$225M$190M$167M$102M$73M$80M$82MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
5.8×2.4×2.7×1.6×2.0×3.5×3.8×3.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$386M$386M$315M$315M$314M$314M$314M$314M$314MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.0B$2.7B$2.5B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$335M$839M$765M$729M$586M$475M$418M$391MTotal debtDebt
$260M$669M$685M$615M$502M$365M$282M$276MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$618M$548M$1.5B$1.3B$301M$357M$397M$481M$467MShareholders’ equityEquity
7.6%11.3%7.6%14.9%12.0%4.6%7.1%7.8%7.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
48.8M49.1M83.9M107M108M113M113M113M114MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.32$5.70$6.15$3.65$4.08$3.45$3.33$3.93$4.03Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.01$-1.27$1.75$-0.52$-2.75$0.60$0.57$0.99$1.07EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.70$3.27$5.01$2.06$1.58$1.32$1.86$1.39$1.38Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.70$3.27$5.01$2.06$1.58$1.32$1.86$1.39$1.38Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.80$0.80$0.37$0.20$0.19$0.19$0.19$0.19$0.19Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.07$0.18$0.09$0.13$0.12$0.03$0.02$0.02$0.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.66$11.15$17.37$12.58$2.80$3.16$3.51$4.26$4.09Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.71 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−10.1%/yr−8.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−9.1%/yr−22.7%/yr
EPS−10.9%/yr
Dividends / share−18.4%/yr−12.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−18.7%/yr−28.9%/yr
Book value / share−14.4%/yr−24.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
113Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
17%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.8×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$156Mowner earningsvs.$111Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $111M of profit into $156M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$111M
Owner earnings$156M · 35% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$111M$65M$67M($296M)($55M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2M+$2M+$2M+$17M+$227M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$35M+$27M+$18M+$53M+$58M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$10M+$119M+$66M+$409M+$5M
Cash from operations$158M$212M$153M$183M$235M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$2M−$2M−$4M−$13M−$14M
Owner earnings$156M$211M$149M$170M$221M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue35%56%38%39%56%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $35M), owner earnings is nearer $122M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $282M · 1.6× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $73M + ST investments $64M − debt $418M
    What this means

    Netting $137M of cash and short-term investments against $418M of debt leaves $282M owed, about 1.6× a year's operating profit (2.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -7%–17%; 17% latest = NOPAT $138M ÷ invested capital $826M
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 32%–81%; latest $156M = operating cash $158M − maintenance capex $2M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 35% of revenue this year, a 39% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $35M of SBC) leaves $122M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $158M ÷ net income $111M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $43M ÷ Owner Earnings $156M
    What this means

    Of $156M Owner Earnings, $43M (28%) went back to shareholders, $22M dividends, $21M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($35M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.92×
    Maintaining
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $2M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $443M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.81×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $418M vs $224M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (8)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +190%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.73/share (latest year $1.01), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.36/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 11% → 36% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 11% early to 36% lately, median 34% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −24.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$281M
  • Cash & short-term investments$116M
  • Receivables$33M
  • Inventory$9M
  • Other current assets$124M
Current liabilities$82M
  • Debt due within a year$21M
  • Accounts payable$6M
  • Other current liabilities$55M
Current ratio3.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.33×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$200Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$21M due · $116M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 3.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($141M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($255M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$400M$9M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$86Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$53M · 3%
  • Dividends$216M · 13%
  • Buybacks$272M · 16%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.1B · 68%
  • Returned to owners$488M

    30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $216M as dividends and $272M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$12.23

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 17M shares were bought for $206M, about $12.23 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $9.43 (2021) to $16.45 (2020); its heaviest year, 2021, paid $9.43 ($85M).

  • Net change in share count133.9%

    The diluted count rose from 49M to 114M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.19/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$617M59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity65%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$68Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $53M of capital spent building

$354M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Jon Kirchner$11.3M$6.1M$221M
2022Jon Kirchner$9.5M−$5.8M$170M
2022Paul E. Davis$11.7M$11.5M$170M
2023Paul E. Davis$5.4M$11.3M$149M
2024Paul E. Davis$7.2M$14.1M$211M
2025Paul E. Davis$6.5M$7.4M$156M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$35M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 20% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Adeia Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?43.2% vs 57.1%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 57.1% early in the record and 43.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?133.9%

    Diluted shares grew 133.9% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $272M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.$2.3B51%15.8%13%12%
CABOCable One$1.5B27.3%10%19%
GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc.$1.0B-33.2%-12%12%
LBRDALiberty Broadband$1.0B100%-54.0%-0%-40%
ATNIATN International Inc.$667M2.5%1%3%
EVCEntravision Communications Corporation$448M70%4.9%4%16%
ADEAAdeia Inc.$443M34.5%13%47%
GSATGlobalstar Inc.$273M96%-47.3%-6%10%
Group median3.7%2%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Adeia Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Adeia Inc. earns about $210M on its 47.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 35.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $157M on 110M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $276M. The if-converted diluted count is 114M, 4% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $158M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Adeia Inc. (ADEA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ADEA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ADCT its page in the Manual ADI →

Industry order: the Media & Broadcasting chapter AMCX →