Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← LB Manual LBRDK → ← IHRT Media & Broadcasting LBRDK →

LBRDA, Liberty Broadband

Media & Broadcasting capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCapital build-out

Liberty provides Liberty Broadband with general and administrative services including legal, tax, accounting, treasury, information technology, cybersecurity and investor relations support.

Liberty Broadband reimburses Liberty for direct, out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Liberty in providing these services which are negotiated semi-annually, as necessary.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LBRDA · Liberty Broadband
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.0B
+3.6% YoY · 132% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 5-yr avg $802M
Operating margin −3.5% 5-yr avg −28.1%
ROIC −0% 5-yr avg −0%
Owner-earnings margin −56% 5-yr avg −53%
Free cash flow margin −56% 5-yr avg −53%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 24% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −54% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 18% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24
Income statement
$31M$13M$22M$15M$51M$988M$975M$981M$1.0BRevenueRevenue
113%184%106%220%149%45%41%41%43%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
33%62%27%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($21M)($25M)($12M)($29M)($60M)($98M)($39M)($39M)($50M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−69.2%−194.6%−54.0%−193.3%−117.6%−9.9%−4.0%−4.0%−4.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$917M$2.0B$70M$117M$398M$732M$1.3B$688M$869MNet incomeNet inc.
38%17%24%25%23%18%20%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($12M)($30M)($26M)($37M)($96M)$3M($56M)$16M$104MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$4M$4M$3M$2M$15M$267M$262M$230M$207MDepreciationDeprec.
($939M)($2.1B)($105M)($166M)($518M)($1.0B)($1.6B)($917M)($987M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$267K$70K$41K$1M$2M$134M$181M$222M$247MCapexCapex
0.9%0.5%0.2%6.7%3.9%13.6%18.6%22.6%24.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($12M)($30M)($26M)($38M)($98M)($131M)($237M)($206M)($143M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−39.8%−229.9%−118.2%−253.3%−192.2%−13.3%−24.3%−21.0%−14.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($12M)($30M)($26M)($38M)($98M)($131M)($237M)($206M)($143M)Free cash flowFCF
−39.8%−229.9%−118.2%−253.3%−192.2%−13.3%−24.3%−21.0%−14.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$597M$4.3B$2.9B$227M$89MBuybacksBuybacks
-0%-0%-0%-0%-0%-1%-0%-0%-0%ROICROIC
11%19%1%1%3%7%15%8%9%Return on equityROE
11%19%1%1%3%7%15%8%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$206M$81M$83M$50M$1.4B$191M$375M$79M$89MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$351M$217M$189M$181M$193MReceivablesReceiv.
$8M$5M$4M$6M$98M$99M$92M$86M$112MAccounts payablePayables
$253M$118M$97M$95M$81MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$258M$84M$85M$52M$1.8B$459M$660M$430M$423MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$412M$11M$8M$12M$612M$582M$1.7B$178M$200MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×8.0×10.3×4.3×3.0×0.8×0.4×2.4×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6M$6M$7M$746M$762M$755M$755M$755MGoodwillGoodwill
$9.6B$11.9B$12.1B$12.3B$21.4B$17.0B$15.1B$15.6B$16.7BTotal assetsAssets
$600M$500M$523M$573M$4.8B$3.8B$3.8B$3.7B$2.7BTotal debtDebt
$394M$419M$440M$523M$3.4B$3.6B$3.4B$3.7B$2.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-1.4×-1.3×-0.5×-1.2×-2.1×-0.8×-0.3×-0.2×-0.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$8.5B$10.5B$10.6B$10.7B$13.5B$10.1B$8.5B$9.0B$9.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
18.7%40.4%25.6%66.7%17.6%4.1%3.8%1.5%1.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
153M183M183M183M183M186M158M147M143MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.20$0.07$0.12$0.08$0.28$5.31$6.17$6.67$7.10Revenue / shareRev/sh
$6.00$11.10$0.38$0.64$2.17$3.94$7.96$4.68$6.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.08$-0.16$-0.14$-0.21$-0.54$-0.70$-1.50$-1.40$-1.00Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.08$-0.16$-0.14$-0.21$-0.54$-0.70$-1.50$-1.40$-1.00Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.01$0.01$0.72$1.15$1.51$1.73Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$55.43$57.26$58.05$58.36$73.79$54.45$53.69$61.24$68.48Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+56.2%/yr+144.1%/yr
EPS+0.2%/yr+56.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+136.8%/yr+216.1%/yr
Book value / share+2.7%/yr+3.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
143Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
−0%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($143M)owner earningsvs.$869Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2021FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business reported $869M of profit but ($143M) of owner earnings: $1.0B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$869M$688M$1.3B$732M$398M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$207M+$230M+$262M+$267M+$15M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$15M+$15M+$37M+$41M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$987M−$917M−$1.6B−$1.0B−$518M
Cash from operations$104M$16M($56M)$3M($96M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$247M−$222M−$181M−$134M−$2M
Owner earnings($143M)($206M)($237M)($131M)($98M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-14%-21%-24%-13%-192%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer ($158M).

Much of fiscal 2024's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($36M) ÷ interest expense $110M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $57M + ST investments $9M − debt $1.7B
    What this means

    Netting $66M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $440M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $1.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 69 + DIO 345 − DPO 87725 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -1%–-0%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($28M) ÷ invested capital $7.4B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range -253%–-13%; latest ($574M) = operating cash ($327M) − maintenance capex $247M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -56% of revenue this year, a -40% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves ($579M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($2.7B) · cash from operations ($327M)

    In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.19×
    Maintaining
    Capex $247M ÷ depreciation $207M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.10×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs ($884M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −7%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.56/share (latest year $-18.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $39.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −106% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −106% early to −4% lately, median −54% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2017 · −194.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“A failure to effectively anticipate or adapt to new technologies (including those that use AI) and changes in customer expectations and behavior could significantly adversely affect its competitive position with respect to the leisure time and discretionary spending of its customers and, as a result, affect its busines…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$129M
  • Receivables$193M
  • Inventory$441K
  • Other current assets$753M
Current liabilities$985M
  • Debt due within a year$965M
  • Accounts payable$107M
Current ratio1.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$90Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$965M due · $129M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.7× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.7B$108M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$154Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$790M
'28$0
'29$0
'30$0

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$790Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$790Min 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$790Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $1.7B of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$18.0M$19.6M($131M)
2022$14.5M−$14.1M($237M)
2023$10.3M$9.6M($206M)
2024$8.6M$11.0M($143M)
2025$1.2M$863k

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$5M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Liberty Broadband is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2024.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$600M → $2.7B

    Debt rose from $600M to $2.7B while owner earnings went from about ($23M) to ($195M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-0.02×

    Across the record the business reported $7.1B of net income but generated ($134M) of operating cash, a -0.02-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Media & Broadcasting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LBTYALiberty Global Ltd. Class A$4.9B72%6.5%1%30%
AMCXAMC Global Media Inc.$2.3B51%15.8%13%12%
CABOCable One$1.5B27.3%10%19%
TDSTelephone and Data Systems$1.1B2.2%1%3%
GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc.$1.0B-33.2%-12%12%
LBRDALiberty Broadband$1.0B100%-54.0%-0%-40%
CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc.$976M57%16.1%17%14%
ADEAAdeia Inc.$443M34.5%13%47%
Group median64%11.1%5%13%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Liberty Broadband is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered1%/yr’19→’24

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−56%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Liberty Broadband (LBRDA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LBRDA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LB its page in the Manual LBRDK →

Industry order: ← IHRT the Media & Broadcasting chapter LBRDK →