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LBRDA, Liberty Broadband
Liberty provides Liberty Broadband with general and administrative services including legal, tax, accounting, treasury, information technology, cybersecurity and investor relations support.
Liberty Broadband reimburses Liberty for direct, out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Liberty in providing these services which are negotiated semi-annually, as necessary.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 24% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −54% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 18% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −0%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $31M | $13M | $22M | $15M | $51M | $988M | $975M | $981M | $1.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 113% | 184% | 106% | 220% | 149% | 45% | 41% | 41% | 43% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 33% | 62% | 27% | — | — | — | — | — | — | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($21M) | ($25M) | ($12M) | ($29M) | ($60M) | ($98M) | ($39M) | ($39M) | ($50M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −69.2% | −194.6% | −54.0% | −193.3% | −117.6% | −9.9% | −4.0% | −4.0% | −4.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $917M | $2.0B | $70M | $117M | $398M | $732M | $1.3B | $688M | $869M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | 17% | 24% | 25% | — | 23% | 18% | 20% | 18% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| ($12M) | ($30M) | ($26M) | ($37M) | ($96M) | $3M | ($56M) | $16M | $104M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $4M | $4M | $3M | $2M | $15M | $267M | $262M | $230M | $207M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($939M) | ($2.1B) | ($105M) | ($166M) | ($518M) | ($1.0B) | ($1.6B) | ($917M) | ($987M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $267K | $70K | $41K | $1M | $2M | $134M | $181M | $222M | $247M | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 6.7% | 3.9% | 13.6% | 18.6% | 22.6% | 24.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($12M) | ($30M) | ($26M) | ($38M) | ($98M) | ($131M) | ($237M) | ($206M) | ($143M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −39.8% | −229.9% | −118.2% | −253.3% | −192.2% | −13.3% | −24.3% | −21.0% | −14.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($12M) | ($30M) | ($26M) | ($38M) | ($98M) | ($131M) | ($237M) | ($206M) | ($143M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −39.8% | −229.9% | −118.2% | −253.3% | −192.2% | −13.3% | −24.3% | −21.0% | −14.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | $597M | $4.3B | $2.9B | $227M | $89M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -0% | -0% | -0% | -0% | -0% | -1% | -0% | -0% | -0% | ROICROIC |
| 11% | 19% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 7% | 15% | 8% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 19% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 7% | 15% | 8% | 9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $206M | $81M | $83M | $50M | $1.4B | $191M | $375M | $79M | $89M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | — | — | $351M | $217M | $189M | $181M | $193M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $8M | $5M | $4M | $6M | $98M | $99M | $92M | $86M | $112M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | — | — | — | $253M | $118M | $97M | $95M | $81M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $258M | $84M | $85M | $52M | $1.8B | $459M | $660M | $430M | $423M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $412M | $11M | $8M | $12M | $612M | $582M | $1.7B | $178M | $200M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.6× | 8.0× | 10.3× | 4.3× | 3.0× | 0.8× | 0.4× | 2.4× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $6M | — | $6M | $7M | $746M | $762M | $755M | $755M | $755M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $9.6B | $11.9B | $12.1B | $12.3B | $21.4B | $17.0B | $15.1B | $15.6B | $16.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $600M | $500M | $523M | $573M | $4.8B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.7B | $2.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $394M | $419M | $440M | $523M | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $2.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1.4× | -1.3× | -0.5× | -1.2× | -2.1× | -0.8× | -0.3× | -0.2× | -0.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $8.5B | $10.5B | $10.6B | $10.7B | $13.5B | $10.1B | $8.5B | $9.0B | $9.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 18.7% | 40.4% | 25.6% | 66.7% | 17.6% | 4.1% | 3.8% | 1.5% | 1.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 153M | 183M | 183M | 183M | 183M | 186M | 158M | 147M | 143M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.20 | $0.07 | $0.12 | $0.08 | $0.28 | $5.31 | $6.17 | $6.67 | $7.10 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $6.00 | $11.10 | $0.38 | $0.64 | $2.17 | $3.94 | $7.96 | $4.68 | $6.08 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.08 | $-0.16 | $-0.14 | $-0.21 | $-0.54 | $-0.70 | $-1.50 | $-1.40 | $-1.00 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.08 | $-0.16 | $-0.14 | $-0.21 | $-0.54 | $-0.70 | $-1.50 | $-1.40 | $-1.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.72 | $1.15 | $1.51 | $1.73 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $55.43 | $57.26 | $58.05 | $58.36 | $73.79 | $54.45 | $53.69 | $61.24 | $68.48 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +56.2%/yr | +144.1%/yr |
| EPS | +0.2%/yr | +56.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +136.8%/yr | +216.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +2.7%/yr | +3.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business reported $869M of profit but ($143M) of owner earnings: $1.0B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $869M | $688M | $1.3B | $732M | $398M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$207M | +$230M | +$262M | +$267M | +$15M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$15M | +$15M | +$37M | +$41M | +$9M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$987M | −$917M | −$1.6B | −$1.0B | −$518M |
| Cash from operations | $104M | $16M | ($56M) | $3M | ($96M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$247M | −$222M | −$181M | −$134M | −$2M |
| Owner earnings | ($143M) | ($206M) | ($237M) | ($131M) | ($98M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -14% | -21% | -24% | -13% | -192% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer ($158M).
Much of fiscal 2024's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.3×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($36M) ÷ interest expense $110M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $57M + ST investments $9M − debt $1.7B
What this means
Netting $66M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $440M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $1.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -87311dNegative, funded by othersDSO 69 + DIO 345 − DPO 87725 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -1%–-0%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($28M) ÷ invested capital $7.4BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -253%–-13%; latest ($574M) = operating cash ($327M) − maintenance capex $247MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -56% of revenue this year, a -40% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves ($579M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($327M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($2.7B) · cash from operations ($327M)
In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record, and a manipulation screen of eight balance-sheet ratios trips on it. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.19×MaintainingCapex $247M ÷ depreciation $207M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.10×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs ($884M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −7%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.56/share (latest year $-18.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $39.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 9
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −106% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −106% early to −4% lately, median −54% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2017 · −194.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“A failure to effectively anticipate or adapt to new technologies (including those that use AI) and changes in customer expectations and behavior could significantly adversely affect its competitive position with respect to the leisure time and discretionary spending of its customers and, as a result, affect its busines…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$129M
- Receivables$193M
- Inventory$441K
- Other current assets$753M
- Debt due within a year$965M
- Accounts payable$107M
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $18.0M | $19.6M | ($131M) |
| 2022 | $14.5M | −$14.1M | ($237M) |
| 2023 | $10.3M | $9.6M | ($206M) |
| 2024 | $8.6M | $11.0M | ($143M) |
| 2025 | $1.2M | $863k | — |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Liberty Broadband is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2024.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$600M → $2.7B
Debt rose from $600M to $2.7B while owner earnings went from about ($23M) to ($195M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?-0.02×
Across the record the business reported $7.1B of net income but generated ($134M) of operating cash, a -0.02-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Media & Broadcasting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LBTYALiberty Global Ltd. Class A | $4.9B | 72% | 6.5% | 1% | 30% |
| AMCXAMC Global Media Inc. | $2.3B | 51% | 15.8% | 13% | 12% |
| CABOCable One | $1.5B | — | 27.3% | 10% | 19% |
| TDSTelephone and Data Systems | $1.1B | — | 2.2% | 1% | 3% |
| GLIBAGCI Liberty, Inc. | $1.0B | — | -33.2% | -12% | 12% |
| LBRDALiberty Broadband | $1.0B | 100% | -54.0% | -0% | -40% |
| CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc. | $976M | 57% | 16.1% | 17% | 14% |
| ADEAAdeia Inc. | $443M | — | 34.5% | 13% | 47% |
| Group median | — | 64% | 11.1% | 5% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFLiberty Broadband is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered1%/yr’19→’24
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← LB its page in the Manual LBRDK →
Industry order: ← IHRT the Media & Broadcasting chapter LBRDK →