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ADNT, Adient plc Ordinary Shares
Adient plc is a global leader in the automotive seating supply industry with leading market positions in the Americas, Europe and Asia and maintains longstanding relationships with the largest global automotive original equipment manufacturers.
Adient's proprietary technologies extend into virtually every area of automotive seating solutions, including complete seating systems, frames, mechanisms, foam, head restraints, armrests and trim covers.
Adient is a global seat supplier with the capability to design, develop, engineer, manufacture, and deliver complete seat systems and components in every major automotive producing region in the world.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −0.2% through the cycle on a 6.3% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $16.8B | $16.2B | $17.4B | $16.5B | $12.7B | $13.7B | $14.1B | $15.4B | $14.7B | $14.5B | $14.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 10% | 9% | 5% | 5% | 5% | — | 6% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 6% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 7% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 3% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $293M | $976M | ($1.2B) | ($81M) | ($490M) | $1.4B | ($26M) | $205M | $50M | ($178M) | $166M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.7% | 6.0% | −6.9% | −0.5% | −3.9% | 9.9% | −0.2% | 1.3% | 0.3% | −1.2% | 1.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($1.5B) | $877M | ($1.7B) | ($491M) | ($547M) | $1.1B | ($120M) | $205M | $18M | ($281M) | $59M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 10% | — | — | — | 18% | — | 0% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($1.0B) | $746M | $679M | $308M | $246M | $260M | $274M | $667M | $543M | $449M | $546M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $327M | $337M | $400M | $278M | $295M | $285M | $298M | $290M | $285M | $279M | $280M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $157M | ($513M) | $1.9B | $501M | $483M | ($1.2B) | $67M | $138M | $209M | $419M | $168M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $437M | $577M | $536M | $468M | $326M | $260M | $227M | $252M | $266M | $245M | $274M | CapexCapex |
| 2.6% | 3.6% | 3.1% | 2.8% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.8% | 1.7% | 1.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($1.5B) | $169M | $143M | ($160M) | ($80M) | $0 | $47M | $415M | $277M | $204M | $272M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −8.8% | 1.0% | 0.8% | −1.0% | −0.6% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 2.7% | 1.9% | 1.4% | 1.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($1.5B) | $169M | $143M | ($160M) | ($80M) | $0 | $47M | $415M | $277M | $204M | $272M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −8.8% | 1.0% | 0.8% | −1.0% | −0.6% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 2.7% | 1.9% | 1.4% | 1.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $247M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $211M | $19M | $6M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $52M | $103M | $26M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $40M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $65M | $275M | $125M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 2% | 13% | -19% | -1% | -11% | 24% | -1% | 6% | 1% | -4% | 3% | ROICROIC |
| -37% | 20% | -70% | -27% | -45% | 47% | -6% | 9% | 1% | -16% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| −37% | 19% | −75% | −28% | −45% | 47% | — | — | — | — | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $105M | $709M | $687M | $924M | $1.7B | $1.5B | $947M | $1.1B | $945M | $958M | $831M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $660M | $735M | $824M | $793M | $685M | $976M | $953M | $841M | $758M | $695M | $735M | InventoryInvent. |
| $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.8B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($2.1B) | ($2.2B) | ($2.3B) | ($1.9B) | ($1.5B) | ($1.2B) | ($1.5B) | ($1.7B) | ($1.8B) | ($1.9B) | ($2.0B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $5.7B | $4.5B | $4.3B | $4.1B | $4.5B | $5.1B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $3.7B | $3.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.8B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $13.0B | $13.2B | $10.9B | $10.3B | $10.3B | $10.8B | $9.2B | $9.4B | $9.4B | $9.0B | $9.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $4.1B | $3.7B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $3.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.6B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $4.2B | $4.3B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $1.2B | $2.4B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $1.8B | $1.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 93.7M | 93.9M | 93.3M | 93.6M | 93.8M | 95.7M | 94.8M | 95.4M | 90.1M | 83.0M | 79.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $179.19 | $172.66 | $186.91 | $176.56 | $135.07 | $142.95 | $148.96 | $161.37 | $163.02 | $175.12 | $188.14 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-16.50 | $9.34 | $-18.06 | $-5.25 | $-5.83 | $11.58 | $-1.27 | $2.15 | $0.20 | $-3.39 | $0.74 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-15.70 | $1.80 | $1.53 | $-1.71 | $-0.85 | $0.00 | $0.50 | $4.35 | $3.07 | $2.46 | $3.43 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-15.70 | $1.80 | $1.53 | $-1.71 | $-0.85 | $0.00 | $0.50 | $4.35 | $3.07 | $2.46 | $3.43 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.55 | $1.10 | $0.28 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $4.66 | $6.14 | $5.74 | $5.00 | $3.48 | $2.72 | $2.39 | $2.64 | $2.95 | $2.95 | $3.45 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $44.57 | $45.57 | $25.64 | $19.74 | $12.93 | $24.83 | $21.87 | $23.35 | $23.68 | $21.28 | $21.57 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.3%/yr | +5.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −5.0%/yr | −3.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | −7.9%/yr | +10.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $281M loss into $204M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($281M) | $18M | $205M | ($120M) | $1.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$279M | +$285M | +$290M | +$298M | +$285M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$32M | +$31M | +$34M | +$29M | +$36M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$419M | +$209M | +$138M | +$67M | −$1.2B |
| Cash from operations | $449M | $543M | $667M | $274M | $260M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$245M | −$266M | −$252M | −$227M | −$260M |
| Owner earnings | $204M | $277M | $415M | $47M | $0 |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $32M), owner earnings is nearer $172M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $958M − debt $2.4B
What this means
Netting $958M of cash and short-term investments against $2.4B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -19%–24%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($141M) ÷ invested capital $3.2BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $204M = operating cash $449M − maintenance capex $245M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 0%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 0% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32M of SBC) leaves $172M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($281M) · cash from operations $449M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $125M ÷ Owner Earnings $204M
What this means
Of $204M Owner Earnings, $125M (61%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $125M buybacks. Net of $32M stock comp, the real buyback was about $93M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.88×MaintainingCapex $245M ÷ depreciation $279M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $14.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.12×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.4B vs $446M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.25/share (latest year $-3.58), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $22.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 0% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, 0% lately, median −0%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · −6.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Artificial intelligence technology is complex and rapidly evolving, and may subject Adient to significant competitive, legal, regulatory, operational and other risks.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$831M
- Inventory$735M
- Other current assets$2.7B
- Accounts payable$2.8B
- Other current liabilities$1.1B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.0B against the $6M due in the twelve months after the Sep 30, 2025 schedule: 173 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $3.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$3.6B · 115%
- Dividends$181M · 6%
- Buybacks$505M · 16%
- Returned to owners$686M
$181M as dividends and $505M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$28.26
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 18M shares were bought for $505M, about $28.26 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $20.44 (2025) to $69.75 (2017); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $29.18 ($275M).
- Net change in share count−15.3%
The diluted count fell from 94M to 79M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$333M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 69% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Del Grosso | $14.2M | $35.0M | $0 |
| 2022 | Mr. Del Grosso | $15.4M | $4.6M | $47M |
| 2023 | Mr. Del Grosso | $14.7M | $27.7M | $415M |
| 2024 | Mr. Del Grosso | $11.2M | — | $277M |
| 2024 | Mr. Dorlack | $9.5M | $3.0M | $277M |
| 2025 | Mr. Dorlack | $13.1M | $11.2M | $204M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$32M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Adient plc Ordinary Shares is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?4% → 5% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $660M to $735M while revenue grew −11%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (4% of revenue then, 5% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $1.6B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Components
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LEALear Corporation | $23.3B | 7% | 3.9% | 11% | 3% |
| APTVAptiv PLC | $20.4B | 19% | 9.1% | 14% | 6% |
| ADNTAdient plc Ordinary Shares | $14.5B | 6% | 0.1% | 0% | 1% |
| BWABorgWarner Inc. | $14.3B | 19% | 8.1% | 9% | 7% |
| ALVAutoliv Inc. | $10.8B | 19% | 8.3% | 15% | 6% |
| OSKOshkosh | $10.4B | 17% | 8.1% | 14% | 5% |
| DANDana Incorporated Common Stock | $7.5B | 9% | 2.6% | 5% | 2% |
| DCHDauch Corporation | $5.8B | 13% | 3.2% | 5% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 15% | 6.0% | 10% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Adient plc Ordinary Shares has delivered.
Adient plc Ordinary Shares’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Adient plc Ordinary Shares earns about $84M on its 0.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $272M on 78M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $1.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($274M) runs well above depreciation ($280M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $301M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ADMA its page in the Manual ADP →
Industry order: ← 6902 the Auto Components chapter AEVA →