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DAN, Dana Incorporated Common Stock
Divestiture of Off-Highway Business — Dana has embarked on a strategic plan to focus on our core on-highway markets, creating a more focused and nimble Dana through the divestiture of our Off-Highway business.
We are a world leader in providing power-conveyance and energy-management solutions for on-highway vehicles.
Our Light Vehicle and Power Technologies segments primarily supported light vehicle original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) with products for light trucks, SUVs, CUVs, vans and passenger cars.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Light Vehicle (70%) and Commercial Vehicle (30%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 8.7% and operating margin about 1.9% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −2.3% to 7.1% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, mix and the cost of the platform. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Light Vehicle is 70% of revenue, with Commercial Vehicle the other meaningful segment at 30%.
- Light Vehicle70%$5.2B
- Commercial Vehicle30%$2.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $5.8B | $7.2B | $8.1B | $8.6B | $7.1B | $8.9B | $10.2B | $7.6B | $7.7B | $7.5B | $7.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 14% | 15% | 14% | 13% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 5% | 5% | 8% | 9% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 7% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $332M | $490M | $579M | $292M | $124M | $395M | $86M | ($108M) | ($176M) | $139M | $150M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.7% | 6.8% | 7.1% | 3.4% | 1.7% | 4.4% | 0.8% | −1.4% | −2.3% | 1.9% | 2.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $640M | $111M | $427M | $226M | ($31M) | $197M | ($242M) | $38M | ($57M) | $85M | $1.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 15% | — | — | 27% | — | 16% | — | 38% | 6% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $384M | $554M | $568M | $637M | $386M | $158M | $649M | $476M | $450M | $512M | $354M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $173M | $220M | $260M | $322M | $345M | $365M | $365M | $299M | $337M | $345M | $347M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($429M) | $223M | ($119M) | $89M | $72M | ($404M) | $526M | $139M | $170M | $82M | ($1.2B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $322M | $393M | $325M | $426M | $326M | $369M | $440M | $427M | $312M | $214M | $209M | CapexCapex |
| 5.5% | 5.5% | 4.0% | 4.9% | 4.6% | 4.1% | 4.3% | 5.6% | 4.0% | 2.9% | 2.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $62M | $161M | $243M | $211M | $60M | ($211M) | $209M | $49M | $138M | $298M | $145M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.1% | 2.2% | 3.0% | 2.4% | 0.8% | −2.4% | 2.1% | 0.6% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 1.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $62M | $161M | $243M | $211M | $60M | ($211M) | $209M | $49M | $138M | $298M | $145M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.1% | 2.2% | 3.0% | 2.4% | 0.8% | −2.4% | 2.1% | 0.6% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 1.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $78M | $185M | $153M | $668M | $6M | $18M | $1M | — | — | — | $1M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $35M | $35M | $58M | $58M | $15M | $58M | $58M | $58M | $58M | $54M | $52M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $81M | — | $25M | $25M | — | $23M | $25M | — | — | $650M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 16% | 11% | 19% | 8% | 2% | 7% | 1% | -2% | -4% | 3% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| 55% | 11% | 32% | 12% | -2% | 10% | -16% | 2% | -4% | 10% | 59% | Return on equityROE |
| 52% | 8% | 27% | 9% | −3% | 7% | −19% | −1% | −9% | 4% | 56% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $737M | $643M | $531M | $527M | $629M | $285M | $425M | $529M | $494M | $469M | $490M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $721M | $994M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $890M | $987M | $1.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $638M | $969M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $994M | InventoryInvent. |
| $819M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $540M | $798M | $879M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.8B | $817M | $848M | $1.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.3B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $3.7B | $3.9B | $3.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.3B | $2.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.8× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $90M | $127M | $264M | $493M | $479M | $482M | $259M | $263M | $250M | — | $257M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $4.9B | $5.6B | $5.9B | $7.2B | $7.4B | $7.6B | $7.4B | $7.9B | $7.5B | $7.8B | $6.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $1.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $916M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $770M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.9× | 4.8× | 6.0× | 2.4× | 0.9× | 3.0× | 0.7× | -0.7× | -1.1× | 0.8× | 0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $840M | $2.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | $6M | $51M | — | $191M | — | — | — | $191M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 147M | 147M | 147M | 145M | 145M | 146M | 144M | 144M | 145M | 134M | 110M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $39.69 | $49.07 | $55.58 | $59.41 | $49.18 | $61.18 | $70.72 | $52.72 | $53.26 | $56.10 | $69.04 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.36 | $0.76 | $2.91 | $1.56 | $-0.21 | $1.35 | $-1.69 | $0.26 | $-0.39 | $0.64 | $10.44 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.42 | $1.10 | $1.66 | $1.45 | $0.42 | $-1.44 | $1.46 | $0.34 | $0.95 | $2.23 | $1.32 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.42 | $1.10 | $1.66 | $1.45 | $0.42 | $-1.44 | $1.46 | $0.34 | $0.95 | $2.23 | $1.32 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.24 | $0.24 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $0.10 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $0.47 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.19 | $2.68 | $2.22 | $2.94 | $2.26 | $2.52 | $3.06 | $2.96 | $2.15 | $1.60 | $1.90 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $7.88 | $6.90 | $9.18 | $12.91 | $12.17 | $13.15 | $10.80 | $10.91 | $9.18 | $6.28 | $17.79 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.9%/yr | +2.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +20.3%/yr | +39.9%/yr |
| EPS | −19.3%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +6.0%/yr | +31.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −3.4%/yr | −6.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | −2.5%/yr | −12.4%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Commercial Vehicle Segment-8.1%
“Commercial Vehicle Segment Segment EBITDA Sales EBITDA Margin 2024 $ 2,484 $ 134 5.4 % Volume and mix (253 ) (63 ) Performance 46 126 Currency effects 6 2 2025 $ 2,283 $ 199 8.7 % Commercial Vehicle sales, exclusive of currency effects, were 8% lower than 2024, reflecting generally weaker global markets partially offset by the conversion of sales backlog and net customer pricing and cost and tariff recovery actions.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $85M of profit into $298M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $85M | ($57M) | $38M | ($242M) | $197M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$345M | +$337M | +$299M | +$365M | +$365M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$82M | +$170M | +$139M | +$526M | −$404M |
| Cash from operations | $512M | $450M | $476M | $649M | $158M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$214M | −$312M | −$427M | −$440M | −$369M |
| Owner earnings | $298M | $138M | $49M | $209M | ($211M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 2% | 1% | 2% | -2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $139M ÷ interest expense $181M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.1B · 15.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $469M + ST investments $17M − debt $2.6B
What this means
Netting $486M of cash and short-term investments against $2.6B of debt leaves $2.1B owed, about 15.2× a year's operating profit (18.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 48 + DIO 54 − DPO 61 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -4%–19%; 3% latest = NOPAT $86M ÷ invested capital $3.0BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $298M = operating cash $512M − maintenance capex $214M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)Industry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $290M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $512M ÷ net income $85M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $704M ÷ Owner Earnings $298M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $298M of Owner Earnings, $704M (236%) went back to shareholders, $54M dividends, $650M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $8M stock comp, the real buyback was about $642M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.62×HarvestingCapex $214M ÷ depreciation $345M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $7.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.17×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.6B vs $560M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −94%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.20/share (latest year $0.79), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 7% early to −1% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −38%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −2.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“AI algorithms may be flawed or perform unpredictably, and datasets may be insufficient, inaccurate, biased or otherwise problematic, which could lead to errors, operational disruptions, unintended outcomes or suboptimal decisions.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$490M
- Receivables$1.3B
- Inventory$994M
- Other current assets$498M
- Debt due within a year$40M
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$800M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.1B, of which the leases are 16%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$3.6B · 74%
- Dividends$487M · 10%
- Buybacks$829M · 17%
- Returned to owners$1.3B
108% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $487M as dividends and $829M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $829M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
- Net change in share count−25.1%
The diluted count fell from 147M to 110M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.40/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$248M written down across 3 years (2019, 2020, 2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 22% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $10.6M | $12.4M | ($211M) |
| 2022 | $11.9M | $4.5M | $209M |
| 2023 | $17.3M | $14.6M | $49M |
| 2024 | $10.6M | $14.2M | $138M |
| 2024 | $13.9M | $10.6M | $138M |
| 2025 | $5.6M | $19.1M | $298M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio128:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Dana Incorporated Common Stock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?23% → 30% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.4B to $2.3B while revenue grew 30%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (23% of revenue then, 30% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Components
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ADNTAdient plc Ordinary Shares | $14.5B | 6% | 0.1% | 0% | 1% |
| BWABorgWarner Inc. | $14.3B | 19% | 8.1% | 9% | 7% |
| ALVAutoliv Inc. | $10.8B | 19% | 8.3% | 15% | 6% |
| DANDana Incorporated Common Stock | $7.5B | 9% | 2.6% | 5% | 2% |
| DCHDauch Corporation | $5.8B | 13% | 3.2% | 5% | 3% |
| LCIILCI Industries | $4.1B | 23% | 8.2% | 12% | 8% |
| PATKPatrick Industries Inc. | $4.0B | 19% | 7.4% | 12% | 7% |
| VCVisteon Corporation | $3.8B | 13% | 5.7% | 28% | 3% |
| Group median | — | 16% | 6.6% | 11% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dana Incorporated Common Stock has delivered.
Dana Incorporated Common Stock’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Dana Incorporated Common Stock earns about $144M on its 1.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $145M on 108M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $770M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← DAL its page in the Manual DAR →
Industry order: ← CPS the Auto Components chapter DCH →