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ADV, Advantage Solutions Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies diversified UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

Retailer Services Retailer Services provides solutions that support retailers in the development of in store merchandising execution, private brands and retail media and marketing initiatives.

We provide outsourced sales, marketing, merchandising, sampling, and retailer support services to consumer packaged goods ("CPG") manufacturers and retailers primarily across North America.

Our services are designed to support distribution, retail execution, shopper engagement, and private brand development across both physical and digital commerce environments.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ADV · Advantage Solutions Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.5B

−0.7% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.6B 5-yr avg $3.7B

Operating margin −3.0% 5-yr avg −9.0%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg −13%

Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −3.6% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −8%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$3.7B	$3.8B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.9B	$3.6B	$3.5B	$3.6B	RevenueRevenue
4%	5%	10%	5%	5%	6%	9%	8%	7%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($1.1B)	$214M	$67M	$230M	($1.5B)	$47M	($295M)	($126M)	($108M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−29.4%	5.6%	2.1%	6.4%	−41.0%	1.2%	−8.3%	−3.6%	−3.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($1.2B)	($21M)	($176M)	$54M	($1.4B)	($63M)	($327M)	($228M)	($243M)	Net incomeNet inc.
									Cash flow & returns
$126M	$151M	$346M	$126M	$105M	$228M	$93M	$62M	$125M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$225M	$233M	$239M	$240M	$216M	$209M	$205M	$202M	$203M	DepreciationDeprec.
$1.1B	($61M)	$193M	($154M)	$1.3B	$85M	$215M	$89M	$165M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$47M	$52M	$31M	$31M	$12M	$21M	$8M	$6M	$3M	CapexCapex
1.3%	1.4%	1.0%	0.9%	0.3%	0.5%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$79M	$99M	$315M	$95M	$92M	$208M	$85M	$55M	$122M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
2.1%	2.6%	10.0%	2.6%	2.5%	5.3%	2.4%	1.6%	3.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$79M	$99M	$315M	$95M	$92M	$208M	$85M	$55M	$122M	Free cash flowFCF
2.1%	2.6%	10.0%	2.6%	2.5%	5.3%	2.4%	1.6%	3.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$186M	$11M	$68M	$43M	$74M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$0	$13M	$0	$6M	$34M	$869K	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	—	3%	-39%	—	-10%	-5%	-5%	ROICROIC
-69%	-1%	-7%	2%	-123%	-6%	-44%	-41%	-51%	Return on equityROE
−69%	−1%	−7%	2%	−123%	−6%	−44%	−41%	−51%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$142M	$184M	$204M	$165M	$118M	$121M	$205M	$241M	$144M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	—	—	—	$869M	$659M	$603M	$595M	$573M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$179M	$195M	$277M	$261M	$173M	$158M	$162M	$176M	Accounts payablePayables
—	—	—	—	$608M	$487M	$445M	$433M	$396M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$952M	$900M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.0B	$911M	$973M	$805M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$518M	$575M	$646M	$601M	$541M	$460M	$433M	$412M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.8×	1.6×	1.7×	1.9×	1.9×	2.0×	2.2×	2.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$725M	$710M	$477M	$439M	$439M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$6.0B	$5.8B	$5.9B	$4.3B	$3.8B	$3.1B	$2.8B	$2.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	$3.2B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.5B	Total debtDebt
—	$3.0B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.7×	0.9×	0.3×	1.7×	-14.3×	0.3×	-2.0×	-0.9×	-0.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.7B	$1.6B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$749M	$554M	$478M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
−0.2%	0.0%	2.8%	−0.4%	−0.2%	−0.1%	0.0%	−0.0%	0.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$652M	—	—	—	$1.4B	—	$233M	$37M	$37M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
									Per share
12.2M	12.2M	13.4M	12.8M	12.7M	12.9M	12.9M	13.0M	13.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$303.28	$309.62	$235.61	$280.55	$286.05	$301.24	$277.31	$272.88	$274.56	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-94.67	$-1.73	$-13.13	$4.24	$-108.30	$-4.89	$-25.42	$-17.54	$-18.62	EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.48	$8.09	$23.50	$7.38	$7.24	$16.05	$6.63	$4.24	$9.34	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$6.48	$8.09	$23.50	$7.38	$7.24	$16.05	$6.63	$4.24	$9.34	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.86	$4.29	$2.31	$2.43	$0.97	$1.60	$0.61	$0.50	$0.21	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$136.55	$129.06	$180.82	$193.40	$88.17	$85.38	$58.22	$42.67	$36.55	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before TTM are restated ×1/25 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−1.5%/yr	+3.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−5.9%/yr	−29.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−25.3%/yr	−26.4%/yr
Book value / share	−15.3%/yr	−25.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

325Mpeak FY2020

ROIC

−5%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

26.0×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$55Mowner earningsvs.($228M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $228M loss into $55M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($228M)	($327M)	($63M)	($1.4B)	$54M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$202M	+$205M	+$209M	+$216M	+$240M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	−$2M	+$723K	−$3M	−$7M	−$15M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$89M	+$215M	+$85M	+$1.3B	−$154M
Cash from operations	$62M	$93M	$228M	$105M	$126M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$6M	−$8M	−$21M	−$12M	−$31M
Owner earnings	$55M	$85M	$208M	$92M	$95M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	2%	5%	3%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less ($2M)), owner earnings is nearer $57M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.9×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($126M) ÷ interest expense $139M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.4B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $241M − debt $1.7B

What this means
Netting $241M of cash and short-term investments against $1.7B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -10%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range -39%–3%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($100M) ÷ invested capital $2.0B

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 2%–10%; latest $55M = operating cash $62M − maintenance capex $6M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less ($2M) of SBC) leaves $57M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $62M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($228M) · cash from operations $62M

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 2%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $869K ÷ Owner Earnings $55M

What this means
Of $55M Owner Earnings, $869K (2%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $869K buybacks. Net of ($2M) stock comp, the real buyback was about $2M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.03×

Harvesting

Capex $6M ÷ depreciation $202M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.25×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.7B vs $540M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-15.49/share (latest year $-17.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $41.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −7% → −4% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −7% early to −4% lately, median −4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · −41.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +6.9%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We cannot control the availability or pricing of such third-party AI Technologies, especially in a highly competitive environment, and we may be unable to negotiate favorable economic terms with the applicable providers.”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$805M

Cash & short-term investments$144M
Receivables$573M
Other current assets$88M

Current liabilities$412M

Debt due within a year$26M
Accounts payable$176M
Other current liabilities$210M

Current ratio1.95×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.95×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.35×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$393Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$26M due · $144M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($912M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.6B$32M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$25Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$209M · 17%
Buybacks$54M · 4%
Retained (debt / cash)$974M · 79%

Returned to owners$54M
5% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $54M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $54M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count7.0%
The diluted count rose from 12M to 13M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.4B51% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity79%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$382Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $209M of capital spent building

$2.3B written down across 4 years (2018, 2022, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership9.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation($2M)
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, -0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Advantage Solutions Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.1% vs 4.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 4.9% early in the record and 3.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?7.0%
Diluted shares grew 7.0% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $54M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 8 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 8 years, $2.3B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc.	$6.9B	28%	14.4%	18%	13%
MMSMaximus	$5.4B	23%	9.7%	16%	8%
TNETTriNet Group Inc.	$5.0B	—	7.1%	38%	7%
RBARB Global Inc.	$4.6B	—	16.4%	8%	17%
WUWestern Union	$3.9B	39%	19.6%	42%	15%
ADVAdvantage Solutions Inc.	$3.5B	—	-1.2%	-8%	3%
CBZCBIZ	$2.8B	14%	8.5%	5%	9%
ALITAlight Inc.	$2.3B	—	-3.6%	-1%	9%
Group median	—	—	9.1%	12%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Advantage Solutions Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Advantage Solutions Inc. earns about $91M on its 2.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($91M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25−3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $122M on 13M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ADV against another business →

The owners of ADV: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Advantage Solutions Inc. (ADV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ADV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ADUS its page in the Manual AEBI →

Industry order: ← ADT the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter AHG →