Owner Scorecard


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CBZ, CBIZ

Commercial Services & Supplies diversified Serial acquirer

CBIZ is a leading professional services advisor to middle-market businesses nationwide.

With industry knowledge and expertise in accounting, tax, advisory, benefits, insurance, and technology, CBIZ delivers actionable insights to help clients anticipate what is next and discover new ways to accelerate growth.

CBIZ has more than 9,500 team members across more than 140 locations in 23 major markets coast to coast.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CBZ · CBIZ
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.8B
+52.1% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $1.7B
Gross margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%
Operating margin 8.5% 5-yr avg 8.3%
ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 6%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Financial Services (83%), Benefits and Insurance Services (15%) and National Practices (2%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 53% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 7 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 13% and operating margin about 8.5% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Financial Services is 83% of revenue, with Benefits and Insurance Services the other meaningful segment at 15%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Financial Services83%$2.3B
  • Benefits and Insurance Services15%$410M
  • National Practices2%$47M
By geographyUnited States100%Canada0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$800M$855M$922M$948M$964M$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.8B$2.8B$2.8BRevenueRevenue
13%12%14%13%14%14%16%14%10%13%13%Gross marginGross mgn
5%4%4%5%5%5%4%4%6%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$66M$66M$93M$81M$92M$73M$168M$165M$74M$234M$234MOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.2%7.8%10.0%8.5%9.6%6.6%11.9%10.4%4.1%8.5%8.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$40M$50M$62M$71M$78M$71M$105M$121M$41M$115M$115MNet incomeNet inc.
40%32%23%24%24%24%26%27%29%28%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$74M$77M$105M$98M$147M$131M$126M$154M$124M$192M$192MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$22M$23M$24M$22M$23M$27M$33M$36M$48M$98M$98MDepreciationDeprec.
$12M$4M$20M($2M)$37M$22M($27M)($16M)$21M($47M)($47M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M$12M$15M$14M$12M$9M$9M$23M$13M$17M$17MCapexCapex
0.5%1.4%1.6%1.5%1.2%0.8%0.6%1.4%0.7%0.6%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$70M$65M$91M$84M$135M$122M$117M$130M$111M$176M$176MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.7%7.6%9.8%8.9%14.0%11.1%8.3%8.2%6.1%6.4%6.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$70M$65M$91M$84M$135M$122M$117M$130M$111M$176M$176MFree cash flowFCF
8.7%7.6%9.8%8.9%14.0%11.1%8.3%8.2%6.1%6.4%6.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M$28M$29M$12M$71M$67M$79M$53M$1.1B$2M$2MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$9M$20M$17M$27M$56M$97M$123M$65M$0$160MBuybacksBuybacks
5%5%7%6%6%5%10%9%1%4%4%ROICROIC
8%9%10%11%11%10%15%15%2%7%7%Return on equityROE
8%9%10%11%11%10%15%15%2%7%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3M$424K$640K$567K$5M$2M$5M$8M$14M$18M$18MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$175M$188M$207M$222M$216M$242M$334M$380M$535M$556M$556MReceivablesReceiv.
$46M$51M$59M$69M$64M$66M$81M$83M$91M$91M$91MAccounts payablePayables
$130M$137M$149M$154M$152M$176M$254M$297M$444M$465M$465MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$442M$448M$424M$456M$436M$452M$568M$613M$836M$899M$899MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$339M$334M$321M$366M$378M$423M$512M$512M$706M$736M$736MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.3×1.3×1.2×1.2×1.1×1.1×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$487M$528M$564M$588M$683M$741M$820M$865M$2.3B$2.3B$2.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.9B$2.0B$4.5B$4.4B$4.4BTotal assetsAssets
$400M$400M$400M$400M$400M$400M$600M$600M$2.0B$2.0B$2.0BTotal debtDebt
$397M$400M$399M$399M$395M$398M$595M$592M$2.0B$2.0B$2.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
20.9×8.2×2.1×2.2×2.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$480M$531M$594M$659M$703M$705M$713M$792M$1.8B$1.8B$1.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.9%1.0%1.0%0.8%0.8%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
53.5M55.7M56.5M55.9M55.4M53.7M52.4M50.6M52.7M63.2M63.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.95$15.36$16.32$16.97$17.41$20.57$26.95$31.47$34.44$43.61$43.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.75$0.90$1.09$1.27$1.41$1.32$2.01$2.39$0.78$1.83$1.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.31$1.17$1.60$1.51$2.44$2.27$2.24$2.58$2.10$2.78$2.78Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.31$1.17$1.60$1.51$2.44$2.27$2.24$2.58$2.10$2.78$2.78Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08$0.21$0.26$0.25$0.21$0.17$0.16$0.46$0.25$0.27$0.27Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.97$9.53$10.51$11.79$12.69$13.11$13.62$15.66$33.80$27.86$27.86Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.6%/yr+20.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.7%/yr+2.6%/yr
EPS+10.4%/yr+5.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.8%/yr+5.1%/yr
Book value / share+13.4%/yr+17.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
63Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
4%low FY2024
Gross margin
13%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
11.3×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$176Mowner earningsvs.$115Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $115M of profit into $176M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$115M
Owner earnings$176M · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$115M$41M$121M$105M$71M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$98M+$48M+$36M+$33M+$27M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$26M+$14M+$12M+$15M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$47M+$21M−$16M−$27M+$22M
Cash from operations$192M$124M$154M$126M$131M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$17M−$13M−$23M−$9M−$9M
Owner earnings$176M$111M$130M$117M$122M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%6%8%8%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $150M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $234M ÷ interest expense $107M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.0B · 8.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $18M − debt $2.0B
    What this means

    Netting $18M of cash and short-term investments against $2.0B of debt leaves $2.0B owed, about 8.5× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 74 + DIO 0 − DPO 14 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–10%; 4% latest = NOPAT $168M ÷ invested capital $3.7B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 6%–14%; latest $176M = operating cash $192M − maintenance capex $17M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $150M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $192M ÷ net income $115M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $160M ÷ Owner Earnings $176M
    What this means

    Of $176M Owner Earnings, $160M (91%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $160M buybacks. Net of $26M stock comp, the real buyback was about $134M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.17×
    Harvesting
    Capex $17M ÷ depreciation $98M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.0B vs $164M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +83%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.68/share (latest year $2.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.99/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 9% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 9% early, 8% lately, median 8%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 4.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Additionally, rapid changes in artificial intelligence, block chain-based technology, automation and related innovations are increasing the competitiveness landscape.”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$899M
  • Cash & short-term investments$18M
  • Receivables$556M
  • Other current assets$325M
Current liabilities$736M
  • Debt due within a year$66M
  • Accounts payable$91M
  • Other current liabilities$578M
Current ratio1.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$164Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$66M due · $18M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+58.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($568M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.8B$373M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.4B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$83M
'27$77M
'28$62M
'29$54M
'30$45M
later$139M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$83Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$460Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$373Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.0B
Lease obligations (present value)$373M
Total fixed claims on the business$2.4B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.4B, of which the leases are 16%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$127M · 10%
  • Buybacks$575M · 47%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$526M · 43%
  • Returned to owners$575M

    52% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $575M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $15M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $575M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count18.2%

    The diluted count rose from 54M to 63M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained36%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($179M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $64M, so each retained $1 added about 0.36 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$2.3B53% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$1.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $127M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Grisko$5.1M$9.6M$122M
2022Mr. Grisko$4.9M$9.8M$117M
2023Mr. Grisko$5.2M$9.1M$130M
2024Mr. Grisko$5.4M$9.9M$111M
2025Mr. Grisko$7.1M$2.0M$176M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$26M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why CBIZ is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.9% vs 8.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.7% early in the record and 6.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?18.2%

    Diluted shares grew 18.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $575M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$400M → $2.0B

    Debt rose from $400M to $2.0B while owner earnings went from about $75M to $139M — about 5.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 14 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
TNETTriNet Group Inc.$5.0B7.1%38%7%
RBARB Global Inc.$4.6B16.4%8%17%
WUWestern Union$3.9B39%19.6%42%15%
ADVAdvantage Solutions Inc.$3.5B-1.2%-8%3%
CBZCBIZ$2.8B14%8.5%5%9%
ALITAlight Inc.$2.3B-3.6%-1%9%
WEXWEX Inc.$1.8B45%29.9%7%25%
RELYRemitly Global Inc.$1.6B-11.4%-27%5%
Group median39%7.8%6%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CBIZ has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, CBIZ earns about $235M on its 8.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $176M on 55M shares outstanding, per the 10-K/A cover, as of 2026-02-20; net debt $2.0B. The if-converted diluted count is 63M, 15% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CBIZ (CBZ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CBZ, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CBU its page in the Manual CC →

Industry order: ← CASS the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter CMPR →