Owner Scorecard


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AI, C3.ai Inc.

Software asset-light UnprofitableNet current asset value

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Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
AI · C3.ai Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$250M
−35.7% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $575M
Cash burn · annual $190M
Runway 3.0 yrs

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −83% through the cycle on a 67% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 45% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −36%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$92M$157M$183M$253M$267M$311M$389M$250M$250MRevenueRevenue
67%75%76%75%68%57%61%31%31%Gross marginGross mgn
24%19%18%24%29%26%24%39%39%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
41%41%38%60%79%65%58%92%92%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($36M)($71M)($60M)($196M)($290M)($318M)($324M)($498M)($498M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−39.3%−45.6%−32.9%−77.6%−108.9%−102.5%−83.4%−199.2%−199.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
($33M)($69M)($56M)($192M)($269M)($280M)($289M)($470M)($470M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($35M)($61M)($38M)($86M)($116M)($62M)($41M)($190M)($190M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$550K$1M$4M$5M$6M$13M$13M$14M$14MDepreciationDeprec.
($6M)($2M)($8M)($13M)($69M)($11M)$4M$3M$3MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$7M$2M$2M$4M$71M$25M$3M$2M$2MCapexCapex
7.4%1.5%0.9%1.5%26.4%8.1%0.8%0.8%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($35M)($63M)($39M)($90M)($122M)($75M)($44M)($192M)($192M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−38.7%−39.9%−21.4%−35.7%−45.6%−24.2%−11.4%−76.8%−76.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($42M)($64M)($39M)($90M)($186M)($88M)($44M)($192M)($192M)Free cash flowFCF
−45.5%−40.6%−21.4%−35.7%−69.8%−28.2%−11.4%−76.8%−76.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$15M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
-5%-24%-36%-36%-38%-67%-67%ROICROIC
-5%-19%-29%-32%-34%-72%-72%Return on equityROE
−5%−19%−29%−32%−34%−72%−72%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$99M$245M$1.1B$960M$812M$750M$743M$575M$575MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$31M$65M$80M$135M$130M$137M$101M$101MReceivablesReceiv.
$5M$12M$54M$25M$11M$15M$6M$6MAccounts payablePayables
$26M$53M$26M$110M$119M$122M$95M$95MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$281M$1.2B$1.1B$889M$904M$904M$708M$708MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$81M$124M$150M$136M$102M$132M$107M$107MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.5×9.4×7.1×6.5×8.8×6.9×6.6×6.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$625K$625K$625K$625K$625K$625K$625K$625KGoodwillGoodwill
$305M$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$816M$816MTotal assetsAssets
($99M)($245M)($1.1B)($960M)($812M)($750M)($743M)($575M)($575M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($165M)($183M)$1.1B$989M$930M$873M$838M$654M$654MShareholders’ equityEquity
4.7%5.3%11.9%44.9%81.2%69.5%59.4%105.4%105.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
105M104M110M119M129M141M141MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.74$2.42$2.43$2.60$3.01$1.78$1.78Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.53$-1.84$-2.45$-2.34$-2.24$-3.35$-3.35EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.37$-0.86$-1.11$-0.63$-0.34$-1.37$-1.37Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.37$-0.86$-1.70$-0.73$-0.34$-1.37$-1.37Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02$0.04$0.64$0.21$0.02$0.01$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.11$9.48$8.46$7.32$6.49$4.65$4.65Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2022 are restated ×30 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+0.4%/yr (5-yr)+0.4%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.6%/yr (5-yr)−2.6%/yr
Book value / share−14.4%/yr (5-yr)−14.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
141Mpeak FY2026
ROIC
−67%low FY2026
Gross margin
31%low FY2026

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($192M)owner earningsvs.($470M)net incomelow FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $470M loss into ($192M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income($470M)($289M)($280M)($269M)($192M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$14M+$13M+$13M+$6M+$5M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$264M+$231M+$216M+$217M+$113M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$3M+$4M−$11M−$69M−$13M
Cash from operations($190M)($41M)($62M)($116M)($86M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2M−$3M−$13M−$6M−$4M
Owner earnings($192M)($44M)($75M)($122M)($90M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$13M−$64M
Free cash flow($192M)($44M)($88M)($186M)($90M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-77%-11%-24%-46%-36%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $264M), owner earnings is nearer ($456M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $66M + ST investments $509M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $575M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 147 + DIO 0 − DPO 12 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -39%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -77%–-11%; latest ($192M) = operating cash ($190M) − maintenance capex $2M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -77% of revenue this year, a -39% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $264M of SBC) leaves ($456M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($470M) · cash from operations ($190M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.14×
    Harvesting
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $14M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $250M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.64×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.46/share (latest year $-3.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −39% → −128% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −39% early to −128% lately, median −83% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Worst year 2026 · −199.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2026, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Any such reputational damage may result in reduced demand for our C3 AI Software, increased risk of losing market share, and costly remediation efforts that may not be successful.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$708M
  • Cash & short-term investments$575M
  • Receivables$101M
  • Other current assets$32M
Current liabilities$107M
  • Accounts payable$6M
  • Other current liabilities$101M
Current ratio6.64×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio6.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio5.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$601Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway3.0 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−46.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters7.9× → 6.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$653Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$545MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$59M$59M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$36Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Siebel$29.8M$839.1M($39M)
2022Mr. Siebel$26.9M−$488.9M($90M)
2023Mr. Siebel$31.7M$50.0M($122M)
2024Mr. Siebel$24.8M$82.2M($75M)
2025Mr. Siebel$25.5M$39.5M($44M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership20.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio118:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$264M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 105% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AMPLAmplitude Inc.$343M70%-32.2%-77%-4%
MKTWMarketWise Inc.$328M57%11.6%14%
DOMODomo, Inc.$319M73%-34.5%-8%
CRNCCerence Inc.$252M70%1.3%-1%12%
AIC3.ai Inc.$250M67%-80.5%-36%-37%
WEAVWeave Communications Inc.$239M63%-35.0%-111%-10%
XZOExzeo Group Inc.$217M40%28.4%35%
IIIVi3 Verticals Inc.$213M32%1.9%1%10%
Group median65%-15.5%-36%3%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

C3.ai Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered9%/yr’21→’26

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−77%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "C3.ai Inc. (AI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AHRT its page in the Manual AIG →

Industry order: ← AGYS the Software chapter ALAR →