Owner Scorecard


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AMPL, Amplitude Inc.

Software asset-light Unprofitable

We generate revenue primarily through subscription-based pricing, offering flexible plans that scale with our customers.

That's why we built an AI Analytics Platform designed specifically to analyze behavioral data and provide real-time, actionable insights that drive business outcomes.

The platform is more than a collection of independent products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AMPL · Amplitude Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$343M
+14.7% YoY · 27% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $357M 5-yr avg $265M
Gross margin 74% 5-yr avg 72%
Operating margin −24.1% 5-yr avg −34.2%
ROIC −52% 5-yr avg −87%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg −0%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg −0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −32% through the cycle on a 70% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 27% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −77%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

39% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States61%$210M
  • International39%$133M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$68M$102M$167M$238M$276M$299M$343M$357MRevenueRevenue
68%70%69%70%74%74%74%74%Gross marginGross mgn
21%18%33%23%20%21%19%18%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
28%25%29%34%33%33%28%28%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($33M)($24M)($74M)($93M)($89M)($93M)($85M)($86M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−48.0%−23.2%−44.2%−38.9%−32.2%−30.9%−24.9%−24.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
($34M)($25M)($75M)($93M)($90M)($94M)($89M)($90M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($16M)($10M)($32M)($5M)$26M$19M$30M$26MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$720K$2M$3M$5M$6M$6M$10M$10MDepreciationDeprec.
$9M($4M)$6M$16M$22M$7M$17M$14MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$648K$984K$2M$4M$1M$2M$2M$2MCapexCapex
0.9%1.0%0.9%1.5%0.5%0.6%0.5%0.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($17M)($11M)($33M)($9M)$24M$17M$28M$25MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−24.4%−11.1%−19.9%−3.8%8.8%5.6%8.2%6.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($17M)($11M)($33M)($9M)$24M$17M$28M$25MFree cash flowFCF
−24.4%−11.1%−19.9%−3.8%8.8%5.6%8.2%6.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$4M$2M$394K$0$16M$3M$3MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$648K$0$31MBuybacksBuybacks
-96%-152%-59%-41%-52%ROICROIC
-24%-32%-31%-32%-36%-41%Return on equityROE
−24%−32%−31%−32%−36%−41%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$81M$118M$307M$302M$322M$298M$253M$213MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$17M$20M$23M$29M$26M$23M$41MReceivablesReceiv.
$4M$3M$490K$3M$991K$6M$3MAccounts payablePayables
$13M$17M$22M$26M$25M$18M$38MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$149M$355M$284M$380M$304M$257M$263MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$53M$91M$109M$132M$145M$165M$174MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×3.9×2.6×2.9×2.1×1.6×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1M$4M$4M$4M$24M$25M$25MGoodwillGoodwill
$175M$400M$414M$434M$446M$421M$402MTotal assetsAssets
($81M)($118M)($307M)($302M)($322M)($298M)($253M)($213M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($63M)($67M)$307M$295M$295M$297M$245M$217MShareholders’ equityEquity
10.7%16.2%20.6%28.2%32.0%33.4%26.8%25.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
24.3M25.1M51.4M111M117M124M132M133MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.81$4.09$3.26$2.14$2.36$2.42$2.60$2.68Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.38$-0.98$-1.46$-0.84$-0.77$-0.76$-0.67$-0.67EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.69$-0.45$-0.65$-0.08$0.21$0.14$0.21$0.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.69$-0.45$-0.65$-0.08$0.21$0.14$0.21$0.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03$0.04$0.03$0.03$0.01$0.01$0.01$0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-2.59$-2.68$5.97$2.65$2.52$2.39$1.86$1.63Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.05 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.17 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
6-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−1.3%/yr−8.7%/yr
Capital spending / share−12.1%/yr−20.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
132Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−41%low FY2023
Gross margin
74%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$28Mowner earningsvs.($89M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $89M loss into $28M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($89M)($94M)($90M)($93M)($75M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$10M+$6M+$6M+$5M+$3M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$92M+$100M+$88M+$67M+$34M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$17M+$7M+$22M+$16M+$6M
Cash from operations$30M$19M$26M($5M)($32M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$2M−$2M−$1M−$4M−$2M
Owner earnings$28M$17M$24M($9M)($33M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%6%9%-4%-20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $92M), owner earnings is nearer ($64M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $81M + ST investments $111M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $192M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $61M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $253M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 25 + DIO 0 − DPO 23 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -5%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $28M = operating cash $30M − maintenance capex $2M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -4%)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -4% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $92M of SBC) leaves ($64M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($89M) · cash from operations $30M

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $31M ÷ Owner Earnings $28M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $28M of Owner Earnings, $31M (109%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $31M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($92M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.17×
    Harvesting
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $10M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $343M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-0.66), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 7
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −38% → −29% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −38% early to −29% lately, median −32% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Worst year 2019 · −48.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our failure to successfully develop and commercialize our products or services involving AI Technologies could depress the market price of our stock and impair our ability to: raise capital; expand our business; provide, improve and diversify our product offerings; continue our operations and efficiently manage our ope…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$263M
  • Cash & short-term investments$182M
  • Receivables$41M
  • Other current assets$40M
Current liabilities$174M
  • Accounts payable$3M
  • Other current liabilities$171M
Current ratio1.52×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.52×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$89Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.5× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$184Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$79MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$7M$7M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$133Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $10M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$11M · 109%
  • Buybacks$31M · 301%
  • Returned to owners$31M

    $0 as dividends and $31M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$32M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $32M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$13.91

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $31M, about $13.91 each.

  • Net change in share count448.1%

    The diluted count rose from 24M to 133M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Skates$450k$102.0M($33M)
2022Mr. Skates$450k−$70.4M($9M)
2023Mr. Skates$300k$147k$24M
2024Mr. Skates$394k−$342k$17M
2025Mr. Skates$789k$789k$28M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio43:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$92M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 27% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
AVPTAvePoint Inc.$419M72%-10.2%12%
PRCHPorch Group Inc.$419M66%-58.4%-26%-10%
CERTCertara Inc.$419M61%4.7%-0%21%
DDD3D Systems Corporation$387M42%-15.2%-11%-6%
CCSIConsensus Cloud Solutions Inc.$350M83%43.0%24%30%
AMPLAmplitude Inc.$343M70%-32.2%-77%-4%
MKTWMarketWise Inc.$328M57%11.6%14%
DOMODomo, Inc.$319M73%-34.5%-8%
Group median68%-12.7%-11%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Amplitude Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $25M on 133M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $213M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Amplitude Inc. (AMPL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AMPL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AMPH its page in the Manual AMPX →

Industry order: ← ALRM the Software chapter ANSS →