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AMPL, Amplitude Inc.
We generate revenue primarily through subscription-based pricing, offering flexible plans that scale with our customers.
That's why we built an AI Analytics Platform designed specifically to analyze behavioral data and provide real-time, actionable insights that drive business outcomes.
The platform is more than a collection of independent products.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −32% through the cycle on a 70% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 27% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −77%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →39% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- United States61%$210M
- International39%$133M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $68M | $102M | $167M | $238M | $276M | $299M | $343M | $357M | RevenueRevenue |
| 68% | 70% | 69% | 70% | 74% | 74% | 74% | 74% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 21% | 18% | 33% | 23% | 20% | 21% | 19% | 18% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 28% | 25% | 29% | 34% | 33% | 33% | 28% | 28% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($33M) | ($24M) | ($74M) | ($93M) | ($89M) | ($93M) | ($85M) | ($86M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −48.0% | −23.2% | −44.2% | −38.9% | −32.2% | −30.9% | −24.9% | −24.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($34M) | ($25M) | ($75M) | ($93M) | ($90M) | ($94M) | ($89M) | ($90M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($16M) | ($10M) | ($32M) | ($5M) | $26M | $19M | $30M | $26M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $720K | $2M | $3M | $5M | $6M | $6M | $10M | $10M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $9M | ($4M) | $6M | $16M | $22M | $7M | $17M | $14M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $648K | $984K | $2M | $4M | $1M | $2M | $2M | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 1.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($17M) | ($11M) | ($33M) | ($9M) | $24M | $17M | $28M | $25M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −24.4% | −11.1% | −19.9% | −3.8% | 8.8% | 5.6% | 8.2% | 6.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($17M) | ($11M) | ($33M) | ($9M) | $24M | $17M | $28M | $25M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −24.4% | −11.1% | −19.9% | −3.8% | 8.8% | 5.6% | 8.2% | 6.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $4M | $2M | $394K | $0 | $16M | $3M | $3M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | $648K | $0 | $31M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | -96% | -152% | -59% | -41% | -52% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -24% | -32% | -31% | -32% | -36% | -41% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −24% | −32% | −31% | −32% | −36% | −41% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $81M | $118M | $307M | $302M | $322M | $298M | $253M | $213M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $17M | $20M | $23M | $29M | $26M | $23M | $41M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $4M | $3M | $490K | $3M | $991K | $6M | $3M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $13M | $17M | $22M | $26M | $25M | $18M | $38M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $149M | $355M | $284M | $380M | $304M | $257M | $263M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $53M | $91M | $109M | $132M | $145M | $165M | $174M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.8× | 3.9× | 2.6× | 2.9× | 2.1× | 1.6× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $1M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $24M | $25M | $25M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $175M | $400M | $414M | $434M | $446M | $421M | $402M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($81M) | ($118M) | ($307M) | ($302M) | ($322M) | ($298M) | ($253M) | ($213M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($63M) | ($67M) | $307M | $295M | $295M | $297M | $245M | $217M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 10.7% | 16.2% | 20.6% | 28.2% | 32.0% | 33.4% | 26.8% | 25.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 24.3M | 25.1M | 51.4M | 111M | 117M | 124M | 132M | 133M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.81 | $4.09 | $3.26 | $2.14 | $2.36 | $2.42 | $2.60 | $2.68 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.38 | $-0.98 | $-1.46 | $-0.84 | $-0.77 | $-0.76 | $-0.67 | $-0.67 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.69 | $-0.45 | $-0.65 | $-0.08 | $0.21 | $0.14 | $0.21 | $0.18 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.69 | $-0.45 | $-0.65 | $-0.08 | $0.21 | $0.14 | $0.21 | $0.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-2.59 | $-2.68 | $5.97 | $2.65 | $2.52 | $2.39 | $1.86 | $1.63 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.05 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.17 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.3%/yr | −8.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −12.1%/yr | −20.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $89M loss into $28M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($89M) | ($94M) | ($90M) | ($93M) | ($75M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$10M | +$6M | +$6M | +$5M | +$3M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$92M | +$100M | +$88M | +$67M | +$34M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$17M | +$7M | +$22M | +$16M | +$6M |
| Cash from operations | $30M | $19M | $26M | ($5M) | ($32M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$2M | −$2M | −$1M | −$4M | −$2M |
| Owner earnings | $28M | $17M | $24M | ($9M) | ($33M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 6% | 9% | -4% | -20% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $92M), owner earnings is nearer ($64M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $81M + ST investments $111M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $192M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $61M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $253M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 25 + DIO 0 − DPO 23 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -5%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid, recently turned positivelatest $28M = operating cash $30M − maintenance capex $2M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -4%)Industry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -4% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $92M of SBC) leaves ($64M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($89M) · cash from operations $30M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $31M ÷ Owner Earnings $28M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $28M of Owner Earnings, $31M (109%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $31M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($92M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.17×HarvestingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $10M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $343M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.56×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-0.66), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −38% → −29% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −38% early to −29% lately, median −32% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2019 · −48.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our failure to successfully develop and commercialize our products or services involving AI Technologies could depress the market price of our stock and impair our ability to: raise capital; expand our business; provide, improve and diversify our product offerings; continue our operations and efficiently manage our ope…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$182M
- Receivables$41M
- Other current assets$40M
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$171M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $10M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$11M · 109%
- Buybacks$31M · 301%
- Returned to owners$31M
$0 as dividends and $31M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$32M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $32M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$13.91
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $31M, about $13.91 each.
- Net change in share count448.1%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 133M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Skates | $450k | $102.0M | ($33M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Skates | $450k | −$70.4M | ($9M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Skates | $300k | $147k | $24M |
| 2024 | Mr. Skates | $394k | −$342k | $17M |
| 2025 | Mr. Skates | $789k | $789k | $28M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio43:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$92M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 27% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AVPTAvePoint Inc. | $419M | 72% | -10.2% | — | 12% |
| PRCHPorch Group Inc. | $419M | 66% | -58.4% | -26% | -10% |
| CERTCertara Inc. | $419M | 61% | 4.7% | -0% | 21% |
| DDD3D Systems Corporation | $387M | 42% | -15.2% | -11% | -6% |
| CCSIConsensus Cloud Solutions Inc. | $350M | 83% | 43.0% | 24% | 30% |
| AMPLAmplitude Inc. | $343M | 70% | -32.2% | -77% | -4% |
| MKTWMarketWise Inc. | $328M | 57% | 11.6% | — | 14% |
| DOMODomo, Inc. | $319M | 73% | -34.5% | — | -8% |
| Group median | — | 68% | -12.7% | -11% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Amplitude Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $25M on 133M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $213M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← AMPH its page in the Manual AMPX →
Industry order: ← ALRM the Software chapter ANSS →