Owner Scorecard


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APPS, Digital Turbine Inc.

Digital Turbine, Inc., through its subsidiaries, is a leading independent mobile growth platform that levels up the landscape for advertisers, publishers, carriers, and device original equipment manufacturers.

Digital Turbine Inc. offers end-to-end products and solutions leveraging proprietary technology to all participants in the mobile application ecosystem, enabling brand discovery and advertising, user acquisition and engagement, and operational efficiency for advertisers.

ODS is comprised of the following product and service groups: Application Media represents the portion of the ODS business platform that delivers apps to end users through partnerships with wireless carriers and OEMs .

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
APPS · Digital Turbine Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$565M
+15.2% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $565M 5-yr avg $603M
Gross margin 57% 5-yr avg 53%
Operating margin 6.0% 5-yr avg −10.9%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg −0%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 3.3% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −69% to 19% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −51 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$40M$75M$104M$139M$314M$748M$666M$544M$491M$565M$565MRevenueRevenue
($24M)($53M)($6M)$14M$55M$36M$17M($420M)($92M)($38M)($38M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($22M)($50M)($3M)$16M$62M$93M$98M($336M)($9M)$34M$34MFunds from operationsFFO
Balance sheet
$108M$87M$83M$184M$260M$1.5B$1.3B$866M$813M$842M$842MTotal assetsAssets
10%37%32%44%50%43%43%Debt / assetsDebt/assets
$10M$4M$0$19M$15M$533M$411M$383M$409M$361M$361MTotal debtDebt
$4M($9M)($11M)($3M)($16M)$407M$335M$351M$369M$323M$323MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.8×3.1×123.5×56.8×32.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$62M$28M$36M$77M$145M$515M$605M$214M$154M$192M$192MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
66.5M70.3M77.4M89.6M96.2M103M102M101M104M113M113MShares out (diluted)Shares
$-0.33$-0.71$-0.04$0.18$0.64$0.91$0.96$-3.33$-0.09$0.30$0.30FFO / shareFFO/sh
$0.93$0.39$0.47$0.86$1.51$5.01$5.94$2.12$1.48$1.70$1.70Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+26.5%/yr+8.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+50.8%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share+6.2%/yr (2-yr)
Book value / share+6.9%/yr+2.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
113Mpeak FY2026
ROIC
5%low FY2024
Gross margin
57%low FY2017
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $34M ÷ interest expense $1M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $323M · 9.5× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $38M − debt $361M
    What this means

    Netting $38M of cash and short-term investments against $361M of debt leaves $323M owed, about 9.5× a year's operating profit (10.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 162 + DIO 0 − DPO 199 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -52%–46%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 3%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Positive this year, negative across the cycle
    latest $11M = operating cash $42M − maintenance capex $31M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median -3%)
    Industry peers: median 45%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves ($5M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($38M) · cash from operations $42M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.43×
    Harvesting
    Capex $31M ÷ depreciation $71M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $565M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.16×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $361M vs $44M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.52/share (latest year $-0.31), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −16% → −25% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (−25%) sits below the early years (−16%), but the latest year (6%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 3% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −20%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2024 · −68.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +6.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$312M
  • Cash & short-term investments$38M
  • Receivables$251M
  • Other current assets$23M
Current liabilities$268M
  • Debt due within a year$7M
  • Accounts payable$133M
  • Other current liabilities$128M
Current ratio1.16×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.16×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.14×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$44Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$7M due · $38M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+12.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($248M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($338M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$369M$8M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$441M52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$222Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $82M of capital spent building

$337M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022Mr. Stone$7.7M−$6.4M
2023Mr. Stone$8.2M−$4.4M
2024Mr. Stone$7.9M−$2.2M$4M
2025Mr. Stone$2.5M$3.0M($16M)
2026Mr. Stone$4.8M$2.8M$11M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 48% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
IDCCInterDigital Inc.$834M36.6%22%45%
IRTIndependence Realty Trust$658M96%21.5%2%30%
CBLCBL & Associates Properties Inc.$578M20.7%4%26%
APPSDigital Turbine Inc.$565M47%4.7%-2%-1%
EPRTEssential Properties$561M58.4%5%68%
GNLGlobal Net Lease$495M91%29.3%3%46%
BNLBroadstone Net Lease Inc.$454M44.2%3%52%
ACTGAcacia Research Corporation$285M27%-26.9%-12%14%
Group median69%25.4%3%37%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Digital Turbine Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $11M on 121M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-05-21; net debt $323M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Digital Turbine Inc. (APPS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/APPS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← APPN its page in the Manual APT →

Industry order: ← APOS the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter ARBK →