Share count
75Mpeak FY2025
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APPN, Appian Corporation
Appian Corporation provides process automation technology.
For over 25 years, our highly reliable and scalable platform has been leveraged by large enterprises and governments.
According to IDC, the worldwide Business Automation Platform market was $27.8 billion in 2024 and is expected to grow to approximately $70.2 billion in 2029.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$727M
+17.8% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $763M 5-yr avg $545M
Revenue $202M +21.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 1.6% yr-ago −0.5%
Net income ($2M) yr-ago ($1M)
Net margin −0.8% yr-ago −0.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Cloud subscriptions (60%) and Professional services (21%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −19% through the cycle on a 71% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 6.3% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −50%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Cloud subscriptions is 60% of revenue, with Professional services the other meaningful line at 21%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Cloud subscriptions60%$437M
- Professional services21%$150M
- License subscriptions15%$106M
- Maintenance and support5%$33M
By geographyUnited States62%International38%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $133M | $177M | $227M | $260M | $305M | $369M | $468M | $545M | $617M | $727M | $763M | RevenueRevenue |
| 62% | 63% | 63% | 64% | 71% | 72% | 72% | 71% | 73% | 73% | 72% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 13% | 15% | 17% | 16% | 17% | 23% | 26% | 15% | 17% | 16% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 17% | 20% | 20% | 22% | 23% | 26% | 30% | 29% | 26% | 24% | 23% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($11M) | ($32M) | ($47M) | ($50M) | ($38M) | ($84M) | ($145M) | ($108M) | ($61M) | $609K | $5M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −8.6% | −18.0% | −20.6% | −19.4% | −12.4% | −22.7% | −31.0% | −19.8% | −9.9% | 0.1% | 0.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($12M) | ($31M) | ($49M) | ($51M) | ($33M) | ($89M) | ($151M) | ($111M) | ($92M) | $1M | $885K | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($8M) | ($9M) | ($31M) | ($9M) | ($8M) | ($54M) | ($107M) | ($110M) | $7M | $63M | $67M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $800K | $900K | $2M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $6M | $8M | $10M | $10M | $10M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $4M | $8M | $76K | $21M | $5M | $6M | ($261K) | ($50M) | $50M | $10M | $13M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $984K | $433K | $7M | $32M | $1M | $6M | $9M | $10M | $4M | $3M | $3M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.2% | 3.1% | 12.5% | 0.4% | 1.6% | 1.9% | 1.8% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($9M) | ($10M) | ($33M) | ($14M) | ($9M) | ($60M) | ($112M) | ($120M) | $3M | $60M | $64M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −6.6% | −5.4% | −14.7% | −5.2% | −2.9% | −16.2% | −24.0% | −22.0% | 0.5% | 8.2% | 8.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($9M) | ($10M) | ($38M) | ($41M) | ($9M) | ($60M) | ($116M) | ($120M) | $3M | $60M | $64M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −6.6% | −5.4% | −16.9% | −15.9% | −2.9% | −16.2% | −24.7% | −22.0% | 0.5% | 8.2% | 8.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $6M | $31M | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $50M | $20M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | -88% | -16% | -50% | -99% | -78% | -48% | 1% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| — | -68% | -68% | -25% | -11% | -38% | -104% | -213% | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| — | −68% | −68% | −25% | −11% | −38% | −104% | −213% | — | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $31M | $74M | $95M | $160M | $222M | $156M | $196M | $159M | $160M | $187M | $206M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $47M | $55M | $79M | $70M | $97M | $130M | $166M | $172M | $195M | $255M | $174M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $5M | $5M | $9M | $5M | $3M | $6M | $8M | $6M | $4M | $7M | $4M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $42M | $50M | $70M | $65M | $94M | $124M | $158M | $165M | $191M | $248M | $170M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $88M | $145M | $210M | $278M | $365M | $338M | $422M | $414M | $436M | $519M | $454M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $76M | $95M | $128M | $112M | $156M | $216M | $270M | $371M | $355M | $452M | $403M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.5× | 1.6× | 2.5× | 2.3× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | $0 | $5M | $28M | $26M | $27M | $26M | $29M | $28M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $103M | $161M | $233M | $371M | $513M | $505M | $594M | $628M | $621M | $691M | $623M | Total assetsAssets |
| $20M | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | $118M | $207M | $250M | $241M | $238M | Total debtDebt |
| ($11M) | ($74M) | — | — | — | ($156M) | ($78M) | $48M | $91M | $54M | $32M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | -86.7× | -6.0× | -2.6× | 0.0× | 0.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($63M) | $46M | $73M | $205M | $297M | $234M | $146M | $52M | ($33M) | ($47M) | ($59M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.0% | 7.3% | 7.1% | 6.3% | 5.0% | 6.5% | 8.3% | 8.0% | 6.3% | 5.7% | 5.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 34.3M | 49.5M | 62.1M | 65.5M | 69.1M | 71.0M | 72.5M | 73.1M | 73.0M | 74.6M | 73.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.88 | $3.57 | $3.65 | $3.98 | $4.41 | $5.20 | $6.46 | $7.46 | $8.45 | $9.74 | $10.33 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.36 | $-0.63 | $-0.80 | $-0.77 | $-0.48 | $-1.25 | $-2.08 | $-1.52 | $-1.26 | $0.02 | $0.01 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.25 | $-0.19 | $-0.54 | $-0.21 | $-0.13 | $-0.84 | $-1.55 | $-1.64 | $0.04 | $0.80 | $0.87 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.25 | $-0.19 | $-0.62 | $-0.63 | $-0.13 | $-0.84 | $-1.60 | $-1.64 | $0.04 | $0.80 | $0.87 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.11 | $0.50 | $0.02 | $0.09 | $0.13 | $0.13 | $0.05 | $0.04 | $0.04 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-1.85 | $0.92 | $1.18 | $3.13 | $4.30 | $3.29 | $2.01 | $0.72 | $-0.45 | $-0.63 | $-0.80 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.45 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +10.8%/yr | +17.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.0%/yr | +19.7%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
1%low FY2022
Gross margin
73%low FY2016
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$60Mowner earningsvs.$1Mnet incomelow FY2023
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1M of profit into $60M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1M | ($92M) | ($111M) | ($151M) | ($89M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$10M | +$10M | +$8M | +$6M | +$5M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$42M | +$39M | +$43M | +$39M | +$24M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$10M | +$50M | −$50M | −$261K | +$6M |
| Cash from operations | $63M | $7M | ($110M) | ($107M) | ($54M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$3M | −$4M | −$10M | −$6M | −$6M |
| Owner earnings | $60M | $3M | ($120M) | ($112M) | ($60M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$3M | — |
| Free cash flow | $60M | $3M | ($120M) | ($116M) | ($60M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 0% | -22% | -24% | -16% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $42M), owner earnings is nearer $18M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $609K ÷ interest expense $21M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $54M · 88.0× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $136M + ST investments $51M − debt $241M
What this means
Netting $187M of cash and short-term investments against $241M of debt leaves $54M owed, about 88.0× a year's operating profit (395.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 128 + DIO 0 − DPO 12 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -99%–1%; 1% latest = NOPAT $305K ÷ invested capital $58MIndustry peers: median -12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $60M = operating cash $63M − maintenance capex $3M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -7%)Industry peers: median 0%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a -7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $42M of SBC) leaves $18M.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 50.99×Cash-backedCash from ops $63M ÷ net income $1M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $20M ÷ Owner Earnings $60M
What this means
Of $60M Owner Earnings, $20M (34%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $20M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($42M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.34×HarvestingCapex $3M ÷ depreciation $10M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $727M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.15×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $241M vs $67M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.92/share (latest year $0.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.64/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −16% → −10% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −16% early to −10% lately, median −19% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −31.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Any success we may experience in the future will depend in large part on our ability to, among other things: Maintain and expand our customer base; Increase revenue from existing customers through increased or broader use of our platform within their organizations; Compete in an AI-accelerated environment; Further pene…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$454M
- Cash & short-term investments$206M
- Receivables$174M
- Other current assets$74M
Current liabilities$403M
- Debt due within a year$10M
- Accounts payable$4M
- Other current liabilities$389M
Current ratio1.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.13×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$51Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $206M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+21.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($88M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($228M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$295M$57M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$327Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $982k | $32.2M | ($60M) |
| 2022 | $19.9M | $11.9M | ($112M) |
| 2023 | $1.2M | $4.8M | ($120M) |
| 2024 | $1.2M | −$3.9M | $3M |
| 2025 | $2.9M | $760k | $60M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$42M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue, equal to 6821% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Appian Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$20M → $238M
Debt rose from $20M to $238M while owner earnings went from about ($17M) to ($19M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COURCoursera Inc. | $758M | 53% | -22.9% | — | 0% |
| BANDBandwidth Inc. | $754M | 44% | -2.3% | -2% | 5% |
| BRZEBraze | $738M | 67% | -30.7% | -30% | -5% |
| CWANClearwater Analytics | $731M | 72% | 1.7% | 0% | 15% |
| APPNAppian Corporation | $727M | 71% | -18.7% | -50% | -6% |
| NTSKNetskope Inc. | $709M | 65% | -76.9% | -107% | -27% |
| NAVNNavan Inc. | $702M | 68% | -28.0% | -21% | -10% |
| BLBlackLine | $700M | 76% | -9.4% | -3% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 68% | -20.8% | -21% | -3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Appian Corporation has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+1834%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+1834%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $64M on 74M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-03-31; net debt $32M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Appian Corporation (APPN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/APPN, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← APPF its page in the Manual APPS →
Industry order: ← APPF the Software chapter ARBE →