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ATGL, Alpha Technology Group Limited
Revenue is led by System Development (56%) and Technological support and maintenance service and other services (28%), with 2 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
- Situation
- Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −61% through the cycle on a 36% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −31%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest System Development at 56%.
- System Development56%HK$4M
- Technological support and maintenance service and other services28%HK$2M
- Hardware installation13%HK$967K
- AI-OCR development3%HK$196K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMSep 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| HK$4M | HK$4M | HK$9M | HK$12M | HK$7M | HK$7M | RevenueRevenue |
| 36% | 23% | 33% | 52% | 49% | 49% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (HK$925K) | (HK$3M) | (HK$7M) | (HK$6M) | (HK$57M) | (HK$57M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −22.8% | −61.4% | −77.7% | −50.6% | −770.5% | −770.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (HK$981K) | (HK$3M) | HK$7M | (HK$5M) | (HK$70M) | HK$7M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| (HK$532K) | HK$2M | HK$4M | (HK$20M) | (HK$13M) | (HK$13M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| HK$450 | HK$6K | HK$10K | HK$15K | HK$86K | HK$86K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| HK$449K | HK$4M | (HK$3M) | (HK$14M) | HK$57M | (HK$20M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| HK$15K | HK$25K | HK$48K | HK$34K | HK$785K | HK$785K | CapexCapex |
| 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 10.6% | 10.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (HK$532K) | HK$2M | HK$4M | (HK$20M) | (HK$13M) | (HK$13M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −13.1% | 35.2% | 46.2% | −158.8% | −179.0% | −179.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (HK$547K) | HK$2M | HK$4M | (HK$20M) | (HK$14M) | (HK$14M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −13.5% | 34.8% | 45.7% | −158.9% | −188.5% | −188.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | -31% | -9% | -181% | -224% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 36% | -11% | -287% | 28% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 36% | −11% | −287% | 28% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| — | HK$5K | HK$248K | HK$1M | HK$1M | HK$1M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | HK$5K | HK$248K | HK$1M | HK$711K | HK$711K | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | HK$6M | HK$26M | HK$44M | HK$33M | HK$33M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | HK$9M | HK$20M | HK$7M | HK$10M | HK$10M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.7× | 1.3× | 6.4× | 3.3× | 3.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | HK$10M | HK$10M | — | HK$10M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | HK$7M | HK$41M | HK$60M | HK$35M | HK$35M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | HK$2M | HK$1M | HK$900K | HK$305K | HK$900K | Total debtDebt |
| — | HK$2M | HK$1M | HK$900K | HK$305K | HK$900K | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -19.4× | -31.3× | -90.6× | -61.2× | -49.9× | -764.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| (HK$2M) | (HK$4M) | HK$19M | HK$52M | HK$25M | HK$25M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| — | — | 1.2M | 14.9M | 16.4M | 16.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | HK$7.43 | HK$0.83 | HK$0.45 | HK$0.45 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | HK$5.97 | HK$-0.37 | HK$-4.28 | HK$0.43 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | HK$3.43 | HK$-1.31 | HK$-0.81 | HK$-0.81 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | HK$3.40 | HK$-1.31 | HK$-0.85 | HK$-0.85 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | HK$0.04 | HK$0.00 | HK$0.05 | HK$0.05 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | — | HK$16.56 | HK$3.46 | HK$1.49 | HK$1.49 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×12.77 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −75.4%/yr (2-yr) | −75.4%/yr (2-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +7.4%/yr (2-yr) | +7.4%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | −70.0%/yr (2-yr) | −70.0%/yr (2-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned (HK$13M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the HK$86K it takes just to hold its position. It put HK$699K more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (HK$14M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (HK$70M) | (HK$5M) | HK$7M | (HK$3M) | (HK$981K) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +HK$86K | +HK$15K | +HK$10K | +HK$6K | +HK$450 |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +HK$57M | −HK$14M | −HK$3M | +HK$4M | +HK$449K |
| Cash from operations | (HK$13M) | (HK$20M) | HK$4M | HK$2M | (HK$532K) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −HK$86K | −HK$15K | −HK$10K | −HK$6K | −HK$450 |
| Owner earnings | (HK$13M) | (HK$20M) | HK$4M | HK$2M | (HK$532K) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −HK$699K | −HK$19K | −HK$39K | −HK$19K | −HK$14K |
| Free cash flow | (HK$14M) | (HK$20M) | HK$4M | HK$2M | (HK$547K) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -179% | -159% | 46% | 35% | -13% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about HK$86K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other HK$699K of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -764.1×Does not cover its interestOperating income (HK$57M) ÷ interest expense HK$75K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash HK$0 − debt HK$900K
What this means
Netting HK$0 of cash and short-term investments against HK$900K of debt leaves HK$900K owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 53 + DIO 0 − DPO 35 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle3-yr median, range -181%–-9%; -224% latest = NOPAT (HK$57M) ÷ invested capital HK$25MIndustry peers: median -124%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -224% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -179%–46%; latest (HK$13M) = operating cash (HK$13M) − maintenance capex HK$86KIndustry peers: median -500%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -179% of revenue this year, a -13% median across 5 years.
- Are earnings backed by cash? -1.88×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops (HK$13M) ÷ net income HK$7M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 9.10×ExpandingCapex HK$785K ÷ depreciation HK$86K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · HK$7M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.33×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · HK$900K vs HK$23M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are HK$-1.50/share (latest year HK$0.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is HK$1.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −42% → −411% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −42% early to −411% lately, median −61% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −770.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- ReceivablesHK$1M
- Other current assetsHK$32M
- Debt due within a yearHK$595K
- Accounts payableHK$364K
- Other current liabilitiesHK$9M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈HK$2M · 32% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the year ended September 30, 2025, two customers accounted for 32 % and 27 % of the total revenue, respectively.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| QBTSD-Wave Quantum Inc. | $25M | 68% | -724.6% | -1142% | -582% |
| GEGGLGreat Elm Group, Inc. | $16M | 93% | -46.5% | -12% | -3% |
| NXTTNext Technology Holding Inc. | $12M | 59% | -24.0% | -1% | -29% |
| ATGLAlpha Technology Group Limited | HK$7M | 36% | -61.4% | -31% | -13% |
| PDYNPalladyne AI Corp. | $5M | 30% | -916.4% | -333% | -500% |
| DJTTrump Media & Technology Group Corp. | $4M | 55% | -3360.9% | -18% | -943% |
| ODYSOdysight.ai Inc. | $3M | 29% | -593.1% | -442% | -584% |
| PHUNPhunware Inc. | $3M | 51% | -175.0% | -124% | -161% |
| Group median | — | 53% | -384.1% | -77% | -330% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Alpha Technology Group Limited reports in HKD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that HKD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in HKD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Alpha Technology Group Limited is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered25%/yr’21→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← ATAT its page in the Manual ATHM →
Industry order: ← APLD the IT Services & Consulting chapter ATHM →