Share count
10Mpeak FY2024
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AURE, Aurelion Inc.
A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
$143K
−59.1% YoY · −63% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $13K
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 4%, above 12% in only 2 of 4 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMMar 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $3M | $2M | $349K | $640K | $143K | RevenueRevenue |
| $2M | $1M | ($1M) | ($7M) | ($10M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| -0% | 14% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| — | 22.6% | -15.1% | -108.7% | -55.1% | Return on assetsROA |
| 48% | 25% | -17% | -226% | -63% | Return on equityROE |
| 19% | — | — | — | −70% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 48% | 25% | -17% | -226% | -568% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| — | $6M | $7M | $6M | $18M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | $3M | $3M | DepositsDeposits |
| $4M | $5M | $6M | $3M | $16M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 8.0M | 8.0M | 8.3M | 10.2M | 46.3M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.24 | $0.17 | $-0.13 | $-0.68 | $-0.22 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.14 | — | — | — | $0.02 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.50 | $0.67 | $0.75 | $0.30 | $0.34 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| $0.50 | $0.67 | $0.75 | $0.30 | $0.04 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×4.55 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −43.5%/yr | −43.5%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −15.9%/yr | −15.9%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$640Klow FY2023
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“To remediate our identified material weaknesses, we have implemented several measures to improve our internal control over financial reporting, including (i) engaging qualified financial and accounting advisory team and relevant staff with working experience…”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -63%Loss on equityNet income ($10M) ÷ equity $16MIndustry peers: median -17%
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $14M − intangibles $512K)Industry peers: median -17%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough data
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 87.9%Well capitalizedEquity $16M ÷ assets $18M
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 15%Leans on wholesale fundingDeposits $3M ÷ assets $18M
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“As of September 30, 2025, the key assumptions used for the value-in-use calculations are as follows: 2025 Average revenue growth rate 30.4 % Terminal growth rate 2.7 % Discount rate 25.0 % The cash flow projections have taken into account the inherent risks associated with early-stage technology adoption, competitive p…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Sep 30, 2024Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$4M
- Cash & short-term investments$13K
- Receivables$13K
- Inventory$26K
- Other current assets$4M
Current liabilities$3M
- Other current liabilities$3M
Current ratio1.12×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.12×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.00×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$410Kthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$181K$181K of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$14M78% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity86%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 4 years buying other businesses
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEELKeel Infrastructure Corp. | $229M | -17% | -17% | — | 0.5% |
| ABTCAmerican Bitcoin Corp. | $185M | -38% | -152% | — | 0.0% |
| BGDEBig Digital Energy Inc. | $40M | -138% | -138% | — | 0.2% |
| TRONTron Inc. | $5M | -50% | -50% | — | 0.1% |
| CDChaince Digital Holdings Inc. | $2M | -12% | -12% | — | 1.0% |
| AUREAurelion Inc. | $143K | 4% | 4% | — | — |
| LDIloanDepot Inc. | $10M | -16% | -16% | — | 0.1% |
| VELVelocity Financial Inc. | $186M | 16% | 16% | — | 2.5% |
| Group median | — | -17% | -17% | — | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Aurelion Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Aurelion Inc.’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered−13%/yr’21→’24
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity4%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $2M on 29M shares, a 4% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Aurelion Inc. (AURE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AURE, data as of 2026-07-09.
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