Owner Scorecard


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AVBC, Avidia Bancorp Inc.

Banks financial Unprofitable

OF AVIDIA BANK Avidia Bank is a Massachusetts-chartered stock savings bank, with its main office in Hudson, Massachusetts.

Consists primarily of taking deposits from the general public in our local markets and nationally for our payments related services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AVBC · Avidia Bancorp Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$104M
+14.7% YoY
Vital signs · FY2025, with 2-yr average
Revenue $104M 2-yr avg $97M
Return on equity −1% 2-yr avg 3%
Return on tangible equity −1% 2-yr avg 3%
Efficiency ratio 85% 2-yr avg 83%
Equity / assets 13.4% 2-yr avg 10.3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Loss on equity
    Net income ($3M) ÷ equity $379M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Loss
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $12M − intangibles $0)
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • High cost ratio (>75%)
    Noninterest expense $88M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 57%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 13.4%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $379M ÷ assets $2.8B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $2.1B ÷ assets $2.8B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost
    Not enough data
    What this means

    Provision or net interest income missing.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
SMBCSouthern Missouri Bancorp Inc.$183M11%12%57%3.2%
FSBWFS Bancorp Inc.$153M13%13%66%4.1%
HBCPHome Bancorp Inc.$149M10%12%61%3.6%
NECBNorthEast Community Bancorp Inc.$105M11%11%44%4.7%
AVBCAvidia Bancorp Inc.$104M-1%-1%85%3.1%
PBFSPioneer Bancorp Inc.$96M6%6%71%3.4%
TSBKTimberland Bancorp Inc.$83M12%13%56%3.5%
GCBCGreene County Bancorp Inc.$75M15%15%53%2.5%
Group median11%12%59%3.4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Avidia Bancorp Inc. (AVBC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AVBC, data as of 2026-07-09.

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