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AVBH, Avidbank Holdings Inc.
We provide competitive deposit products and treasury management solutions with a high-touch, relationship-driven approach, guided by our commitment to being Responsive, Collaborative & Accountable—principles we embody in every client interaction.
The Bank operates with one branch located in San Jose, California and one loan production office in each of San Francisco, California and Redwood City, California.
The Bank is a full-service commercial bank with a focus in the Bay Area through our Corporate Banking, Commercial Real Estate, and Construction Lending divisions, and expanded reach both in the Bay Area and nationally through our Venture Lending and Specialty Finance divisions.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -7%Loss on equityNet income ($20M) ÷ equity $281MIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $0 − intangibles $0)Industry peers: median 11%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 58%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 10.9%Well capitalizedEquity $281M ÷ assets $2.6B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Deposit funding 85%Deposit-fundedDeposits $2.2B ÷ assets $2.6B
What this means
Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.
- Credit cost (provision / NII) 6%LowProvision for credit losses $5M ÷ net interest income $87M
What this means
What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership16.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Banks
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CHMGChemung Financial Corp | $95M | 10% | 12% | 68% | 3.0% |
| CBKCommercial Bancgroup Inc. | $90M | 13% | 14% | 47% | 3.5% |
| USCBUSCB Financial Holdings Inc. | $90M | 11% | 11% | 57% | 2.9% |
| NWFLNorwood Financial Corp. | $88M | 10% | 11% | 59% | 3.1% |
| COSOCoastalSouth Bancshares Inc. | $82M | 10% | 10% | 58% | 3.2% |
| PKBKParke Bancorp Inc. | $80M | 14% | 14% | 33% | 3.3% |
| AVBHAvidbank Holdings Inc. | $31M | -7% | -7% | — | 3.4% |
| BMRCBank of Marin Bancorp | $29M | 8% | 9% | 58% | 3.1% |
| Group median | — | 10% | 11% | — | 3.1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Manual order: ← AVBC its page in the Manual AVGO →
Industry order: ← AVBC the Banks chapter AX →