Share count
6Mpeak FY2021
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BEPJ, BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P.
We have comprehensive operational and development capabilities located in each of our core markets which we believe positions us to maintain and increase the value of our asset base while competitively positioning us for continued growth.
We invest in renewable power and sustainable solutions assets directly, as well as with institutional partners, joint venture partners and through other arrangements.
Excludes 613 GWh solar and 911 GWh wind LTA related to our sustainable solutions investments to facilitate the decarbonization of a utility and independent power producer with operations in the Caribbean and Latin America.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$6.4B
+9.0% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $6.4B 5-yr avg $5.2B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Hydroelectric (43%) and Wind (25%), with 2 more segments behind.
- Situation
- Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 103% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −6.5% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 15% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Hydroelectric at 43%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Hydroelectric43%$2.7B
- Wind25%$1.6B
- Solar21%$1.3B
- Distributed Energy And Storage11%$723M
- Sustainable solutions0%$7M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.5B | $2.6B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.7B | $5.0B | $5.9B | $6.4B | $6.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | ($307M) | ($38M) | ($329M) | ($175M) | ($168M) | ($104M) | ($383M) | ($496M) | ($496M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| — | — | −8.1% | −1.0% | −8.6% | −4.3% | −3.6% | −2.1% | −6.5% | −7.7% | −7.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($36M) | ($32M) | $23M | ($88M) | ($184M) | ($191M) | ($166M) | ($91M) | ($255M) | ($71M) | ($71M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $632M | $928M | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $734M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $781M | $782M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($113M) | $178M | $112M | $371M | $113M | ($576M) | $294M | $104M | ($481M) | ($1.2B) | ($1.2B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $369M | $355M | $271M | $460M | $447M | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.7B | $6.6B | $6.6B | CapexCapex |
| 15.0% | 13.5% | 7.1% | 11.6% | 11.7% | 48.0% | 46.5% | 55.8% | 63.5% | 102.8% | 102.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $263M | $573M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $849M | ($767M) | $128M | $13M | ($736M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.3B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 10.7% | 21.8% | 26.7% | 27.5% | 22.3% | −18.7% | 2.7% | 0.3% | −12.5% | −19.9% | −19.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $263M | $573M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $849M | ($1.2B) | ($479M) | ($944M) | ($2.5B) | ($5.4B) | ($5.4B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 10.7% | 21.8% | 26.7% | 27.5% | 22.3% | −30.1% | −10.2% | −18.7% | −41.8% | −84.9% | −84.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $522M | $591M | $643M | $684M | $769M | $854M | $915M | $990M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | -4% | -0% | -5% | -3% | -2% | -2% | -8% | -7% | -7% | ROICROIC |
| -1% | -1% | 1% | -2% | -5% | -5% | -4% | -2% | -7% | -2% | -2% | Return on equityROE |
| −16% | −16% | −14% | −17% | −25% | −26% | −26% | −27% | −37% | −31% | −31% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $223M | $927M | $422M | $483M | $607M | $900M | $998M | $1.1B | $3.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $454M | $554M | $607M | $979M | $928M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | $43M | $26M | $31M | $42M | $111M | $154M | $177M | $177M | InventoryInvent. |
| $467M | $542M | $533M | $687M | $625M | $779M | $1.1B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($13M) | $12M | $74M | $335M | $329M | $935M | $816M | $89M | $174M | $473M | $473M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $907M | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $2.9B | $4.2B | $4.6B | $8.8B | $12.3B | $12.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.7B | $2.5B | $1.7B | $2.4B | $2.8B | $3.2B | $4.9B | $8.0B | $14.6B | $21.7B | $21.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.5× | 0.7× | 1.2× | 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.9× | 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $896M | $901M | $948M | $949M | $970M | $966M | $1.5B | $1.9B | $5.4B | $6.0B | $6.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $27.7B | $30.9B | $34.1B | $46.2B | $49.7B | $55.9B | $64.1B | $76.1B | $94.8B | $98.7B | $98.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $9.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.5B | Total debtDebt |
| $8.9B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | ($42M) | $1.4B | $1.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | -23.6× | -5.4× | -164.5× | -87.5× | — | -3.0× | -6.1× | -2.6× | -2.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.4B | $4.0B | $4.5B | $4.6B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| — | — | — | 3.7M | 3.5M | 6.2M | 6.2M | — | 6.0M | 6.0M | 6.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | — | $1069.04 | $1085.52 | $664.82 | $764.65 | — | $979.33 | $1067.83 | $1067.83 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | — | $-23.69 | $-52.42 | $-31.00 | $-26.94 | — | $-42.50 | $-11.83 | $-11.83 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | $294.52 | $241.89 | $-124.49 | $20.78 | — | $-122.67 | $-213.00 | $-213.00 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | $294.52 | $241.89 | $-200.13 | $-77.75 | — | $-409.83 | $-906.67 | $-906.67 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | $184.14 | $219.10 | $138.61 | $148.51 | — | $176.83 | $190.00 | $190.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | — | $123.84 | $127.36 | $319.27 | $355.46 | — | $622.17 | $1097.83 | $1097.83 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | — | — | $1232.72 | $1095.49 | $664.18 | $664.82 | — | $600.67 | $661.67 | $661.67 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.76 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×1/50 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.0%/yr (6-yr) | −0.3%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +0.5%/yr (6-yr) | −2.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +43.9%/yr (6-yr) | +53.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | −9.9%/yr (6-yr) | −9.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
−7%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
116.1×peak FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($1.3B)owner earningsvs.($71M)net incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($1.3B) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put $4.2B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($5.4B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($71M) | ($255M) | ($91M) | ($166M) | ($191M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2.4B | +$2.0B | +$1.9B | +$1.6B | +$1.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$1.2B | −$481M | +$104M | +$294M | −$576M |
| Cash from operations | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $734M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2.4B | −$2.0B | −$1.9B | −$1.6B | −$1.5B |
| Owner earnings | ($1.3B) | ($736M) | $13M | $128M | ($767M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$4.2B | −$1.7B | −$957M | −$607M | −$466M |
| Free cash flow | ($5.4B) | ($2.5B) | ($944M) | ($479M) | ($1.2B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -20% | -13% | 0% | 3% | -19% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $4.2B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.6×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($496M) ÷ interest expense $189M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $2.1B − debt $3.5B
What this means
Netting $2.1B of cash and short-term investments against $3.5B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -8%–-0%; -7% latest = NOPAT ($392M) ÷ invested capital $5.4BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -20%–28%; latest ($1.3B) = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $2.4BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -20% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put $4.2B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($5.4B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($71M) · cash from operations $1.1B
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.72×ExpandingCapex $6.6B ÷ depreciation $2.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.4B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.57×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.5B vs ($9.4B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-23.17/share (latest year $-11.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $661.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −6% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −6% early, −5% lately, median −7%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −8.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Demand for power in the U.S. has significantly increased over the past three years on the back of accelerating digitalization and the proliferation of AI.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$12.3B
- Cash & short-term investments$2.1B
- Receivables$2.5B
- Inventory$177M
- Other current assets$7.5B
Current liabilities$21.7B
- Accounts payable$2.2B
- Other current liabilities$19.5B
Current ratio0.57×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.56×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($9.4B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($51.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.3B$852M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$63Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $12.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$19.2B · 154%
- Dividends$8.2B · 66%
- Returned to owners$8.2B
708% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $8.2B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$14.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $14.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Net change in share count61.5%
The diluted count rose from 4M to 6M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$190.00/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−10.7% vs 19.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 19.8% early in the record and −10.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?61.5%
Diluted shares grew 61.5% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 40% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $454M to $2.5B while revenue grew 161%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 40% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Did debt outgrow the business?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Electric Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NEENextEra Energy Inc. | $27.4B | — | 28.2% | 6% | — |
| DTBDTE Energy Co | $15.8B | — | 13.6% | 6% | — |
| ETREntergy Corporation | $12.9B | — | 15.3% | 5% | 13% |
| CNPCenterPoint Energy Inc (Holding Co) | $9.3B | — | 17.4% | 5% | 9% |
| PPLPPL Corporation | $9.0B | — | 25.9% | 5% | 20% |
| BEPJBROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P. | $6.4B | — | -5.4% | -3% | 7% |
| PNWPinnacle West | $5.3B | 71% | 20.5% | 6% | 11% |
| PORPortland General Electric | $3.6B | — | 15.6% | 5% | 9% |
| Group median | — | — | 16.5% | 5% | 10% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P. has delivered.
BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P. earns about $431M on its 6.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −19.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow ($5.4B) on 6M diluted shares; net debt $1.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6.6B) runs well above depreciation ($2.4B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($1.3B), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PARTNERS L.P. (BEPJ), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BEPJ, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BEPI its page in the Manual BGIN →
Industry order: ← BEPI the Electric Utilities chapter BKH →