Owner Scorecard


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POR, Portland General Electric

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
POR · Portland General Electric
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.6B
+4.0% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.5B 5-yr avg $3.0B
Operating margin 14.0% 5-yr avg 14.9%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg −11%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 16% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Capital spending runs about 30% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$2.9B$3.4B$3.6B$3.5BRevenueRevenue
12%13%14%14%13%14%13%12%12%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$340M$380M$346M$353M$269M$378M$397M$396M$512M$555M$494MOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.7%18.9%17.4%16.6%12.5%15.8%15.0%13.5%14.9%15.5%14.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$193M$187M$212M$214M$155M$244M$233M$228M$313M$306M$251MNet incomeNet inc.
21%32%7%11%0%9%14%16%11%15%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$562M$597M$630M$546M$567M$532M$674M$420M$778M$1.1B$1.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$321M$345M$382M$409M$454M$404M$417M$458M$496M$578M$582MDepreciationDeprec.
$42M$58M$31M($86M)($53M)($130M)$9M($283M)($55M)$218M$306MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$584M$514M$595M$606M$784M$636M$766M$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1BCapexCapex
30.4%25.6%29.9%28.5%36.6%26.5%28.9%46.5%36.9%33.2%30.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$241M$252M$248M$137M$113M$128M$257M($38M)$282M$540M$573MOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.5%12.5%12.5%6.5%5.3%5.3%9.7%−1.3%8.2%15.1%16.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($22M)$83M$35M($60M)($217M)($104M)($92M)($938M)($490M)($71M)$66MFree cash flowFCF
−1.1%4.1%1.8%−2.8%−10.1%−4.3%−3.5%−32.1%−14.2%−2.0%1.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$110M$118M$125M$134M$140M$150M$158M$179M$200M$225M$230MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$12M$18M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
6%5%7%6%5%6%5%5%6%5%5%ROICROIC
8%8%8%8%6%9%8%7%8%7%6%Return on equityROE
4%3%3%3%1%3%3%1%3%2%1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$6M$39M$119M$30M$257M$52M$165M$5M$12M$76M$8MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$155M$168M$193M$253M$271M$329M$398M$414M$456M$460M$405MReceivablesReceiv.
$129M$132M$168M$165M$153M$244M$457M$347M$365M$330M$277MAccounts payablePayables
$26M$36M$25M$88M$118M$85M($59M)$67M$91M$130M$128MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$463M$526M$643M$500M$721M$688M$1.2B$935M$1.0B$1.1B$1.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$577M$432M$791M$519M$815M$768M$1.5B$1.1B$1.1B$993M$929MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×1.2×0.8×1.0×0.9×0.9×0.8×0.8×0.9×1.1×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$7.5B$7.8B$8.1B$8.4B$9.1B$9.5B$10.5B$11.2B$12.5B$13.2B$13.2BTotal assetsAssets
$2.4B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$3.0B$3.3B$3.6B$4.0B$4.5B$4.7B$4.7BTotal debtDebt
$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$2.6B$2.8B$3.2B$3.5B$4.0B$4.5B$4.6B$4.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.0×3.2×2.8×2.8×2.0×2.8×2.5×2.3×2.4×2.4×2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.3B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B$2.7B$2.8B$3.3B$3.8B$4.1B$4.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.4%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
89.1M89.2M89.3M89.6M89.6M89.6M89.6M98.0M104M111M116MShares out (diluted)Shares
$21.59$22.53$22.28$23.71$23.93$26.73$29.53$29.84$33.03$32.29$30.37Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.17$2.10$2.37$2.39$1.73$2.72$2.60$2.33$3.01$2.76$2.16EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.71$2.83$2.78$1.53$1.26$1.43$2.87$-0.39$2.71$4.88$4.93Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.25$0.93$0.39$-0.67$-2.42$-1.16$-1.03$-9.58$-4.70$-0.64$0.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.24$1.32$1.40$1.50$1.56$1.67$1.76$1.83$1.92$2.03$1.98Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.56$5.76$6.66$6.77$8.75$7.10$8.55$13.86$12.17$10.74$9.38Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$26.32$27.09$28.05$28.93$29.15$30.20$31.00$33.88$36.43$37.32$35.47Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.6%/yr+6.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.8%/yr+31.1%/yr
EPS+2.7%/yr+9.8%/yr
Dividends / share+5.7%/yr+5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.6%/yr+4.2%/yr
Book value / share+4.0%/yr+5.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
111Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
5%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
8.5×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$540Mowner earningsvs.$306Mnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $540M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $578M it takes just to hold its position. It put $611M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($71M).

Reported net income$306M
Owner earnings$540M · 15% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$306M$313M$228M$233M$244M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$578M+$496M+$458M+$417M+$404M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$16M+$24M+$17M+$15M+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$218M−$55M−$283M+$9M−$130M
Cash from operations$1.1B$778M$420M$674M$532M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$578M−$496M−$458M−$417M−$404M
Owner earnings$540M$282M($38M)$257M$128M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$611M−$772M−$900M−$349M−$232M
Free cash flow($71M)($490M)($938M)($92M)($104M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%8%-1%10%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $578M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $611M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $16M), owner earnings is nearer $524M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $555M ÷ interest expense $232M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.6B · 8.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $76M − debt $4.7B
    What this means

    Netting $76M of cash and short-term investments against $4.7B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 8.3× a year's operating profit (8.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–7%; 5% latest = NOPAT $473M ÷ invested capital $8.7B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -1%–15%; latest $540M = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $578M
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $611M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($71M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $16M of SBC) leaves $524M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $306M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $225M ÷ Owner Earnings $540M
    What this means

    Of $540M Owner Earnings, $225M (42%) went back to shareholders, $225M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.06×
    Expanding
    Capex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $578M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.08×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.7B vs $79M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +43%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.44/share (latest year $2.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to 15% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 12.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“These projects target improvements in electrical system reliability and resiliency, wildfire situational awareness and mitigation, greater communications capabilities, advancements in customer usage analytics using artificial intelligence, renewable resources and advanced electri…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$8M
  • Receivables$405M
  • Other current assets$597M
Current liabilities$929M
  • Accounts payable$277M
  • Other current liabilities$652M
Current ratio1.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.09×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$81Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−7.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($8.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.0B$303M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$160M
'28$100M
'29$200M
'30$325M
later$3.9B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$160Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$325Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$4.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$8.3B · 129%
  • Dividends$1.5B · 24%
  • Buybacks$30M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$1.6B

    73% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.5B as dividends and $30M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$3.4B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.4B to $4.7B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $30M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count30.4%

    The diluted count rose from 89M to 116M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.03/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained2%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($716M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $14M, so each retained $1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Ms. Pope$5.4M$7.8M$128M
2022Ms. Pope$6.3M$7.0M$257M
2023Ms. Pope$7.0M$6.4M($38M)
2024Ms. Pope$7.4M$6.8M$282M
2025Ms. Pope$7.6M$7.7M$540M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio45:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$16M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Portland General Electric is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?30.4%

    Diluted shares grew 30.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $30M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.4B → $4.7B

    Debt rose from $2.4B to $4.7B while owner earnings went from about $247M to $261M — about 9.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 18 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 11% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $155M to $405M while revenue grew 83%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 11% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PNWPinnacle West$5.3B71%20.5%6%11%
PORPortland General Electric$3.6B15.6%5%9%
OGEOGE Energy$3.2B61%23.5%6%15%
HEHawaiian Electric Industries Inc.$3.1B11.9%6%7%
TLNTalen Energy Corporation$2.6B3.5%2%4%
BKHBlack Hills$2.3B23.0%6%17%
PNMPNM Resources$2.1B18.3%5%11%
CWENClearway Energy Inc.$1.4B67%21.6%2%36%
Group median19.4%6%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Portland General Electric has delivered.

Portland General Electric’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Portland General Electric earns about $320M on its 9.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 15.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $66M on 116M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $4.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.1B) runs well above depreciation ($582M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $577M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Portland General Electric (POR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/POR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← POOL its page in the Manual POST →

Industry order: ← PNW the Electric Utilities chapter PPL →