Owner Scorecard


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BKNG, Booking Holdings Inc.

Hotels & Resorts asset-light

Booking Holdings runs online travel marketplaces, among them Booking.com, Priceline, Agoda, Kayak and OpenTable, that connect travelers with hotels and other travel providers and take a cut of each booking. On merchant bookings it handles the traveler’s payment; on agency bookings it does not, and simply passes the customer along. It also sells advertising.

Merchant revenues are derived from transactions where we facilitate payments from travelers for the services provided, generally at the time of booking.

Agency revenues are derived from travel-related transactions where we do not facilitate payments from travelers for the services provided, and consist almost entirely of travel reservation commissions from Booking.com's accommodation reservations.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
BKNG · Booking Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$26.9B
+13.4% YoY · 32% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $27.7B 5-yr avg $20.0B
Operating margin 32.6% 5-yr avg 28.9%
Owner-earnings margin 33% 5-yr avg 32%
Free cash flow margin 33% 5-yr avg 32%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Merchant Revenue (66%), Agency Revenue (30%) and Advertising and other revenues (4%).
What moves the needle
The outcome turns on a two-sided marketplace: whether more properties draw more travelers and more travelers draw more properties. That is the network effect to test, not to assume, and its evidence would show in repeat visits and in how cheaply each booking is won. Watch the toll paid to bring travelers in, the reliance on paid search and advertising, and whether direct and returning traffic can lower that toll; watch pricing power too, both the cut taken from the hotels and the footing held against rivals, since the filing itself warns that generative AI lowers the barriers to entry and lets competitors copy core functionality. The figures sit in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 30%, above 15% in 5 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 33% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Merchant Revenue is 66% of revenue, with Agency Revenue the other meaningful line at 30%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Merchant Revenue66%$17.8B
  • Agency Revenue30%$8.0B
  • Advertising and other revenues4%$1.2B
By geographyInternational90%United States10%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$10.7B$12.7B$14.5B$15.1B$6.8B$11.0B$17.1B$21.4B$23.7B$26.9B$27.7BRevenueRevenue
96%98%99%Gross marginGross mgn
4%5%5%5%9%5%4%7%4%3%3%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$2.9B$4.5B$5.3B$5.3B($631M)$2.5B$5.1B$5.8B$7.6B$8.8B$9.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
27.1%35.8%36.8%35.5%−9.3%22.8%29.9%27.3%31.8%32.8%32.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.1B$2.3B$4.0B$4.9B$59M$1.2B$3.1B$4.3B$5.9B$5.4B$6.2BNet incomeNet inc.
21%47%17%18%20%22%22%19%21%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.0B$4.7B$5.3B$4.9B$85M$2.8B$6.6B$7.3B$8.3B$9.4B$9.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$309M$363M$426M$469M$458M$421M$451M$504M$591M$623M$600MDepreciationDeprec.
$1.5B$2.0B$914M($469M)($432M)$1.2B$3.0B$2.6B$1.9B$3.4B$2.5BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$220M$288M$442M$368M$286M$304M$368M$345M$429M$322M$308MCapexCapex
2.0%2.3%3.0%2.4%4.2%2.8%2.2%1.6%1.8%1.2%1.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3.8B$4.4B$4.9B$4.5B($201M)$2.5B$6.2B$7.0B$7.9B$9.1B$9.0BOwner earningsOwner earn.
35.0%34.5%33.7%29.8%−3.0%23.0%36.2%32.8%33.3%33.8%32.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3.8B$4.4B$4.9B$4.5B($201M)$2.5B$6.2B$7.0B$7.9B$9.1B$9.0BFree cash flowFCF
35.0%34.5%33.7%29.8%−3.0%23.0%36.2%32.8%33.3%33.8%32.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M$553M$273M$9M$0$1.2B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$1.2B$1.2B$1.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
$1.0B$1.8B$6.0B$8.2B$1.3B$163M$6.6B$10.4B$6.5B$6.4BBuybacksBuybacks
16%14%30%60%-5%33%131%ROICROIC
22%21%46%82%1%19%110%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
$11.7B$13.0B$6.3B$7.3B$11.1B$11.2B$12.4B$12.7B$16.2B$17.2B$25.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$860M$1.2B$1.4B$1.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$419M$668M$1.1B$1.2B$735M$1.6B$2.5B$3.4B$3.8B$5.1B$4.1BAccounts payablePayables
$441M$550M$289M($2.5B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$5.4B$9.0B$8.4B$9.8B$12.2B$13.1B$15.8B$17.0B$20.5B$22.3B$20.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.9B$3.5B$3.6B$5.4B$3.4B$6.2B$8.5B$13.3B$15.6B$16.7B$19.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×2.6×2.4×1.8×3.6×2.1×1.9×1.3×1.3×1.3×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.4B$2.7B$2.9B$2.9B$1.9B$2.9B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8B$2.7B$2.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$19.8B$25.5B$22.7B$21.4B$21.9B$23.6B$25.4B$24.3B$27.7B$29.3B$27.7BTotal assetsAssets
$6.2B$8.8B$8.6B$7.6B$12.0B$10.9B$12.5B$14.2B$16.6B$18.7B$18.4BTotal debtDebt
($5.5B)($4.2B)$2.4B$330M$951M($226M)$89M$1.5B$434M$1.5B($7.0B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
14.0×17.9×19.9×20.1×-1.8×7.5×13.0×6.5×5.8×5.5×7.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$9.8B$11.3B$8.8B$5.9B$4.9B$6.2B$2.8B($2.7B)($4.0B)($5.6B)($8.7B)Shareholders’ equityEquity
$941M$1.1B$180M$180MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
1.25B1.25B1.20B1.09B1.03B1.03B1.00B913M852M816M794MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.58$10.15$12.10$13.85$6.60$10.60$17.07$23.39$27.88$32.99$34.87Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.71$1.87$3.33$4.47$0.06$1.13$3.05$4.70$6.91$6.62$7.75EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.01$3.50$4.08$4.13$-0.20$2.43$6.18$7.66$9.27$11.14$11.38Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.01$3.50$4.08$4.13$-0.20$2.43$6.18$7.66$9.27$11.14$11.38Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$1.38$1.53$1.60Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.18$0.23$0.37$0.34$0.28$0.29$0.37$0.38$0.50$0.39$0.39Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.85$9.02$7.32$5.45$4.76$5.97$2.78$-3.00$-4.72$-6.84$-10.99Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before TTM are restated ×25 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+16.1%/yr+37.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+15.7%/yr
EPS+16.3%/yr+158.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.4%/yr+7.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Advertising and other revenues+11.3%
    “Advertising and other revenues increased year-over-year in 2025 due to growth at OpenTable and growth in advertising revenues at Booking.com.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
33Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
131%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$9.1Bowner earningsvs.$5.4Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $5.4B of profit into $9.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$5.4B
Owner earnings$9.1B · 34% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$5.4B$5.9B$4.3B$3.1B$1.2B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$623M+$591M+$504M+$451M+$421M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$3.4B+$1.9B+$2.6B+$3.0B+$1.2B
Cash from operations$9.4B$8.3B$7.3B$6.6B$2.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$322M−$429M−$345M−$368M−$304M
Owner earnings$9.1B$7.9B$7.0B$6.2B$2.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue34%33%33%36%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $8.8B ÷ interest expense $1.6B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 0.2× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $17.2B − debt $18.7B
    What this means

    Netting $17.2B of cash and short-term investments against $18.7B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (2.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $10.4B in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $8.9B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 19 + DIO 0 − DPO 7683 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not meaningful here
    Invested capital ($4.0B) = debt $18.7B + equity ($5.6B) − cash
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–36%; latest $9.1B = operating cash $9.4B − maintenance capex $322M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 34% of revenue this year, a 33% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $66M of SBC) leaves $9.0B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $9.4B ÷ net income $5.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $7.7B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.1B
    What this means

    Of $9.1B Owner Earnings, $7.7B (85%) went back to shareholders, $1.2B dividends, $6.4B buybacks. Net of $66M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6.4B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.52×
    Harvesting
    Capex $322M ÷ depreciation $623M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $26.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.33×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $18.7B vs $5.6B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +84%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.70/share (latest year $6.97), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-7.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 33% → 31% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    The recent-years average (31%) sits below the early years (33%), but the latest year (33%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 30% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −9.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −4.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Other large technology platforms and AI-native competitors are developing Gen AI-powered assistants and agents that can search, compare, recommend, and facilitate travel and dining reservations directly within their search engines, operating systems, messaging platforms, or "super-apps."…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$20.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$16.0B
  • Receivables$1.7B
  • Other current assets$3.2B
Current liabilities$19.8B
  • Debt due within a year$3.0B
  • Accounts payable$4.1B
  • Other current liabilities$12.7B
Current ratio1.06×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.06×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.81×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3.0B due · $16.0B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+16.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($12.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($15.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$19.1B$645M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $53.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$3.4B · 6%
  • Dividends$2.4B · 5%
  • Buybacks$48.4B · 91%
  • Returned to owners$50.8B

    102% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.4B as dividends and $48.4B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $12.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $13.9B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$95.87

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 505M shares were bought for $48.4B, about $95.87 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $53.05 (2016) to $198.46 (2025); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $111.22 ($10.4B).

  • Net change in share count−36.6%

    The diluted count fell from 1252M to 794M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.53/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.6B12% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.4B of capital spent building

$2.2B written down across 3 years (2016, 2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Fogel$55.1M$78.2M$2.5B
2022Mr. Fogel$31.5M$32.4M$6.2B
2023Mr. Fogel$46.7M$139.5M$7.0B
2024Mr. Fogel$44.8M$126.4M$7.9B
2025Mr. Fogel$35.4M$64.8M$9.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio351:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$66M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Booking Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$6.2B → $18.4B

    Debt rose from $6.2B to $18.4B while owner earnings went from about $4.3B to $8.0B — about 1.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BKNGBooking Holdings Inc.$26.9B99%30.8%30%33%
CHRWC.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc.$16.2B92%5.0%23%4%
EXPEExpedia Group Inc.$14.7B82%6.9%11%15%
FWRDForward Air Corporation$2.5B52%7.8%15%7%
Group median87%7.4%19%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Booking Holdings Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Booking Holdings Inc. earns about $9.0B on its 33.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 33.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $9.0B on 775M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-20; net cash $7.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Booking Holdings Inc. (BKNG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BKNG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BKKT its page in the Manual BKR →

Industry order: ← ATAT the Hotels & Resorts chapter BWLP →