Share count
12Mpeak FY2025
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BKKT, Bakkt Inc.
Our long-term strategy is to build and scale an integrated financial infrastructure platform through our three solutions: Bakkt Markets, Bakkt Agent, and Bakkt Global.
The term customers is in accordance with the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") Accounting Standards Codification ("ASC") 606, Revenue from Contracts with Customers .
Digital asset" means an asset that is built using blockchain technology, including virtual currencies (as used in the State of New York), coins, cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and other tokens.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$2.3B
−32.1% YoY · 201% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.3B 5-yr avg $1.3B
Revenue $578M +13.3% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −3.2% yr-ago −4.3%
Net income ($30M) yr-ago ($36M)
Net margin −5.2% yr-ago −7.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median -146%, above 12% in only 0 of 4 years). The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $28M | $56M | $727M | $3.4B | $2.3B | $2.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| $123K | $2M | $4M | $4M | $791K | $354K | Net interest incomeNet int. |
| ($80M) | ($578M) | ($75M) | ($47M) | ($107M) | ($127M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| -17.0% | -126.9% | -28.2% | -17.3% | -65.9% | -59.3% | Return on assetsROA |
| — | -601% | -155% | -138% | -95% | -74% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −601% | −155% | −138% | −95% | −74% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| — | -2352% | — | — | -252% | -126% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $468M | $456M | $265M | $269M | $163M | $213M | Total assetsAssets |
| $233M | $16M | $68M | $68M | $65M | $65M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $0 | $96M | $48M | $34M | $113M | $171M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| — | 2.8M | 3.6M | 5.9M | 12.1M | 28.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $-203.08 | $-21.01 | $-7.97 | $-8.87 | $-4.46 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $33.82 | $13.55 | $5.79 | $9.33 | $6.02 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| — | $8.63 | $-6.35 | $-6.32 | $3.52 | $3.55 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.64 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.06 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.35 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +113.9%/yr (3-yr) | +113.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −77.8%/yr (2-yr) | −77.8%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | −34.9%/yr (3-yr) | −34.9%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$2.3Blow FY2020
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity -95%Loss on equityNet income ($107M) ÷ equity $113MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- LossNet income ÷ (equity − goodwill $65M − intangibles $6M)Industry peers: median 22%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 47%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 69.3%Well capitalizedEquity $113M ÷ assets $163M
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$125M
- Cash & short-term investments$80M
- Receivables$10M
- Other current assets$35M
Current liabilities$30M
- Accounts payable$3M
- Other current liabilities$28M
Current ratio4.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.13×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.65×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$95Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 4.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$101Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$82MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$79K$79K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$70M43% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity57%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 5 years buying other businesses, against $64M of capital spent building
$1.5B written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | $1.5M | $10.5M | ($70M) |
| 2024 | $7.3M | $12.9M | ($22M) |
| 2024 | $3.9M | −$5.0M | ($22M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership38.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$72M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BKKTBakkt Inc. | $2.3B | -146% | -252% | — | 0.5% |
| GDOTGreen DOT Corp | $2.0B | 5% | 13% | — | -0.1% |
| ATLCAtlanticus Holdings Corporation | $2.0B | 42% | 42% | 55% | 21.3% |
| TREELendingTree Inc. | $1.1B | 5% | — | — | -2.2% |
| UPSTUpstart | $1.0B | -7% | -8% | — | 0.0% |
| SOFISoFi Technologies | $3.6B | -6% | -9% | 85% | 3.6% |
| SLMSLM Corporation | $2.0B | 30% | 31% | 33% | 5.0% |
| OMFOneMain Holdings Inc. | $4.9B | 23% | 48% | 39% | 15.3% |
| Group median | — | 5% | 13% | — | 2.1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFA bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Bakkt Inc. (BKKT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BKKT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← BKH its page in the Manual BKNG →
Industry order: ← BGIN the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter BLK →