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BLND, Blend Labs Inc.

Software asset-light Unprofitable

We help financial institutions deliver transparency, speed, and scale across all major product lines in home lending and consumer banking, supporting end-to-end mortgage applications, home equity, refinance, vehicle, credit card, personal loan, and deposit account opening.

Blend (NYSE: BLND) is on a mission to transform the financial services industry by making the process of obtaining a loan or opening an account as seamless and intuitive as modern e-commerce.

Our platform brings together the data, technology, and AI-powered architecture needed to streamline and personalize every step of origination.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BLND · Blend Labs Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$124M

+6.8% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $128M 5-yr avg $164M

Gross margin 75% 5-yr avg 61%

Operating margin −14.7% 5-yr avg −118.4%

Owner-earnings margin −8% 5-yr avg −55%

Free cash flow margin −8% 5-yr avg −55%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Mortgage Suite (56%), Consumer Banking Suite (37%) and Professional services (7%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −84% through the cycle on a 64% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 24% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −57%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Mortgage Suite at 56%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Mortgage Suite56%$69M
Consumer Banking Suite37%$45M
Professional services7%$9M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$51M	$96M	$234M	$235M	$110M	$116M	$124M	$128M	RevenueRevenue
61%	64%	49%	38%	70%	72%	74%	75%	Gross marginGross mgn
52%	31%	55%	59%	56%	39%	41%	40%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
96%	58%	39%	59%	74%	40%	27%	27%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($82M)	($75M)	($197M)	($746M)	($144M)	($49M)	($22M)	($19M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−161.3%	−78.4%	−84.1%	−317.3%	−131.1%	−42.2%	−17.6%	−14.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($81M)	($75M)	($170M)	($720M)	($179M)	($43M)	($7M)	($5M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
($59M)	($65M)	($128M)	($190M)	($128M)	($13M)	$12M	($1M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M	$4M	$11M	$11M	$2M	$1M	$3M	$4M	DepreciationDeprec.
$8M	($5M)	($39M)	$409M	$4M	$1M	($14M)	($30M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$580K	$1M	$2M	$2M	$35K	$10M	$12M	$8M	CapexCapex
1.1%	1.4%	0.7%	0.9%	0.0%	8.4%	9.4%	6.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($60M)	($66M)	($129M)	($192M)	($128M)	($23M)	($81K)	($10M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−117.5%	−69.1%	−55.1%	−81.8%	−116.5%	−19.7%	−0.1%	−7.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($60M)	($66M)	($129M)	($192M)	($128M)	($23M)	($81K)	($10M)	Free cash flowFCF
−117.5%	−69.1%	−55.1%	−81.8%	−116.5%	−19.7%	−0.1%	−7.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$400M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$25M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-57%	-49%	-20%	-273%	-119%	—	—	—	ROICROIC
-60%	-46%	-22%	-585%	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
−60%	−46%	−22%	−585%	—	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$23M	$41M	$547M	$354M	$129M	$94M	$105M	$59M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$3M	$6M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$3M	$259K	Accounts payablePayables
—	$186M	$613M	$396M	$170M	$135M	$139M	$93M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$35M	$60M	$35M	$32M	$39M	$58M	$51M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	5.3×	10.2×	11.2×	5.4×	3.5×	2.4×	1.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	$0	$287M	$0	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$216M	$1.1B	$433M	$206M	$178M	$187M	$161M	Total assetsAssets
—	$0	$214M	$217M	$138M	$0	$0	$0	Total debtDebt
—	($41M)	($333M)	($137M)	$9M	($94M)	($105M)	($59M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	-17.5×	-30.1×	-4.7×	-7.2×	—	—	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$135M	$163M	$775M	$123M	($19M)	($56M)	($17M)	($56M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
19.5%	10.5%	30.2%	46.6%	41.6%	24.1%	23.4%	23.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
32.8M	39.4M	132M	234M	245M	254M	259M	256M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.55	$2.44	$1.78	$1.00	$0.45	$0.46	$0.48	$0.50	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.49	$-1.89	$-1.29	$-3.08	$-0.73	$-0.17	$-0.03	$-0.02	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.82	$-1.68	$-0.98	$-0.82	$-0.52	$-0.09	$-0.00	$-0.04	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.82	$-1.68	$-0.98	$-0.82	$-0.52	$-0.09	$-0.00	$-0.04	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.02	$0.03	$0.01	$0.01	$0.00	$0.04	$0.04	$0.03	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.12	$4.14	$5.87	$0.53	$-0.08	$-0.22	$-0.07	$-0.22	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.35 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.77 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−17.8%/yr	−27.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+16.7%/yr	+6.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

259Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−119%low FY2022

Gross margin

74%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($81K)owner earningsvs.($7M)net incomelow FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $7M loss into ($81K) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($7M)	($43M)	($179M)	($720M)	($170M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$3M	+$1M	+$2M	+$11M	+$11M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$29M	+$28M	+$46M	+$110M	+$71M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$14M	+$1M	+$4M	+$409M	−$39M
Cash from operations	$12M	($13M)	($128M)	($190M)	($128M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$12M	−$10M	−$35K	−$2M	−$2M
Owner earnings	($81K)	($23M)	($128M)	($192M)	($129M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	0%	-20%	-117%	-82%	-55%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $29M), owner earnings is nearer ($29M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“For example, in connection with the audit of our consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31, 2025, we identified two material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$105M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $56M + ST investments $49M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $105M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($73M) = debt $0 + equity ($17M) − cash

Industry peers: median -24%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin -69%

Consumes cash through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -117%–-0%; latest ($81K) = operating cash $12M − maintenance capex $12M

Industry peers: median -19%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -0% of revenue this year, a -69% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $29M of SBC) leaves ($29M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $12M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($7M) · cash from operations $12M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 3.53×

Expanding

Capex $12M ÷ depreciation $3M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $124M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $82M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.31/share (latest year $-0.03), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-0.07/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 0 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −108% → −64% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −108% early to −64% lately, median −84% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2022 · −317.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI technology into their products, offerings, and solutions more quickly or more successfully than us, which could impair our ability to compete effectively and adversely affect our results of operations.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$93M

Cash & short-term investments$59M
Other current assets$34M

Current liabilities$51M

Accounts payable$259K
Other current liabilities$51M

Current ratio1.81×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.81×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$42Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Cash runway6.1 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.4× → 1.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($56M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$40MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1M$1M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$34Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$77K0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$400Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $27M of capital spent building

$287M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 72% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership36.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$29M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 23% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$96M · 75% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“In 2025, 75.0% of our revenue was generated from 25 customers with more than $1 million each in revenue.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PUBMPubMatic Inc.	$283M	68%	7.5%	8%	25%
NXDRNextdoor Holdings Inc.	$258M	83%	-55.8%	-24%	-28%
BLZEBackblaze Inc.	$146M	52%	-32.1%	-88%	1%
IONQIonQ Inc.	$130M	—	-715.7%	-23%	-405%
BBAIBigBear.ai Inc.	$128M	25%	-62.6%	-31%	-19%
BLNDBlend Labs Inc.	$124M	64%	-84.1%	-57%	-69%
CEVACeva, Inc.	$110M	89%	-1.2%	-0%	7%
RUMRumble Inc.	$101M	—	-125.9%	-322%	-86%
Group median	—	66%	-59.2%	-28%	-24%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Blend Labs Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered−5%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−8%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh BLND against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Blend Labs Inc. (BLND), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BLND, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BLMN its page in the Manual BLZE →

Industry order: ← BLKB the Software chapter BLZE →