← All companies ← BLLN Manual BLND → ← BJRI Restaurants BRCB →

BLMN, Bloomin' Brands Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand Cyclical

Bloomin' Brands Inc. is one of the largest casual dining restaurant companies in the world, with a portfolio of leading, differentiated restaurant concepts.

OSI Restaurant Partners, LLC ("OSI"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bloomin' Brands, is our primary operating entity.

On December 30, 2024, we completed the sale of the majority ownership of our Brazil operations, and all restaurants in that market are now operated as unconsolidated franchisees.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BLMN · Bloomin' Brands Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$4.0B

+0.1% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $4.0B 5-yr avg $4.0B

Gross margin 70% 5-yr avg 70%

Operating margin 1.0% 5-yr avg 5.3%

ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 18%

Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 69% and operating margin about 3.5% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −5.5% to 7.6% — on a steadier 69% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$4.3B	$4.2B	$4.1B	$4.1B	$3.2B	$4.1B	$4.0B	$4.2B	$4.0B	$4.0B	$4.0B	RevenueRevenue
68%	69%	69%	69%	69%	70%	69%	70%	71%	70%	70%	Gross marginGross mgn
6%	7%	7%	7%	8%	6%	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$124M	$139M	$145M	$191M	($175M)	$309M	$306M	$283M	$140M	$37M	$39M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.9%	3.3%	3.5%	4.6%	−5.5%	7.5%	7.6%	6.8%	3.5%	0.9%	1.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$39M	$101M	$107M	$131M	($159M)	$216M	$102M	$247M	($128M)	$8M	$22M	Net incomeNet inc.
18%	7%	-9%	5%	—	11%	25%	7%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$341M	$409M	$288M	$318M	$139M	$402M	$391M	$532M	$228M	$277M	$279M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$194M	$192M	$202M	$197M	$180M	$163M	$150M	$169M	$176M	$178M	$180M	DepreciationDeprec.
$86M	$89M	($48M)	($34M)	$103M	($896K)	$123M	$104M	$173M	$83M	$68M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$261M	$261M	$208M	$162M	$88M	$123M	$193M	$282M	$221M	$180M	$159M	CapexCapex
6.1%	6.2%	5.0%	3.9%	2.8%	3.0%	4.8%	6.8%	5.6%	4.5%	4.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$80M	$148M	$80M	$156M	$51M	$280M	$198M	$250M	$7M	$97M	$119M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.9%	3.5%	1.9%	3.8%	1.6%	6.8%	4.9%	6.0%	0.2%	2.4%	3.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$80M	$148M	$80M	$156M	$51M	$280M	$198M	$250M	$7M	$97M	$119M	Free cash flowFCF
1.9%	3.5%	1.9%	3.8%	1.6%	6.8%	4.9%	6.0%	0.2%	2.4%	3.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$31M	$31M	$33M	$36M	$17M	$0	$50M	$84M	$83M	$38M	$26M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$310M	$273M	$114M	$107M	$0	$0	$109M	$71M	$266M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	12%	14%	16%	-15%	30%	22%	24%	10%	3%	3%	ROICROIC
22%	144%	234%	77%	-3829%	100%	38%	60%	-94%	2%	5%	Return on equityROE
4%	100%	161%	56%	n/m	100%	19%	40%	−155%	−9%	−1%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$127M	$128M	$72M	$67M	$110M	$88M	$85M	$112M	$70M	$59M	$71M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$65M	$51M	$73M	$87M	$62M	$79M	$78M	$63M	$69M	$61M	$53M	InventoryInvent.
$195M	$185M	$174M	$175M	$141M	$168M	$184M	$156M	$153M	$138M	$145M	Accounts payablePayables
($130M)	($134M)	($102M)	($88M)	($80M)	($89M)	($106M)	($93M)	($84M)	($77M)	($91M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$391M	$360M	$335M	$340M	$324M	$353M	$347M	$343M	$321M	$270M	$209M	Current assetsCur. assets
$823M	$813M	$791M	$962M	$950M	$985M	$979M	$1.0B	$952M	$879M	$800M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×	0.4×	0.4×	0.4×	0.3×	0.4×	0.4×	0.3×	0.3×	0.3×	0.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$310M	$310M	$295M	$288M	$271M	$268M	$273M	$213M	$213M	$185M	$185M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$3.6B	$3.4B	$3.3B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.2B	$3.1B	Total assetsAssets
$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$793M	$833M	$781M	$1.0B	$787M	$768M	Total debtDebt
$962M	$990M	$1.0B	$982M	$927M	$705M	$749M	$669M	$957M	$728M	$697M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$183M	$70M	$46M	$170M	$4M	$216M	$271M	$409M	$136M	$334M	$396M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.6%	0.7%	0.6%	0.5%	0.6%	0.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$1M	—	—	$2M	—	—	—	—	$28M	$28M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
114M	99.7M	94.1M	89.8M	87.5M	108M	98.5M	96.5M	85.9M	85.3M	85.8M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$37.27	$42.36	$43.86	$46.11	$36.25	$38.24	$40.70	$43.21	$45.99	$46.37	$46.25	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.34	$1.02	$1.14	$1.45	$-1.81	$2.00	$1.03	$2.56	$-1.49	$0.10	$0.25	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.70	$1.49	$0.85	$1.73	$0.58	$2.59	$2.01	$2.59	$0.09	$1.13	$1.39	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.70	$1.49	$0.85	$1.73	$0.58	$2.59	$2.01	$2.59	$0.09	$1.13	$1.39	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.27	$0.31	$0.35	$0.40	$0.20	$0.00	$0.50	$0.87	$0.96	$0.45	$0.30	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.28	$2.61	$2.21	$1.80	$1.00	$1.14	$1.96	$2.93	$2.57	$2.11	$1.86	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.60	$0.71	$0.49	$1.90	$0.05	$2.01	$2.75	$4.24	$1.58	$3.91	$4.61	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.5%/yr	+5.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+5.5%/yr	+14.2%/yr
EPS	−13.2%/yr	—
Dividends / share	+5.6%/yr	+17.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.9%/yr	+16.0%/yr
Book value / share	+10.5%/yr	+141.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

85Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

3%low FY2020

Gross margin

70%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

7.5×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$97Mowner earningsvs.$8Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $8M of profit into $97M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$8M

Owner earnings$97M · 2% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$8M	($128M)	$247M	$102M	$216M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$178M	+$176M	+$169M	+$150M	+$163M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$8M	+$7M	+$12M	+$16M	+$24M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$83M	+$173M	+$104M	+$123M	−$896K
Cash from operations	$277M	$228M	$532M	$391M	$402M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$180M	−$221M	−$282M	−$193M	−$123M
Owner earnings	$97M	$7M	$250M	$198M	$280M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	0%	6%	5%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $89M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $774M · 20.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $59M − debt $833M

What this means
Netting $59M of cash and short-term investments against $833M of debt leaves $774M owed, about 20.8× a year's operating profit (22.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 12%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -15%–30%; 3% latest = NOPAT $29M ÷ invested capital $1.1B

Industry peers: median 24%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 0%–7%; latest $97M = operating cash $277M − maintenance capex $180M

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $89M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 33.59×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $277M ÷ net income $8M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 40%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $38M ÷ Owner Earnings $97M

What this means
Of $97M Owner Earnings, $38M (40%) went back to shareholders, $38M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.01×

Maintaining

Capex $180M ÷ depreciation $178M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.31×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $833M vs ($609M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Near

Uninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −49%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.50/share (latest year $0.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.90/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 3% early, 4% lately, median 4%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −8%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 8% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −5.5% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −3.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“For example, our competitors may more successfully implement menu or technology initiatives, such as remote ordering, social media or mobile technology platforms that expedite or enhance the customer experience, or artificial intelligence to develop new customer insights.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$209M

Cash & short-term investments$71M
Inventory$53M
Other current assets$84M

Current liabilities$800M

Debt due within a year$11M
Accounts payable$145M
Other current liabilities$644M

Current ratio0.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.19×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($591M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $71M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.3× → 0.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($214M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$1.2B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.1B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$321Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$186M

'27$183M

'28$175M

'29$169M

'30$160M

later$1.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$186Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$2.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.2Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$833M

Lease obligations (present value)$1.2B

Total fixed claims on the business$2.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.1B, of which the leases are 60%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 28, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.0B · 59%
Dividends$403M · 12%
Buybacks$1.2B · 38%

Returned to owners$1.7B
123% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $403M as dividends and $1.2B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$306M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $306M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $56M.
Average price paid for buybacks$19.62
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 41M shares were bought for $804M, about $19.62 each.
Net change in share count−25.0%
The diluted count fell from 114M to 86M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.45/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$610M19% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity55%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.0B of capital spent building

$32M written down across 3 years (2017, 2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$7.5M	$11.4M	$280M
2022	$6.3M	$5.1M	$198M
2023	$6.8M	$8.3M	$250M
2024	$4.0M	$3.7M	$7M
2024	$6.3M	−$2.1M	$7M
2025	$5.5M	$6.5M	$97M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$8M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 21% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Bloomin' Brands Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $190M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
YUMYum! Brands Inc.	$8.2B	73%	32.2%	75%	20%
TXRHTexas Roadhouse	$5.9B	—	8.0%	26%	9%
EATBrinker Intl	$5.4B	74%	6.6%	24%	5%
BLMNBloomin' Brands Inc.	$4.0B	69%	3.5%	13%	3%
CAKECheesecake Factory Incorporated (The)	$3.8B	77%	3.7%	13%	5%
CBRLCracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc	$3.5B	69%	6.9%	20%	5%
PLAYDave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.	$2.1B	83%	13.0%	15%	13%
PZZAPapa John's International Inc.	$2.1B	—	6.0%	37%	4%
Group median	—	74%	6.8%	22%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Bloomin' Brands Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Bloomin' Brands Inc. earns about $118M on its 3.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($118M) Net of stock comp (−$9M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−32%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $119M on 86M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $697M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BLMN against another business →

The owners of BLMN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Bloomin' Brands Inc. (BLMN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BLMN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BLLN its page in the Manual BLND →

Industry order: ← BJRI the Restaurants chapter BRCB →