Share count
53Mpeak FY2024
← All companies ← CDE Manual CDNL → ← CAI Life Sciences Tools & Services CRL →
CDNA, CareDx Inc.
CareDx is differentiated in the molecular diagnostics market because we innovated the go-to-market model for a laboratory developed test business.
We deliver solutions designed to empower clinicians and improve patient outcomes.
The Company's integrated solutions include non-invasive molecular testing for heart, kidney, and lung transplants; laboratory products; digital health technologies; and patient solutions that support care before and after transplant.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$380M
+13.8% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $413M 5-yr avg $322M
Revenue $118M +39.0% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 1.0% yr-ago −15.8%
Net income $3M yr-ago ($10M)
Net margin 2.4% yr-ago −12.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Services (72%), Patient and Digital Solutions (15%) and Products (13%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 12% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −20%) on a 57% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 12% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −26%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Services is 72% of revenue, with Patient And Digital Solutions the other meaningful line at 15%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Services72%$274M
- Patient And Digital Solutions15%$57M
- Products13%$48M
By geographyUnited States95%International5%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $41M | $48M | $77M | $127M | $192M | $296M | $322M | $280M | $334M | $380M | $413M | RevenueRevenue |
| 75% | 56% | 57% | 64% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 87% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 51% | 42% | 30% | 29% | 25% | 25% | 31% | 42% | 37% | 28% | 28% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 30% | 26% | 19% | 24% | 25% | 26% | 28% | 29% | 22% | 19% | 18% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($37M) | ($20M) | ($16M) | ($25M) | ($23M) | ($30M) | ($77M) | ($203M) | $41M | ($31M) | ($16M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −91.9% | −42.0% | −20.3% | −19.3% | −11.7% | −10.0% | −24.0% | −72.5% | 12.2% | −8.1% | −3.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($39M) | ($55M) | ($47M) | ($22M) | ($19M) | ($31M) | ($77M) | ($190M) | $53M | ($21M) | ($8M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($17M) | ($14M) | ($4M) | ($3M) | $33M | ($19M) | ($25M) | ($18M) | $38M | $42M | $73M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $4M | $4M | $6M | $7M | $9M | $12M | $14M | $14M | $15M | $15M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $18M | $36M | $31M | ($9M) | $22M | ($34M) | ($7M) | $108M | ($95M) | $14M | $30M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $549K | $186K | $2M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2M | CapexCapex |
| 1.4% | 0.4% | 2.7% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($17M) | ($14M) | ($6M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $71M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −42.0% | −30.0% | −7.9% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 17.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($17M) | ($14M) | ($6M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $71M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −42.0% | −30.0% | −7.9% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 17.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $21M | $6M | $692K | $18M | $0 | $15M | $610K | $7M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $642K | $28M | $522K | $88M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -81% | -145% | -39% | -32% | -12% | -20% | -18% | -90% | 15% | -10% | -5% | ROICROIC |
| -203% | — | -49% | -22% | -7% | -7% | -18% | -73% | 14% | -7% | -3% | Return on equityROE |
| −203% | — | −49% | −22% | −7% | −7% | −18% | −73% | 14% | −7% | −3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $17M | $17M | $65M | $38M | $225M | $348M | $293M | $235M | $261M | $201M | $198M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $3M | $3M | $10M | $24M | $35M | $60M | $66M | $51M | $65M | $43M | $45M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $5M | $6M | $5M | $6M | $10M | $17M | $19M | $19M | $20M | $27M | $26M | InventoryInvent. |
| $3M | $3M | $5M | $6M | $10M | $13M | $10M | $13M | $8M | $10M | $9M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $5M | $5M | $10M | $25M | $35M | $64M | $76M | $58M | $76M | $59M | $62M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $27M | $27M | $81M | $72M | $273M | $433M | $388M | $314M | $352M | $257M | $269M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $41M | $43M | $20M | $35M | $69M | $77M | $76M | $78M | $89M | $90M | $79M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.7× | 0.6× | 4.2× | 2.1× | 3.9× | 5.6× | 5.1× | 4.0× | 3.9× | 2.9× | 3.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $14M | $12M | $12M | $24M | $24M | $37M | $38M | $40M | $40M | $40M | $40M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $49M | $84M | $131M | $152M | $369M | $567M | $543M | $467M | $491M | $413M | $411M | Total assetsAssets |
| $34M | $34M | $0 | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | $13M | Total debtDebt |
| $17M | $17M | ($65M) | ($38M) | ($225M) | — | — | — | — | — | ($185M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $19M | ($6M) | $96M | $99M | $278M | $466M | $431M | $261M | $378M | $303M | $314M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 4.9% | 3.6% | 9.3% | 17.6% | 12.2% | 12.2% | 14.5% | 17.5% | 19.9% | 9.2% | 8.7% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 16.5M | 23.3M | 35.6M | 42.2M | 46.5M | 52.2M | 53.3M | 53.8M | 56.6M | 53.3M | 53.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.46 | $2.07 | $2.15 | $3.01 | $4.13 | $5.67 | $6.03 | $5.21 | $5.90 | $7.13 | $7.77 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.39 | $-2.38 | $-1.31 | $-0.52 | $-0.40 | $-0.59 | $-1.44 | $-3.54 | $0.93 | $-0.40 | $-0.15 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.03 | $-0.62 | $-0.17 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $1.33 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.03 | $-0.62 | $-0.17 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $1.33 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.01 | $0.06 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0.04 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.18 | $-0.26 | $2.69 | $2.35 | $5.97 | $8.92 | $8.08 | $4.86 | $6.68 | $5.69 | $5.90 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.41 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.53 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.5%/yr | +11.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +31.0%/yr (2-yr) | +31.0%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | +19.1%/yr | −1.0%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Patient And Digital Solutions+30.5%
“Patient and digital solutions revenue Patient and digital solutions revenue increased by $13.3 million, or 31%, during the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily driven by higher pharmacy sales and growth in our digital solutions, particularly an expanded customer base from Ottr software.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−10%low FY2017
Gross margin
64%low FY2017
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($6M)owner earningsvs.($47M)net incomelow FY2016
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2020FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2018 the business turned a $47M loss into ($6M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2018 | FY2017 | FY2016 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($47M) | ($55M) | ($39M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$4M | +$4M | +$3M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$7M | +$2M | +$2M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$31M | +$36M | +$18M |
| Cash from operations | ($4M) | ($14M) | ($17M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$2M | −$186K | −$549K |
| Owner earnings | ($6M) | ($14M) | ($17M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -8% | -30% | -42% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer ($13M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $65M + ST investments $112M − debt $34M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $143M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $24M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $167M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 41 + DIO 214 − DPO 80 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -145%–15%; -9% latest = NOPAT ($24M) ÷ invested capital $272M
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $40M = operating cash $42M − maintenance capex $2M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (3-yr median -30%)Industry peers: median -31%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a -30% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $35M of SBC) leaves $5M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($21M) · cash from operations $42M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $88M ÷ Owner Earnings $40M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $40M of Owner Earnings, $88M (219%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $88M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $35M stock comp, the real buyback was about $53M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.14×HarvestingCapex $2M ÷ depreciation $15M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $380M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.86×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $34M vs $167M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.03/share (latest year $-0.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −51% → −23% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −51% early to −23% lately, median −20% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −55%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2016 · −91.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If we fail to keep pace with rapidly evolving AI technological developments, especially in the healthcare sector, our competitive position and business results may suffer.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$269M
- Cash & short-term investments$187M
- Receivables$45M
- Inventory$26M
- Other current assets$11M
Current liabilities$79M
- Accounts payable$9M
- Other current liabilities$70M
Current ratio3.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.07×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.36×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$190Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+39.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.1× → 3.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$241Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$172MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$24M$24M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$72M17% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity13%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$68Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3M of capital spent building
$15M written down across 2 years (2016, 2017): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 22% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $7.1M | −$50k | ($31M) |
| 2022 | $12.8M | −$648k | ($77M) |
| 2023 | $3.1M | $1.9M | ($190M) |
| 2023 | $10.6M | $6.7M | ($190M) |
| 2024 | $9.4M | $24.2M | $53M |
| 2024 | $2.9M | $7.4M | $53M |
| 2025 | $7.2M | $3.5M | ($21M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio48:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$35M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 9% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why CareDx Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $21M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions, Stock compensation, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EXASExact Sciences | $3.2B | 70% | -36.6% | -13% | -13% |
| GHGuardant Health Inc. | $982M | 61% | -101.3% | -30% | -62% |
| CDNACareDx Inc. | $380M | 61% | -19.8% | -26% | -30% |
| BLLNBillionToOne Inc. | $305M | 53% | -30.9% | — | -31% |
| Group median | — | 61% | -33.7% | -26% | -30% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CareDx Inc. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $71M on 52M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net cash $185M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CareDx Inc. (CDNA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CDNA, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CDE its page in the Manual CDNL →
Industry order: ← CAI the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter CRL →