Owner Scorecard


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EXAS, Exact Sciences

Life Sciences Tools & Services consumer brand UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

A healthcare-services business, paid to deliver or facilitate care.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EXAS · Exact Sciences
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.2B
+17.7% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.2B 5-yr avg $2.5B
Gross margin 70% 5-yr avg 70%
Operating margin −6.4% 5-yr avg −26.0%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg −10%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg −2%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 56% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −38% through the cycle on a 70% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 10% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −13%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$99M$266M$454M$876M$1.5B$1.8B$2.1B$2.5B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2BRevenueRevenue
55%71%75%76%74%68%70%70%70%70%Gross marginGross mgn
77%41%39%40%32%45%32%32%28%27%27%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
34%16%15%16%37%22%19%17%16%16%16%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($169M)($118M)($159M)($234M)($768M)($856M)($594M)($215M)($1.0B)($206M)($206M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−170.1%−44.5%−35.1%−26.7%−51.5%−48.4%−28.5%−8.6%−38.0%−6.4%−6.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($167M)($114M)($175M)($213M)($824M)($596M)($624M)($204M)($1.0B)($208M)($208M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($130M)($72M)($69M)($112M)$136M($102M)($224M)$156M$211M$491M$491MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$11M$15M$21M$34M$70M$85M$100M$114M$120M$125M$125MDepreciationDeprec.
$2M($7M)$25M($41M)$737M$155M$93M$15M$905M$357M$357MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$15M$48M$150M$173M$65M$136M$214M$124M$136M$135M$135MCapexCapex
14.9%18.2%33.0%19.7%4.4%7.7%10.3%5.0%4.9%4.1%4.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($141M)($86M)($89M)($146M)$71M($188M)($324M)$32M$75M$357M$357MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−142.3%−32.4%−19.7%−16.6%4.8%−10.6%−15.5%1.3%2.7%11.0%11.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($145M)($120M)($219M)($284M)$71M($238M)($438M)$32M$75M$357M$357MFree cash flowFCF
−145.8%−45.2%−48.2%−32.4%4.8%−13.5%−21.0%1.3%2.7%11.0%11.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3M$18M$974M$7M$500M$15M$52M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
-46%-21%-13%-7%-23%-13%-9%-3%-20%-4%-4%ROICROIC
-50%-22%-39%-11%-37%-18%-20%-6%-43%-9%-9%Return on equityROE
−50%−22%−39%−11%−37%−18%−20%−6%−43%−9%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$311M$425M$1.1B$324M$1.8B$1.0B$632M$778M$1.0B$965M$965MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$9M$26M$45M$130M$233M$217M$158M$204M$249M$299M$299MReceivablesReceiv.
$7M$26M$39M$62M$92M$105M$118M$127M$162M$166M$166MInventoryInvent.
$710K$16M$28M$26M$36M$68M$75M$79M$90M$176M$176MAccounts payablePayables
$15M$36M$56M$166M$290M$254M$201M$252M$322M$289M$289MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$334M$487M$1.2B$554M$2.2B$1.4B$982M$1.2B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$31M$68M$136M$236M$633M$517M$413M$515M$732M$641M$641MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
10.9×7.2×9.0×2.3×3.5×2.8×2.4×2.3×2.1×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2M$17M$1.2B$1.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$377M$599M$1.5B$3.5B$4.9B$6.7B$6.2B$6.5B$5.9B$5.9B$5.9BTotal assetsAssets
$5M$4M$665M$804M$1.9B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3BTotal debtDebt
($306M)($420M)($459M)$480M$22M$1.1B$1.6B$1.5B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-574.3×-4.3×-1.2×-11.3×-46.0×-30.2×-11.1×-38.8×-5.2×-5.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$335M$520M$447M$2.0B$2.2B$3.4B$3.0B$3.1B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
23.9%13.4%13.3%12.4%10.3%14.3%9.9%9.3%7.8%6.7%6.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
102M116M122M131M151M171M176M180M184M189M189MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.97$2.30$3.72$6.68$9.87$10.31$11.82$13.88$14.98$17.21$17.21Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.63$-0.99$-1.43$-1.62$-5.45$-3.48$-3.54$-1.13$-5.59$-1.10$-1.10EPS (diluted)EPS
$-1.38$-0.75$-0.73$-1.11$0.47$-1.09$-1.84$0.18$0.40$1.89$1.89Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.42$-1.04$-1.79$-2.17$0.47$-1.39$-2.48$0.18$0.40$1.89$1.89Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.15$0.42$1.23$1.32$0.43$0.79$1.22$0.69$0.74$0.71$0.71Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.28$4.50$3.66$14.91$14.79$19.77$17.26$17.46$13.04$12.72$12.72Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+37.6%/yr+11.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+32.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+19.4%/yr+10.6%/yr
Book value / share+16.3%/yr−3.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
189Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−4%low FY2016
Gross margin
70%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.8×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$357Mowner earningsvs.($208M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $208M loss into $357M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($208M)($1.0B)($204M)($624M)($596M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$125M+$120M+$114M+$100M+$85M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$218M+$215M+$231M+$207M+$253M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$357M+$905M+$15M+$93M+$155M
Cash from operations$491M$211M$156M($224M)($102M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$135M−$136M−$124M−$100M−$85M
Owner earnings$357M$75M$32M($324M)($188M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$114M−$50M
Free cash flow$357M$75M$32M($438M)($238M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue11%3%1%-16%-11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $218M), owner earnings is nearer $139M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($206M) ÷ interest expense $39M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $956M + ST investments $9M − debt $2.3B
    What this means

    Netting $965M of cash and short-term investments against $2.3B of debt leaves $1.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 34 + DIO 62 − DPO 65 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -46%–-3%; -4% latest = NOPAT ($163M) ÷ invested capital $3.8B
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest $357M = operating cash $491M − maintenance capex $135M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -16%)
    Industry peers: median -31%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a -16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $218M of SBC) leaves $139M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($208M) · cash from operations $491M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.08×
    Maintaining
    Capex $135M ÷ depreciation $125M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.43×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.3B vs $915M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 10 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.52/share (latest year $-1.09), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 10 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −83% → −18% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −83% early to −18% lately, median −38% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Worst year 2016 · −170.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$965M
  • Receivables$299M
  • Inventory$166M
  • Other current assets$126M
Current liabilities$641M
  • Debt due within a year$834K
  • Accounts payable$176M
  • Other current liabilities$464M
Current ratio2.43×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.17×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.50×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$915Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$834K due · $965M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+20.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($887M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$246M$196M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $286M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 418%
  • Source of funding−$910M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $910M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5M to $2.3B.

  • Net change in share count84.4%

    The diluted count rose from 102M to 189M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.3B56% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity99%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020Mr. Conroy$20.2M$31.5M$71M
2021Mr. Conroy$14.7M−$2.1M($188M)
2022Mr. Conroy$14.2M$2.4M($324M)
2023Mr. Conroy$16.1M$35.9M$32M
2024Mr. Conroy$15.5M−$714k$75M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$218M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Exact Sciences is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?84.4%

    Diluted shares grew 84.4% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$5M → $2.3B

    Debt rose from $5M to $2.3B while owner earnings went from about ($106M) to $154M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $1.1B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EXASExact Sciences$3.2B70%-36.6%-13%-13%
GHGuardant Health Inc.$982M61%-101.3%-30%-62%
CDNACareDx Inc.$380M61%-19.8%-26%-30%
BLLNBillionToOne Inc.$305M53%-30.9%-31%
Group median61%-33.7%-26%-30%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Exact Sciences has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+234%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $357M on 191M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-02-12; net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Exact Sciences (EXAS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EXAS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EWBC its page in the Manual EXC →

Industry order: ← DGX the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter EYPT →