Share count
63Mpeak FY2024
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CNXC, Concentrix Corporation
Commercial Services & Supplies diversified
We are a global technology and services leader that powers exceptional brand experiences and digital operations for more than 2,000 clients across the globe.
We design, build, and run fully integrated, end-to-end solutions — including customer experience ("CX") process optimization, technology innovation and design engineering, front- and back-office automation, analytics, and business transformation services — for clients in five primary industry verticals.
Our solutions help our clients drive deep understanding, full lifecycle engagement, and differentiated customer experiences for their brands.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$9.8B
+2.2% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $10.0B 5-yr avg $7.7B
Revenue $2.5B +1.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 3.9% yr-ago 6.1%
Net income $55M yr-ago $42M
Net margin 2.2% yr-ago 1.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 36% and operating margin about 6.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −9.3% to 10% — on a steadier 36% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →89% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- Others52%$5.1B
- Philippines16%$1.6B
- United States11%$1.1B
- India11%$1.1B
- United Kingdom4%$356M
- Germany3%$334M
- Canada3%$302M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMay 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $4.7B | $4.7B | $5.6B | $6.3B | $7.1B | $9.6B | $9.8B | $10.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 37% | 35% | 35% | 36% | 36% | 36% | 35% | 34% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 31% | 29% | 25% | 26% | 27% | 30% | 29% | 29% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $294M | $309M | $572M | $640M | $661M | $596M | ($918M) | ($1.0B) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.3% | 6.5% | 10.2% | 10.1% | 9.3% | 6.2% | −9.3% | −10.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $117M | $165M | $406M | $435M | $314M | $251M | ($1.3B) | ($1.3B) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 43% | 38% | 27% | 28% | 23% | 16% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $450M | $508M | $514M | $601M | $678M | $667M | $807M | $744M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $139M | $129M | $140M | $147M | $173M | $247M | $226M | $229M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $183M | $198M | ($68M) | ($28M) | $129M | $73M | $1.8B | $1.7B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $111M | $171M | $149M | $140M | $181M | $239M | $234M | $230M | CapexCapex |
| 2.4% | 3.6% | 2.7% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.4% | 2.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $339M | $378M | $365M | $461M | $497M | $429M | $572M | $514M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.2% | 8.0% | 6.5% | 7.3% | 7.0% | 4.5% | 5.8% | 5.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $339M | $336M | $365M | $461M | $497M | $429M | $572M | $514M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.2% | 7.1% | 6.5% | 7.3% | 7.0% | 4.5% | 5.8% | 5.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $9M | $6M | $3M | $1.7B | $1.9B | $6M | $16M | $15M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $0 | $13M | $53M | $63M | $84M | $90M | $91M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | $25M | $121M | $64M | $136M | $169M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 12% | 6% | 13% | 10% | 6% | 6% | -10% | -11% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 7% | 15% | 16% | 8% | 6% | -47% | -49% | Return on equityROE |
| 8% | 7% | 15% | 14% | 6% | 4% | −50% | −52% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $84M | $153M | $182M | $145M | $295M | $241M | $327M | $256M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $141M | $129M | $161M | $244M | $210M | $245M | $198M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $941M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.9B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $1.0B | $968M | $1.1B | $2.1B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.4× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $2.9B | $5.1B | $5.0B | $3.7B | $3.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $5.2B | $5.0B | $6.7B | $12.5B | $12.0B | $10.8B | $10.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.1B | $802M | $2.2B | $5.0B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $4.7B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $992M | $620M | $2.1B | $4.7B | $4.5B | $4.3B | $4.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.2× | 6.4× | 24.8× | 9.1× | 3.3× | 1.9× | -3.2× | -3.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.5B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $2.7B | $2.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 1.0% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 51.6M | 51.6M | 51.9M | 51.7M | 54.0M | 65.1M | 63.0M | 61.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $91.24 | $91.46 | $107.62 | $122.24 | $131.73 | $147.81 | $155.93 | $163.71 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.27 | $3.19 | $7.81 | $8.41 | $5.81 | $3.86 | $-20.30 | $-21.52 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $6.56 | $7.33 | $7.03 | $8.90 | $9.21 | $6.59 | $9.09 | $8.41 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $6.56 | $6.52 | $7.03 | $8.90 | $9.21 | $6.59 | $9.09 | $8.41 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.25 | $1.03 | $1.18 | $1.29 | $1.42 | $1.50 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.15 | $3.32 | $2.87 | $2.71 | $3.34 | $3.67 | $3.72 | $3.77 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $28.48 | $44.61 | $50.47 | $52.10 | $76.71 | $62.08 | $43.55 | $44.23 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.3%/yr | +11.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +5.6%/yr | +4.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.5%/yr | +2.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.3%/yr | −0.5%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+2.2%
“Revenue in our retail, travel and e-commerce vertical increased 3.0%, which included increases in underlying business, primarily from several larger clients in this vertical.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−10%low FY2025
Gross margin
35%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.6×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$572Mowner earningsvs.($1.3B)net incomelow FY2019
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.3B loss into $572M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($1.3B) | $251M | $314M | $435M | $406M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$226M | +$247M | +$173M | +$147M | +$140M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$96M | +$96M | +$62M | +$47M | +$36M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.8B | +$73M | +$129M | −$28M | −$68M |
| Cash from operations | $807M | $667M | $678M | $601M | $514M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$234M | −$239M | −$181M | −$140M | −$149M |
| Owner earnings | $572M | $429M | $497M | $461M | $365M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 4% | 7% | 7% | 7% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $96M), owner earnings is nearer $476M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -3.2×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($918M) ÷ interest expense $290M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $327M − debt $4.7B
What this means
Netting $327M of cash and short-term investments against $4.7B of debt leaves $4.3B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 74 + DIO 0 − DPO 14 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -10%–13%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($725M) ÷ invested capital $7.1BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 4%–8%; latest $572M = operating cash $807M − maintenance capex $234MIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $96M of SBC) leaves $476M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($1.3B) · cash from operations $807M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $258M ÷ Owner Earnings $572M
What this means
Of $572M Owner Earnings, $258M (45%) went back to shareholders, $90M dividends, $169M buybacks. Net of $96M stock comp, the real buyback was about $72M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.04×MaintainingCapex $234M ÷ depreciation $226M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $9.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.40×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $4.7B vs $888M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (7-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −204%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.90/share (latest year $-20.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $44.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 2% lately, median 7% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −9.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.4%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Uncertainty around, and disruption from, new and emerging technologies, including the increased adoption and utilization of GenAI and agentic AI, may result in risks and challenges that could impact our business.”
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, May 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$3.0B
- Cash & short-term investments$256M
- Receivables$2.0B
- Other current assets$796M
Current liabilities$2.6B
- Debt due within a year$650M
- Accounts payable$198M
- Other current liabilities$1.7B
Current ratio1.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.18×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$461Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$650M due · $256M cash
cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the May 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.7B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.5B$919M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.6B (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$313Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$898Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$4.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$898M
Total fixed claims on the business$5.6B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.6B, of which the leases are 16%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Nov 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$1.2B · 29%
- Dividends$303M · 7%
- Buybacks$515M · 12%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.2B · 52%
- Returned to owners$818M
27% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $303M as dividends and $515M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$69.11
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $515M, about $69.11 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $47.43 (2025) to $181.86 (2021); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $47.43 ($169M).
- Net change in share count18.4%
The diluted count rose from 52M to 61M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.42/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$5.6B52% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$3.7Bover 7 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building
$1.5B written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 42% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Chris Caldwell | $15.1M | $32.9M | $365M |
| 2022 | Chris Caldwell | $8.6M | $2.2M | $461M |
| 2023 | Chris Caldwell | $10.2M | $2.8M | $497M |
| 2024 | Chris Caldwell | $11.6M | $2.3M | $429M |
| 2025 | Chris Caldwell | $13.3M | $9.6M | $572M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership0.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio2,080:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$96M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Concentrix Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.8% vs 7.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.2% early in the record and 5.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?18.4%
Diluted shares grew 18.4% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $515M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MELIMercadoLibre Inc. | $20.3B | 36% | 11.0% | 14% | 23% |
| AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc. | $14.4B | 10% | 2.5% | 3% | 1% |
| DASHDoorDash Inc. | $13.7B | — | -12.2% | -14% | 8% |
| FISFidelity National Info | $10.7B | 36% | 14.3% | 4% | 23% |
| CNXCConcentrix Corporation | $9.8B | 36% | 6.5% | 6% | 7% |
| BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc. | $6.9B | 28% | 14.4% | 18% | 13% |
| MMSMaximus | $5.4B | 23% | 9.7% | 16% | 8% |
| TNETTriNet Group Inc. | $5.0B | — | 7.1% | 38% | 7% |
| Group median | — | 32% | 8.4% | 10% | 8% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Concentrix Corporation has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Concentrix Corporation earns about $687M on its 7.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $514M on 61M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-30; net debt $4.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Concentrix Corporation (CNXC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CNXC, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CNX its page in the Manual CNXN →
Industry order: ← CMPR the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter CPAY →