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AMTM, Amentum Holdings Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies diversified

Amentum Holdings Inc. is a global advanced engineering and technology solutions provider to a broad base of U.S. and allied government agencies, and customers in international and commercial markets.

The Transaction brought together two premier government services companies with complementary capabilities and a deep understanding of our customers' missions and priorities developed over more than 100 years as trusted engineering and technical experts.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

AMTM · Amentum Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$14.4B

+71.6% YoY · 23% 3-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average

Revenue $14.2B 4-yr avg $9.6B

Gross margin 10% 4-yr avg 10%

Operating margin 3.7% 4-yr avg 2.3%

ROIC 5% 4-yr avg 9%

Owner-earnings margin 3% 4-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 3% 4-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is GES (61%) and DS (39%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 10% and operating margin about 1.6% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 0.7% to 3.5% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 1 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

GES is 61% of revenue, with DS the other meaningful segment at 39%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

GES61%$8.8B
DS39%$5.5B

By geographyUnited States75%International25%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
					Income statement
$7.7B	$7.9B	$8.4B	$14.4B	$14.2B	RevenueRevenue
10%	10%	10%	11%	10%	Gross marginGross mgn
4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$121M	$57M	$291M	$480M	$527M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.6%	0.7%	3.5%	3.3%	3.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($84M)	($314M)	($82M)	$66M	$148M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	46%	27%	Effective tax rateTax rate
					Cash flow & returns
$126M	$67M	$47M	$543M	$465M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$20M	$27M	$23M	$40M	$40M	DepreciationDeprec.
$187M	$351M	$88M	$416M	$249M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$18M	$12M	$11M	$27M	$26M	CapexCapex
0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$108M	$55M	$36M	$516M	$439M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.4%	0.7%	0.4%	3.6%	3.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$108M	$55M	$36M	$516M	$439M	Free cash flowFCF
1.4%	0.7%	0.4%	3.6%	3.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.8B	$0	$0	$70M	$70M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
28%	1%	3%	3%	5%	ROICROIC
-12%	-84%	-2%	1%	3%	Return on equityROE
−12%	−84%	−2%	1%	3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
					Balance sheet
$366M	$305M	$452M	$437M	$428M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$1.4B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$2.5B	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$560M	$764M	$892M	$832M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$880M	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.7B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$1.9B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$1.4B	$2.0B	$2.4B	$2.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.4×	1.6×	1.3×	1.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.0B	$2.9B	$5.6B	$5.7B	$5.7B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$6.4B	$12.0B	$11.5B	$11.2B	Total assetsAssets
—	$4.1B	$4.7B	$3.9B	$3.9B	Total debtDebt
—	$3.8B	$4.2B	$3.5B	$3.5B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$706M	$375M	$4.5B	$4.5B	$4.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$108M	$186M	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
					Per share
270M	270M	273M	244M	245M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$28.43	$29.13	$30.73	$58.99	$57.96	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.31	$-1.16	$-0.30	$0.27	$0.60	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.40	$0.20	$0.13	$2.11	$1.79	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.40	$0.20	$0.13	$2.11	$1.79	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.07	$0.04	$0.04	$0.11	$0.11	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.61	$1.39	$16.34	$18.46	$18.81	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2025 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	3-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+27.5%/yr	+27.5%/yr (3-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+74.2%/yr	+74.2%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	+18.4%/yr	+18.4%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	+91.8%/yr	+91.8%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

244Mpeak FY2024

ROIC

3%low FY2023

Gross margin

11%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.8×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$516Mowner earningsvs.$66Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2022FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $66M of profit into $516M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$66M

Owner earnings$516M · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$66M	($82M)	($314M)	($84M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$40M	+$23M	+$27M	+$20M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$21M	+$18M	+$3M	+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$416M	+$88M	+$351M	+$187M
Cash from operations	$543M	$47M	$67M	$126M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$27M	−$11M	−$12M	−$18M
Owner earnings	$516M	$36M	$55M	$108M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	0%	1%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $21M), owner earnings is nearer $495M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

Interest expense not tagged in the data

What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.5B · 7.3× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $437M − debt $3.9B

What this means
Netting $437M of cash and short-term investments against $3.9B of debt leaves $3.5B owed, about 7.3× a year's operating profit (8.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 38d

Tight

DSO 63 + DIO 0 − DPO 25 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range 1%–28%; 3% latest = NOPAT $260M ÷ invested capital $8.0B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin through the cycle

4-yr median margin, range 0%–4%; latest $516M = operating cash $543M − maintenance capex $27M

Industry peers: median 19%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $21M of SBC) leaves $495M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 8.23×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $543M ÷ net income $66M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.68×

Harvesting

Capex $27M ÷ depreciation $40M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $14.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.9B vs $759M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.45/share (latest year $0.27), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 4

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 1% → 3% (2-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 3% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +50%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 50% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · 0.7% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We will also need to continue to respond to and anticipate changes resulting from artificial intelligence and other similarly disruptive technologies.”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 3, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.1B

Cash & short-term investments$428M
Receivables$2.5B
Other current assets$173M

Current liabilities$2.1B

Debt due within a year$40M
Accounts payable$832M
Other current liabilities$1.2B

Current ratio1.48×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.48×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$40M due · $428M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 3, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 1.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($2.9B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$4.2B$224M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$180Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$43M

'27$39M

'28$38M

'29$38M

'30$38M

later$3.8B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$43Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$82Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$43Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$4.0Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Apr 3, 2026$428M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$516M

Together, against $43M due next year22.0×

Cash on hand as of Apr 3, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $944M against the $43M due in the twelve months after the Oct 3, 2025 schedule: 22 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Oct 3, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $783M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$68M · 9%
Retained (debt / cash)$715M · 91%

Net change in share count−9.3%
The diluted count fell from 270M to 245M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$7.7B67% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$2.3Bover 4 years buying other businesses, against $68M of capital spent building

$294M written down across 2 years (2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership19.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio253:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$21M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Amentum Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc.	$33.2B	—	15.8%	16%	19%
MAMastercard Incorporated	$32.8B	—	53.2%	81%	42%
MELIMercadoLibre Inc.	$20.3B	36%	11.0%	14%	23%
AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc.	$14.4B	10%	2.5%	3%	1%
DASHDoorDash Inc.	$13.7B	—	-12.2%	-14%	8%
FISFidelity National Info	$10.7B	36%	14.3%	4%	23%
CNXCConcentrix Corporation	$9.8B	36%	6.5%	6%	7%
BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc.	$6.9B	28%	14.4%	18%	13%
Group median	—	36%	12.7%	10%	16%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Amentum Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Amentum Holdings Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Amentum Holdings Inc. earns about $152M on its 1.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($152M) Net of stock comp (−$28M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25+50%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $439M on 244M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-08; net debt $3.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh AMTM against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Amentum Holdings Inc. (AMTM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AMTM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AMTB its page in the Manual AMZN →

Industry order: ← ALLE the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter ANDG →