Owner Scorecard


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COSO, CoastalSouth Bancshares Inc.

Banks financial

A balance-sheet business, read on book value, net interest margin and credit losses rather than an earnings multiple.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
COSO · CoastalSouth Bancshares Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$82M
+17.4% YoY
Vital signs · FY2025, with 2-yr average
Revenue $82M 2-yr avg $76M
Return on equity 10% 2-yr avg 10%
Return on tangible equity 10% 2-yr avg 11%
Efficiency ratio 58% 2-yr avg 59%
Equity / assets 11.3% 2-yr avg 10.3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income $25M ÷ equity $260M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Modest
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $5M − intangibles $2M)
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Efficient (<65%)
    Noninterest expense $48M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 49%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 11.3%
    Well capitalized
    Equity $260M ÷ assets $2.3B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $2.0B ÷ assets $2.3B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) 4%
    Low
    Provision for credit losses $3M ÷ net interest income $74M
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership15.1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
BSVNBank7 Corp.$96M19%21%37%4.7%
WTBAWest Bancorporation$95M14%14%49%2.6%
CHMGChemung Financial Corp$95M10%12%68%3.0%
CBKCommercial Bancgroup Inc.$90M13%14%47%3.5%
USCBUSCB Financial Holdings Inc.$90M11%11%57%2.9%
NWFLNorwood Financial Corp.$88M10%11%59%3.1%
COSOCoastalSouth Bancshares Inc.$82M10%10%58%3.2%
PKBKParke Bancorp Inc.$80M14%14%33%3.3%
Group median12%13%53%3.1%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

A bank / financial isn't read on an owner-earnings DCF; its economics live on the balance sheet (book value, the return earned on it, and the cash the assets throw off).

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CoastalSouth Bancshares Inc. (COSO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/COSO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CORZZ its page in the Manual COST →

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