Owner Scorecard


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COST, Costco Wholesale Corp.

Costco runs a chain of membership warehouse clubs: large, no-frills stores where shoppers pay an annual fee for the right to buy. It stocks a deliberately narrow range of goods — food and household staples alongside general merchandise such as apparel, appliances and home goods, plus ancillary offerings like gasoline, pharmacy and optical — and sells them in bulk at very small markups. The merchandise moves close to cost; the membership fee is where most of the profit comes from.

Merchandise is generally stored on racks above the sales floor and displayed on pallets containing large quantities, reducing labor required.

In general, with variations by country, our warehouses accept certain credit cards, including Costco co-branded cards, debit cards, cash and checks, Executive member 2% reward certificates, co-brand cardholder rebates, and our proprietary stored-value card (shop card).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
COST · Costco Wholesale Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$275.2B
+8.2% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $293.6B 5-yr avg $239.0B
Gross margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%
Operating margin 3.8% 5-yr avg 3.5%
ROIC 42% 5-yr avg 36%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Food and Sundries (40%) and Non-Foods (26%), with 3 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
The first test is whether the membership fee behaves like a true subscription that members keep renewing, which would turn a thin-margin retailer into something more durable — so watch the renewal rate and the fee income in the record below, because that line, not the markup on goods, is meant to carry the economics. The second test is the cost position: a club lives or dies on buying a short list of items cheaply and handing the saving back, so the levers are purchasing scale, a tight item count and low operating expense, and the proof is whether returns on capital stay high while gross margin stays low. The bad case is plain — this is still retail, the merchandise margin is slim by design, and Walmart, Sam's Club and online sellers chase the same dollar; if members ever stop judging the fee worth paying, the model loses the part that sets it apart. The record below holds the renewal, the margins and the returns.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 32%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Food and Sundries at 40%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Food and Sundries40%$109.6B
  • Non-Foods26%$71.2B
  • Other19%$51.2B
  • Fresh Food14%$38.0B
  • Membership2%$5.3B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$118.7B$129.0B$141.6B$152.7B$166.8B$195.9B$227.0B$242.3B$254.5B$275.2B$293.6BRevenueRevenue
13%13%13%13%13%13%12%12%13%13%13%Gross marginGross mgn
10%10%10%10%10%9%9%9%9%9%9%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$3.7B$4.1B$4.5B$4.7B$5.4B$6.7B$7.8B$8.1B$9.3B$10.4B$11.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.1%3.2%3.2%3.1%3.3%3.4%3.4%3.3%3.6%3.8%3.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$2.4B$2.7B$3.1B$3.7B$4.0B$5.0B$5.8B$6.3B$7.4B$8.1B$8.8BNet incomeNet inc.
35%33%29%22%25%24%25%26%24%25%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.3B$6.7B$5.8B$6.4B$8.9B$9.0B$7.4B$11.1B$11.3B$13.3B$15.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.2B$2.4B$2.6BDepreciationDeprec.
($772M)$2.2B$659M$610M$2.6B$1.5B($1.1B)$1.9B$917M$1.9B$2.7BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2.6B$2.5B$3.0B$3.0B$2.8B$3.6B$3.9B$4.3B$4.7B$5.5B$6.2BCapexCapex
2.2%1.9%2.1%2.0%1.7%1.8%1.7%1.8%1.9%2.0%2.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.0B$5.4B$4.3B$4.9B$7.2B$7.2B$5.5B$9.0B$9.1B$10.9B$12.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.7%4.2%3.1%3.2%4.3%3.7%2.4%3.7%3.6%4.0%4.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$643M$4.2B$2.8B$3.4B$6.1B$5.4B$3.5B$6.7B$6.6B$7.8B$8.8BFree cash flowFCF
0.5%3.3%2.0%2.2%3.6%2.7%1.5%2.8%2.6%2.8%3.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$1.2B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$746M$3.9B$689M$1.0B$1.5B$5.7B$1.5B$1.3B$9.0B$2.2B$2.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
$486M$469M$328M$247M$196M$496M$439M$676M$700M$903MBuybacksBuybacks
17%21%24%27%30%37%34%34%36%37%42%ROICROIC
19%25%24%24%22%29%28%25%31%28%26%Return on equityROE
13%−11%19%17%14%−4%21%20%−7%20%19%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4.7B$5.8B$7.3B$9.4B$13.3B$12.2B$11.0B$15.2B$11.1B$15.3B$20.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$2.2B$2.3B$2.7B$3.2B$3.8BReceivablesReceiv.
$9.0B$9.8B$11.0B$11.4B$12.2B$14.2B$17.9B$16.7B$18.6B$18.1B$19.4BInventoryInvent.
$7.6B$9.6B$11.2B$11.7B$14.2B$16.3B$17.8B$17.5B$19.4B$19.8B$22.4BAccounts payablePayables
$2.6B$1.7B$1.5B$1.3B($380M)($260M)$2.3B$1.5B$1.9B$1.5B$805MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$15.2B$17.3B$20.3B$23.5B$28.1B$29.5B$32.7B$35.9B$34.2B$38.4B$45.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$15.6B$17.5B$19.9B$23.2B$24.8B$29.4B$32.0B$33.6B$35.5B$37.1B$42.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.0×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.0×1.0×1.1×1.0×1.0×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$53M$988M$996M$993M$994M$994M$994MGoodwillGoodwill
$33.2B$36.3B$40.8B$45.4B$55.6B$59.3B$64.2B$69.0B$69.8B$77.1B$86.4BTotal assetsAssets
$5.2B$6.7B$6.6B$6.8B$7.6B$7.5B$6.6B$6.5B$5.9B$5.8B$5.7BTotal debtDebt
$432M$880M($682M)($2.6B)($5.7B)($4.7B)($4.5B)($8.8B)($5.2B)($9.5B)($14.3B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
27.6×30.7×28.2×31.6×34.0×39.2×49.3×50.7×54.9×67.4×76.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$12.1B$10.8B$12.8B$15.2B$18.3B$17.6B$20.6B$25.1B$23.6B$29.2B$33.5BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
441M441M442M443M444M444M445M444M445M445M444MShares out (diluted)Shares
$269.04$292.62$320.43$344.76$375.67$440.94$510.29$545.14$572.11$618.78$660.56Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.33$6.08$7.09$8.26$9.02$11.27$13.14$14.16$16.56$18.21$19.89EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.62$12.15$9.82$10.98$16.26$16.15$12.35$20.23$20.47$24.53$27.98Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.46$9.58$6.35$7.58$13.63$12.09$7.87$15.18$14.90$17.62$19.81Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.69$8.85$1.56$2.34$3.33$12.94$3.37$2.81$20.33$4.91$5.19Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.00$5.67$6.72$6.77$6.33$8.07$8.75$9.73$10.59$12.36$13.94Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$27.37$24.44$28.97$34.41$41.19$39.53$46.41$56.38$53.11$65.57$75.39Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.7%/yr+10.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+20.4%/yr+8.6%/yr
EPS+14.6%/yr+15.1%/yr
Dividends / share+12.6%/yr+8.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.4%/yr+14.3%/yr
Book value / share+10.2%/yr+9.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
445Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
37%low FY2016
Gross margin
13%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$10.9Bowner earningsvs.$8.1Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $10.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put $3.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $7.8B.

Reported net income$8.1B
Owner earnings$10.9B · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$8.1B$7.4B$6.3B$5.8B$5.0B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.4B+$2.2B+$2.1B+$1.9B+$1.8B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$860M+$818M+$774M+$724M+$665M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.9B+$917M+$1.9B−$1.1B+$1.5B
Cash from operations$13.3B$11.3B$11.1B$7.4B$9.0B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2.4B−$2.2B−$2.1B−$1.9B−$1.8B
Owner earnings$10.9B$9.1B$9.0B$5.5B$7.2B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$3.1B−$2.5B−$2.2B−$2.0B−$1.8B
Free cash flow$7.8B$6.6B$6.7B$3.5B$5.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%4%4%2%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $3.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $860M), owner earnings is nearer $10.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $10.4B ÷ interest expense $154M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $14.2B + ST investments $1.1B − debt $5.8B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $9.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 4 + DIO 28 − DPO 30 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 17%–37%; 37% latest = NOPAT $7.8B ÷ invested capital $20.8B
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 37% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 2%–4%; latest $10.9B = operating cash $13.3B − maintenance capex $2.4B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put $3.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $7.8B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $860M of SBC) leaves $10.0B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $13.3B ÷ net income $8.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $3.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $10.9B
    What this means

    Of $10.9B Owner Earnings, $3.1B (28%) went back to shareholders, $2.2B dividends, $903M buybacks. Net of $860M stock comp, the real buyback was about $43M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.27×
    Expanding
    Capex $5.5B ÷ depreciation $2.4B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $275.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.03×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.8B vs $1.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +167%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $16.35/share (latest year $18.26), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $65.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 3% early, 4% lately, median 3%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC
    What this means

    The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.

  • Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 3.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Some competitors have greater financial resources and technology capabilities, including the faster adoption of artificial intelligence, better access to merchandise, and greater market penetration than we do.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 10, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$45.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$20.0B
  • Receivables$3.8B
  • Inventory$19.4B
  • Other current assets$2.0B
Current liabilities$42.1B
  • Accounts payable$22.4B
  • Other current liabilities$19.8B
Current ratio1.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.61×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$32.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($7.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$8.3B$2.7B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $9.9B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$3.2Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$75M
'27$2.3B
'28$0
'29$148M
'30$1.8B
later$1.6B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$75Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.3Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$5.8Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, May 10, 2026$20.0B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$10.9B
Together, against $75M due next year412.1×

Cash on hand as of May 10, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $30.9B against the $75M due in the twelve months after the Aug 31, 2025 schedule: 412 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Aug 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$400M
'27$382M
'28$370M
'29$326M
'30$293M
later$4.2B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$400Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$6.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$4.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$5.8B
Lease obligations (present value)$4.1B
Total fixed claims on the business$9.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $9.9B, of which the leases are 42%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Aug 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $83.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$35.9B · 43%
  • Dividends$27.6B · 33%
  • Buybacks$4.9B · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$14.6B · 18%
  • Returned to owners$32.5B

    50% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $27.6B as dividends and $4.9B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$325.28

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 15M shares were bought for $4.9B, about $325.28 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $152.64 (2016) to $957.58 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($903M).

  • Net change in share count0.7%

    The diluted count barely moved (441M to 444M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$4.91/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained36%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($15.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $5.8B, so each retained $1 added about 0.36 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021W. Craig Jelinek$8.8M$10.3M$7.2B
2022W. Craig Jelinek$9.9M$11.9M$5.5B
2023W. Craig Jelinek$16.9M$18.7M$9.0B
2024Ron M. Vachris$12.2M$18.7M$9.1B
2024W. Craig Jelinek$16.0M$29.4M$9.1B
2025Ron M. Vachris$13.9M$15.6M$10.9B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio283:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$860M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Costco Wholesale Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Department & General Merchandise Stores

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
WMTWalmart Inc.$706.4B24%4.2%14%4%
COSTCostco Wholesale Corp.$275.2B13%3.3%32%4%
TGTTarget Corp.$104.8B29%5.6%17%5%
DGDollar General Corporation$42.7B31%8.4%18%6%
MMacy's$21.8B38%5.0%13%4%
BJBJ's Wholesale$21.5B18%3.7%24%3%
DLTRDollar Tree Inc.$19.4B31%8.3%14%5%
PSMTPriceSmart Inc.$5.3B15%4.3%13%3%
Group median27%4.6%16%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Costco Wholesale Corp. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Costco Wholesale Corp. earns about $10.0B on its 3.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $8.8B on 443M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-27; net cash $14.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($6.2B) runs well above depreciation ($2.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $12.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Costco Wholesale Corp. (COST), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/COST, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← COSO its page in the Manual COTY →

Industry order: ← BURL the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter DDS →