Owner Scorecard


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CSV, Carriage Services Inc.

We provide funeral and cemetery services and products on both an "atneed" and "preneed" basis.

Our funeral homes offer a complete range of services to meet a family's funeral needs, including consultation, the removal and preparation of remains, the sale of caskets, and related funeral merchandise, the use of funeral home facilities for visitation and memorial services, and transportation services.

Most of our funeral homes have a non-denominational chapel on the premises, which permits family visitation and services to take place at one location and thereby reduces transportation costs and inconvenience to the family.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CSV · Carriage Services Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$417M
+3.3% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $416M 5-yr avg $390M
Gross margin 35% 5-yr avg 34%
Operating margin 21.9% 5-yr avg 22.3%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 23%
Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 32% and operating margin about 20% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$248M$258M$268M$274M$329M$376M$370M$383M$404M$417M$416MRevenueRevenue
32%30%28%29%32%34%32%32%35%35%35%Gross marginGross mgn
11%10%12%9%8%9%10%11%15%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$50M$49M$42M$47M$57M$94M$80M$81M$82M$98M$91MOperating incomeOp. inc.
20.2%19.0%15.7%17.3%17.4%24.9%21.5%21.2%20.2%23.4%21.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$20M$37M$12M$15M$16M$33M$41M$33M$33M$52M$44MNet incomeNet inc.
39%26%33%34%33%27%28%28%34%27%30%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$50M$45M$49M$43M$83M$84M$61M$76M$52M$61M$62MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$15M$16M$17M$18M$19M$21M$20M$21M$23M$25M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
$12M($11M)$13M$9M$44M$25M($6M)$13M($10M)($23M)($15M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$17M$16M$14M$15M$15M$25M$26M$18M$16M$21M$21MCapexCapex
6.8%6.4%5.0%5.6%4.6%6.6%7.0%4.7%4.0%4.9%5.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$33M$29M$35M$28M$68M$59M$41M$58M$36M$40M$40MOwner earningsOwner earn.
13.4%11.2%13.2%10.2%20.6%15.8%11.1%15.0%8.9%9.6%9.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$33M$29M$35M$28M$68M$59M$35M$58M$36M$40M$40MFree cash flowFCF
13.4%11.2%13.2%10.2%20.6%15.8%9.4%15.0%8.9%9.6%9.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$27M$29M$38M$141M$28M$3M$34M$45M$0$59M$59MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$2M$4M$6M$5M$6M$7M$7M$7M$7M$7M$7MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$16M$16M$9M$0$140M$37M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
8%9%11%14%16%41%33%9%11%10%ROICROIC
11%19%5%6%7%26%30%19%16%20%17%Return on equityROE
10%17%3%4%4%20%25%15%13%17%14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$952K$952K$644K$716K$889K$1M$1M$2M$1M$2M$3MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$19M$20M$19M$21M$25M$25M$24M$27M$30M$41M$42MReceivablesReceiv.
$6M$7M$7M$7M$7M$7M$8M$8M$8M$8M$8MInventoryInvent.
$10M$7M$10M$8M$11M$14M$12M$12M$15M$19M$13MAccounts payablePayables
$15M$20M$16M$20M$21M$18M$20M$24M$23M$29M$37MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$33M$30M$29M$40M$35M$40M$38M$42M$45M$56M$57MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$44M$43M$35M$36M$48M$61M$45M$51M$58M$57M$50MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.7×0.8×1.1×0.7×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.8×1.0×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$288M$304M$398M$393M$392M$392M$410M$424M$415M$428M$428MGoodwillGoodwill
$922M$918M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3BTotal assetsAssets
$217M$229M$35M$7M$6M$5M$4M$6M$397M$397M$397MTotal debtDebt
$216M$228M$34M$6M$5M$3M$3M$4M$395M$396M$394MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.3×3.8×2.0×1.9×1.8×3.7×3.1×2.2×2.6×3.4×3.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$176M$198M$221M$227M$241M$128M$137M$173M$209M$255M$267MShareholders’ equityEquity
1.3%1.2%2.5%0.8%1.0%1.5%1.6%2.0%1.6%1.9%2.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$145K$1M$700K$14M$1MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
17.5M17.7M18.4M18.0M18.1M18.3M15.7M15.5M15.4M15.6M15.8MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.22$14.57$14.59$15.22$18.22$20.58$23.56$24.75$26.17$26.70$26.40Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.12$2.10$0.63$0.81$0.89$1.82$2.63$2.16$2.13$3.29$2.79EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.90$1.63$1.93$1.55$3.75$3.25$2.62$3.72$2.32$2.56$2.56Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.90$1.63$1.93$1.55$3.75$3.25$2.22$3.72$2.32$2.56$2.56Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.14$0.21$0.30$0.30$0.33$0.40$0.43$0.43$0.44$0.45$0.45Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.96$0.93$0.74$0.85$0.84$1.36$1.66$1.17$1.04$1.32$1.35Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.06$11.16$12.05$12.58$13.30$7.01$8.73$11.20$13.50$16.30$16.92Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.3%/yr+7.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.4%/yr−7.3%/yr
EPS+12.7%/yr+29.9%/yr
Dividends / share+13.6%/yr+6.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.5%/yr+9.4%/yr
Book value / share+5.5%/yr+4.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
16Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
11%low FY2016
Gross margin
35%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.9×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$40Mowner earningsvs.$52Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $52M of profit but $40M of owner earnings: $11M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$52M
Owner earnings$40M · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$52M$33M$33M$41M$33M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$25M+$23M+$21M+$20M+$21M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$8M+$7M+$8M+$6M+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$23M−$10M+$13M−$6M+$25M
Cash from operations$61M$52M$76M$61M$84M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$21M−$16M−$18M−$20M−$25M
Owner earnings$40M$36M$58M$41M$59M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$6M
Free cash flow$40M$36M$58M$35M$59M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%9%15%11%16%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $8M), owner earnings is nearer $32M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $98M ÷ interest expense $28M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $396M · 4.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $2M − debt $397M
    What this means

    Netting $2M of cash and short-term investments against $397M of debt leaves $396M owed, about 4.1× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 36 + DIO 10 − DPO 26 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 8%–41%; 11% latest = NOPAT $72M ÷ invested capital $650M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 9%–21%; latest $40M = operating cash $61M − maintenance capex $21M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $8M of SBC) leaves $32M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $61M ÷ net income $52M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $7M ÷ Owner Earnings $40M
    What this means

    Of $40M Owner Earnings, $7M (18%) went back to shareholders, $7M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.84×
    Maintaining
    Capex $21M ÷ depreciation $25M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $417M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $397M vs ($1M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +72%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.48/share (latest year $3.25), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 18% early to 22% lately, median 20% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 25%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · 15.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI into their products more quickly or more successfully than us, which could impair our ability to compete effectively and adversely affect our results of operations.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$57M
  • Cash & short-term investments$3M
  • Receivables$42M
  • Inventory$8M
  • Other current assets$4M
Current liabilities$50M
  • Debt due within a year$762K
  • Accounts payable$13M
  • Other current liabilities$36M
Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.99×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$7Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$762K due · $3M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($161M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$19M$13M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $604M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$183M · 30%
  • Dividends$58M · 10%
  • Buybacks$218M · 36%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$145M · 24%
  • Returned to owners$276M

    65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $58M as dividends and $218M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $180M and cash and short-term investments rose $2M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$20.13

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $42M, about $20.13 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $14.76 (2018) to $28.51 (2017), and 2017, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($16M).

  • Net change in share count−9.6%

    The diluted count fell from 17M to 16M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.45/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained

    Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$428M32% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$403Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $183M of capital spent building

$16M written down across 5 years (2016, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Carlos R. Quezada$5.3M$20.9M$59M
2022Carlos R. Quezada$3.4M−$11.2M$41M
2023Carlos R. Quezada$2.8M$2.4M$58M
2024Carlos R. Quezada$4.3M$7.3M$36M
2025Carlos R. Quezada$3.9M$4.0M$40M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$8M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Carriage Services Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.2% vs 12.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 12.6% early in the record and 11.2% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$217M → $397M

    Debt rose from $217M to $397M while owner earnings went from about $32M to $45M — about 6.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $21M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (general), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HRBH&R Block$3.8B45%21.8%108%17%
UNFUnifirst Corporation$2.4B37%8.6%9%6%
TOIThe Oncology Institute Inc.$503M-18.9%-55%-10%
NVEENV5 Global$491M11.5%7%9%
LQDTLiquidity Services Inc.$477M6.4%37%12%
PHRPhreesia Inc.$468M-17.3%-36%-7%
CSVCarriage Services Inc.$417M32%20.2%11%12%
TRNSTranscat Inc.$332M28%6.4%9%4%
Group median34%7.5%9%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Carriage Services Inc. has delivered.

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Through the cycle, Carriage Services Inc. earns about $51M on its 12.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $40M on 16M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $394M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Carriage Services Inc. (CSV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CSV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CSTM its page in the Manual CSW →

Industry order: ← CSGP the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter CTAS →