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PHR, Phreesia Inc.
Phreesia provides an integrated software, payments, and engagement platform designed to address three foundational challenges in healthcare delivery: access to care, affordability of care, and patient health outcomes.
Our platform is embedded directly into provider workflows and patient interactions, enabling healthcare organizations to activate patients, streamline administrative processes, and improve financial performance across the care continuum.
We serve a diverse group of healthcare organizations including ambulatory practices, health systems, and hospitals, as well as life sciences companies, government entities, patient advocacy, public interest and not-for-profit and other organizations.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Subscription and Services (47%), Network solutions (30%) and Payment solutions (26%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 38% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −17% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Stock-based pay runs about 14% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −36%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Subscription And Services at 47%.
- Subscription And Services47%$219M
- Network solutions30%$140M
- Payment solutions26%$121M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $80M | $100M | $125M | $149M | $213M | $281M | $346M | $410M | $468M | $483M | RevenueRevenue |
| 24% | 20% | 24% | 27% | 32% | 29% | 23% | 19% | 17% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 14% | 14% | 15% | 15% | 25% | 32% | 32% | 29% | 26% | 24% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($15M) | ($9M) | ($15M) | ($26M) | ($117M) | ($177M) | ($136M) | ($58M) | ($7M) | $3M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −18.2% | −9.5% | −12.3% | −17.3% | −54.8% | −62.9% | −39.4% | −14.2% | −1.4% | 0.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($18M) | ($15M) | ($20M) | ($27M) | ($118M) | ($176M) | ($137M) | ($59M) | $2M | $9M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ($11M) | ($2M) | $826K | $3M | ($75M) | ($90M) | ($32M) | $32M | $79M | $88M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $10M | $12M | $14M | $16M | $21M | $25M | $29M | $28M | $31M | $35M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($3M) | ($109K) | $1M | $785K | ($14M) | $2M | $3M | ($4M) | ($22M) | ($20M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7M | $5M | $7M | $11M | $18M | $5M | $6M | $9M | $11M | $12M | CapexCapex |
| 8.3% | 4.7% | 5.6% | 7.6% | 8.6% | 1.7% | 1.7% | 2.1% | 2.4% | 2.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($18M) | ($7M) | ($6M) | ($8M) | ($93M) | ($95M) | ($38M) | $24M | $68M | $76M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −22.2% | −6.9% | −5.0% | −5.6% | −43.7% | −33.8% | −11.0% | 5.8% | 14.5% | 15.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($18M) | ($7M) | ($6M) | ($8M) | ($93M) | ($95M) | ($38M) | $24M | $68M | $76M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −22.2% | −6.9% | −5.0% | −5.6% | −43.7% | −33.8% | −11.0% | 5.8% | 14.5% | 15.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $1M | $0 | $7M | $34M | $0 | $15M | $0 | $153M | $153M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -34% | -36% | -79% | -117% | -61% | -23% | -1% | 1% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -20% | -10% | -28% | -61% | -54% | -22% | 1% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −20% | −10% | −28% | −61% | −54% | −22% | 1% | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $11M | $2M | $90M | $219M | $314M | $177M | $88M | $84M | $74M | $76M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $16M | $22M | $29M | $40M | $51M | $65M | $74M | $97M | $90M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $4M | $6M | $4M | $5M | $11M | $8M | $6M | $11M | $12M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $12M | $16M | $25M | $35M | $41M | $56M | $68M | $86M | $78M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $33M | $132M | $272M | $386M | $262M | $196M | $203M | $280M | $267M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $28M | $35M | $55M | $68M | $79M | $110M | $114M | $183M | $152M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 3.7× | 5.0× | 5.6× | 3.3× | 1.8× | 1.8× | 1.5× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $250K | $250K | $8M | $34M | $34M | $76M | $76M | $170M | $170M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $59M | $159M | $327M | $494M | $370M | $370M | $388M | $664M | $666M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $28M | $24M | $11M | $13M | $8M | $11M | $16M | $100M | $91M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $26M | ($66M) | ($207M) | ($301M) | ($169M) | ($76M) | ($68M) | $26M | $14M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | -2.7× | -5.0× | -15.1× | -100.4× | -125.1× | -73.6× | -24.8× | -1.0× | 0.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($168M) | ($211M) | $102M | $263M | $417M | $288M | $251M | $265M | $337M | $359M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.0% | 1.4% | 5.0% | 9.1% | 17.0% | 20.9% | 20.7% | 16.3% | 14.4% | 13.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.5M | 1.8M | 20.3M | 39.5M | 49.9M | 52.4M | 54.6M | 57.6M | 61.5M | 62.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $51.89 | $54.14 | $6.15 | $3.76 | $4.27 | $5.36 | $6.34 | $7.13 | $7.61 | $7.78 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-11.82 | $-8.16 | $-1.00 | $-0.69 | $-2.37 | $-3.36 | $-2.51 | $-1.02 | $0.04 | $0.15 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-11.52 | $-3.72 | $-0.30 | $-0.21 | $-1.87 | $-1.81 | $-0.70 | $0.41 | $1.10 | $1.22 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-11.52 | $-3.72 | $-0.30 | $-0.21 | $-1.87 | $-1.81 | $-0.70 | $0.41 | $1.10 | $1.22 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $4.28 | $2.56 | $0.35 | $0.28 | $0.37 | $0.09 | $0.11 | $0.15 | $0.18 | $0.19 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-108.98 | $-114.35 | $5.02 | $6.66 | $8.36 | $5.49 | $4.61 | $4.60 | $5.48 | $5.79 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×11 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.95 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −21.3%/yr | +15.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −32.7%/yr | −8.7%/yr |
| Book value / share | — | −3.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Network solutions+14.9%
“Network Solutions revenue is primarily generated through annual contracts priced on a per-engagement basis, supported by closed-loop reporting and third-party measurement, and is typically higher in the second half of our fiscal year, reflecting life sciences marketing budget cycles.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2018–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $2M of profit into $68M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2M | ($59M) | ($137M) | ($176M) | ($118M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$31M | +$28M | +$29M | +$25M | +$21M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$67M | +$67M | +$72M | +$59M | +$36M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$22M | −$4M | +$3M | +$2M | −$14M |
| Cash from operations | $79M | $32M | ($32M) | ($90M) | ($75M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$11M | −$9M | −$6M | −$5M | −$18M |
| Owner earnings | $68M | $24M | ($38M) | ($95M) | ($93M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 6% | -11% | -34% | -44% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $67M), owner earnings is nearer $261K.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($7M) ÷ interest expense $7M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $74M − debt $100M
What this means
Netting $74M of cash and short-term investments against $100M of debt leaves $26M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -117%–-1%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($5M) ÷ invested capital $363MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $68M = operating cash $79M − maintenance capex $11M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -7%)Industry peers: median 8%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a -7% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $67M of SBC) leaves $261K.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 34.18×Cash-backedCash from ops $79M ÷ net income $2M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.35×HarvestingCapex $11M ÷ depreciation $31M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $468M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.53×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $100M vs $97M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.04/share (latest year $0.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.46/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −13% → −18% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (−18%) sits below the early years (−13%), but the latest year (−1%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −17% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −24%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2023 · −62.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Additionally, AI technologies may make it easier for competitors to enter our market due to lower up-front costs.”
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$76M
- Receivables$90M
- Other current assets$101M
- Debt due within a year$336K
- Accounts payable$12M
- Other current liabilities$140M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Indig | $8.9M | −$15.0M | ($93M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Indig | $7.6M | $12.5M | ($95M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Indig | $8.3M | −$240k | ($38M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Indig | $10.5M | $11.8M | $24M |
| 2026 | Mr. Indig | $8.1M | −$17.9M | $68M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership5.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio108:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$67M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 14% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ANDGAndersen Group Inc. | $839M | — | 17.7% | — | 20% |
| PAYOPayoneer | $813M | — | 1.2% | 27% | 13% |
| ACVAACV Auctions Inc. | $760M | — | -19.5% | -19% | 3% |
| XMTRXometry Inc. | $687M | 38% | -20.2% | -10% | -18% |
| FLYWFlywire | $623M | — | -6.6% | -9% | 8% |
| IMXIInternational Money Express Inc. | $608M | — | 14.5% | 40% | 6% |
| LQDTLiquidity Services Inc. | $477M | — | 6.4% | 37% | 12% |
| PHRPhreesia Inc. | $468M | — | -17.3% | -36% | -7% |
| Group median | — | — | -2.7% | -9% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Phreesia Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $76M on 62M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-22; net debt $14M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← PHM its page in the Manual PHUN →
Industry order: ← PDD the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter PMEC →