Owner Scorecard


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DXCM, DexCom Inc.

Medical Devices & Equipment consumer brand Cyclical

We are a medical device company primarily focused on the design, development and commercialization of continuous glucose monitoring, or CGM, systems for the management of diabetes and metabolic health by patients, caregivers, and clinicians around the world.

We received approval from the Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, and commercialized our first product in 2006.

We launched our latest generation systems, the Dexcom G7 Continuous Glucose Monitoring System, or G7, in 2023, and the Dexcom G7 15 Day Continuous Glucose Monitoring System, or G7 15 Day, in late 2025.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
DXCM · DexCom Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.7B
+15.6% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.8B 5-yr avg $3.5B
Gross margin 62% 5-yr avg 63%
Operating margin 21.4% 5-yr avg 15.0%
ROIC 26% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 32% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin 30% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 64% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −18% to 20% — on a steadier 64% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Capital spending runs about 9.2% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and what follows it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). By owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

28% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States72%$3.3B
  • International28%$1.3B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$573M$719M$1.0B$1.5B$1.9B$2.4B$2.9B$3.6B$4.0B$4.7B$4.8BRevenueRevenue
66%68%64%63%66%69%65%63%60%60%62%Gross marginGross mgn
50%49%42%35%32%33%35%33%32%28%28%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
27%26%19%19%19%21%17%14%14%13%12%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($64M)($43M)($186M)$142M$300M$266M$391M$598M$600M$912M$1.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
−11.1%−5.9%−18.1%9.6%15.5%10.9%13.4%16.5%14.9%19.6%21.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
($66M)($50M)($127M)$101M$550M$217M$341M$542M$576M$836M$930MNet incomeNet inc.
3%16%13%24%19%23%23%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$56M$92M$123M$315M$476M$443M$670M$749M$990M$1.4B$1.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$15M$16M$29M$49M$67M$102M$156M$186M$218M$252M$259MDepreciationDeprec.
($4M)$20M$119M$62M($261M)$10M$46M($130M)$25M$193M$425MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$56M$66M$67M$180M$199M$389M$365M$237M$359M$364M$353MCapexCapex
9.7%9.2%6.5%12.2%10.3%15.9%12.5%6.5%8.9%7.8%7.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$41M$76M$94M$266M$409M$341M$514M$563M$772M$1.2B$1.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.2%10.6%9.1%18.0%21.2%13.9%17.7%15.5%19.1%25.5%31.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$500K$26M$56M$135M$277M$53M$305M$512M$631M$1.1B$1.4BFree cash flowFCF
0.1%3.6%5.4%9.1%14.4%2.2%10.5%14.1%15.6%23.1%29.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$11M$0$0$30M$4M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$100M$0$0$0$558M$689M$750M$500MBuybacksBuybacks
-27%-11%-27%9%11%8%13%12%18%23%26%ROICROIC
-23%-12%-19%11%35%11%16%26%27%30%31%Return on equityROE
−23%−12%−19%11%35%11%16%26%27%30%31%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$124M$549M$1.1B$446M$818M$1.1B$642M$566M$606M$918M$1.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$102M$134M$227M$286M$429M$514M$713M$974M$1.0B$1.2B$1.1BReceivablesReceiv.
$45M$45M$71M$120M$235M$357M$307M$560M$543M$629M$694MInventoryInvent.
$41M$47M$76M$102M$163M$189M$238M$276M$345M$344M$394MAccounts payablePayables
$106M$133M$222M$304M$500M$682M$782M$1.3B$1.2B$1.5B$1.4BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$280M$745M$1.7B$2.0B$3.4B$3.7B$3.7B$4.4B$4.3B$4.0B$4.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$102M$139M$222M$360M$614M$721M$1.8B$1.6B$2.9B$2.1B$2.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×5.4×7.6×5.5×5.6×5.1×2.0×2.8×1.5×1.9×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$11M$12M$19M$19M$19M$27M$26M$25M$23M$24M$24MGoodwillGoodwill
$403M$904M$1.9B$2.4B$4.3B$4.9B$5.4B$6.3B$6.5B$6.3B$6.6BTotal assetsAssets
$0$328M$1.0B$1.1B$2.0B$2.0B$1.2B$2.4B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BTotal debtDebt
($124M)($221M)($127M)$614M$1.2B$929M$555M$1.9B$631M$323M($127M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-91.3×-3.3×-8.2×2.4×16.9×14.1×21.0×29.4×31.6×49.8×61.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$284M$419M$663M$883M$1.6B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.7B$3.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
19.3%14.8%9.9%7.0%6.2%4.6%4.3%4.2%4.2%3.4%3.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
83.6M86.3M88.2M92.3M420M429M428M426M413M406M394MShares out (diluted)Shares
$6.86$8.33$11.70$15.99$4.58$5.71$6.81$8.51$9.77$11.50$12.24Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.78$-0.58$-1.44$1.10$1.31$0.51$0.80$1.27$1.40$2.06$2.36EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.49$0.88$1.07$2.88$0.97$0.79$1.20$1.32$1.87$2.93$3.87Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.01$0.30$0.64$1.46$0.66$0.12$0.71$1.20$1.53$2.66$3.63Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.67$0.76$0.76$1.95$0.47$0.91$0.85$0.56$0.87$0.90$0.90Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.39$4.86$7.52$9.56$3.69$4.76$4.99$4.86$5.09$6.77$7.51Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×4.55 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.9%/yr+20.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+21.9%/yr+24.7%/yr
EPS+9.5%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.4%/yr+13.6%/yr
Book value / share+8.0%/yr+12.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
406Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
23%low FY2018
Gross margin
60%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$836Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $252M it takes just to hold its position. It put $112M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $1.1B.

Reported net income$836M
Owner earnings$1.2B · 26% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$836M$576M$542M$341M$217M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$252M+$218M+$186M+$156M+$102M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$160M+$170M+$151M+$127M+$113M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$193M+$25M−$130M+$46M+$10M
Cash from operations$1.4B$990M$749M$670M$443M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$252M−$218M−$186M−$156M−$102M
Owner earnings$1.2B$772M$563M$514M$341M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$112M−$141M−$51M−$209M−$287M
Free cash flow$1.1B$631M$512M$305M$53M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue26%19%16%18%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $252M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $112M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $160M), owner earnings is nearer $1.0B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $912M ÷ interest expense $18M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $231M · 0.3× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $918M + ST investments $93M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Netting $1.0B of cash and short-term investments against $1.2B of debt leaves $231M owed, about 0.3× a year's operating profit (1.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $14M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $216M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 95 + DIO 123 − DPO 68 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -27%–23%; 23% latest = NOPAT $701M ÷ invested capital $3.1B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 23% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 7%–26%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.4B − maintenance capex $252M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $160M of SBC) leaves $1.0B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.4B ÷ net income $836M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $500M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B
    What this means

    Of $1.2B Owner Earnings, $500M (42%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $500M buybacks. Net of $160M stock comp, the real buyback was about $340M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.44×
    Expanding
    Capex $364M ÷ depreciation $252M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.88×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $1.9B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.69/share (latest year $2.17), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −12% → 17% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −12% early to 17% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 22%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · −18.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.4B
  • Receivables$1.1B
  • Inventory$694M
  • Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$2.2B
  • Accounts payable$394M
  • Other current liabilities$1.8B
Current ratio1.95×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.62×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.8× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$655MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$92M$90M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$11Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.3B · 43%
  • Buybacks$2.6B · 49%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$475M · 9%
  • Returned to owners$2.6B

    61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $1.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$85.97

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 30M shares were bought for $2.6B, about $85.97 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $64.94 (2025) to $146.53 (2023); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $72.12 ($750M).

  • Net change in share count370.8%

    The diluted count rose from 84M to 394M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained238%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($324M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $771M, so each retained $1 added about 2.38 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$12.0M$36.1M$341M
2022$15.4M$5.7M$514M
2023$15.7M$23.0M$563M
2024$15.8M−$8.7M$772M
2025$8.0M$6.7M$1.2B
2025$16.3M$13.0M$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$160M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 18% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why DexCom Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?370.8%

    Diluted shares grew 370.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $2.6B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $1.2B

    Debt rose from $0 to $1.2B while owner earnings went from about $70M to $841M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 1.5 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?26% → 37% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $147M to $1.8B while revenue grew 740%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (26% of revenue then, 37% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Medical Devices & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RMDResMed Inc.$5.1B57%27.1%17%19%
DXCMDexCom Inc.$4.7B65%12.1%10%17%
HOLXHologic$4.1B66%20.6%13%24%
ALGNAlign Technology$4.0B72%19.9%23%22%
MMEDMiniMed Group Inc.$3.1B56%-5.4%-3%-4%
GMEDGlobus Medical$2.9B75%19.9%11%17%
PODDInsulet Corporation$2.7B65%6.2%5%5%
TFXTeleflex$2.0B55%16.6%7%13%
Group median65%18.2%10%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what DexCom Inc. has delivered.

DexCom Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, DexCom Inc. earns about $773M on its 16.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 25.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+23%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+59%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.4B on 386M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net cash $127M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($353M) runs well above depreciation ($259M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "DexCom Inc. (DXCM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DXCM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← DXC its page in the Manual DXPE →

Industry order: ← DRIO the Medical Devices & Equipment chapter ELMD →