Owner Scorecard


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TFX, Teleflex

Medical Devices & Equipment consumer brand Cyclical

Teleflex is a global provider of medical technology products that enhance clinical benefits, improve patient and provider safety and reduce total procedural costs.

We primarily design, develop, manufacture and supply single-use medical devices used by hospitals and healthcare providers for common diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in critical care and surgical applications.

We market and sell our products to hospitals and healthcare providers worldwide through a combination of our direct sales force and distributors.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
TFX · Teleflex
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.0B
+17.2% YoY · −5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.1B 5-yr avg $2.2B
Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 58%
Operating margin 3.0% 5-yr avg 13.5%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Americas (64%), EMEA (24%) and Asia (12%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 55% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 5.9% to 22% — on a steadier 55% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 18% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the installed base and what follows it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Americas is 64% of revenue, with EMEA the other meaningful segment at 24%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Americas64%$1.3B
  • EMEA24%$472M
  • Asia12%$241M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.9B$2.1B$2.4B$2.6B$2.5B$2.8B$2.8B$1.7B$1.7B$2.0B$2.1BRevenueRevenue
53%55%53%54%52%55%55%61%61%56%55%Gross marginGross mgn
30%33%33%33%29%31%31%36%40%36%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%4%4%4%5%5%6%7%6%7%8%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$319M$372M$322M$427M$423M$628M$500M$259M$104M$118M$63MOperating incomeOp. inc.
17.1%17.3%13.1%16.5%16.7%22.4%17.9%15.1%6.1%5.9%3.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$237M$153M$201M$461M$335M$485M$363M$356M$70M($906M)($1.0B)Net incomeNet inc.
3%46%10%6%13%19%11%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$411M$426M$435M$437M$437M$652M$343M$206M$302M$97M$116MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$128M$160M$215M$218M$227M$237M$231M$148M$162M$178M$193MDepreciationDeprec.
$28M$94M($3M)($270M)($146M)($94M)($278M)($326M)$45M$799M$906MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$53M$71M$81M$103M$91M$72M$79M$46M$90M$95M$90MCapexCapex
2.8%3.3%3.3%4.0%3.6%2.5%2.8%2.7%5.3%4.8%4.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$357M$355M$354M$334M$346M$581M$264M$160M$211M$1M$26MOwner earningsOwner earn.
19.1%16.6%14.5%12.9%13.7%20.7%9.4%9.3%12.4%0.1%1.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$357M$355M$354M$334M$346M$581M$264M$160M$211M$1M$26MFree cash flowFCF
19.1%16.6%14.5%12.9%13.7%20.7%9.4%9.3%12.4%0.1%1.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$59M$61M$62M$63M$63M$64M$64M$64M$64M$60M$60MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$200M$300MBuybacksBuybacks
12%5%7%9%7%11%7%4%2%ROICROIC
11%6%8%15%10%13%9%8%2%-29%-33%Return on equityROE
8%4%5%13%8%11%7%7%0%−31%−35%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$544M$334M$357M$301M$376M$445M$292M$223M$248M$379M$309MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$272M$346M$366M$419M$395M$384M$409M$443M$227M$346M$366MReceivablesReceiv.
$316M$396M$428M$477M$513M$478M$579M$626M$307M$404M$381MInventoryInvent.
$69M$92M$107M$103M$103M$118M$127M$132M$98M$130M$144MAccounts payablePayables
$519M$650M$687M$792M$806M$743M$861M$937M$436M$620M$603MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.5B$1.9B$1.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$428M$484M$582M$563M$540M$680M$581M$607M$649M$762M$728MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×2.3×2.1×2.3×2.6×2.1×2.4×2.3×2.3×2.5×2.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.3B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.6B$2.5B$2.5B$2.9B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$3.9B$6.2B$6.3B$6.3B$7.2B$6.9B$6.9B$7.5B$7.1B$6.9B$6.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.0B$2.2B$2.2B$1.9B$2.5B$1.9B$1.7B$1.8B$1.7B$2.6B$2.6BTotal debtDebt
$490M$1.9B$1.8B$1.6B$2.1B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.4B$2.3B$2.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.8×4.5×3.1×5.3×6.4×11.0×9.2×3.0×1.2×1.2×0.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.1B$2.4B$2.5B$3.0B$3.3B$3.8B$4.0B$4.4B$4.3B$3.1B$3.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%0.9%0.9%1.0%0.8%0.8%1.0%1.6%1.5%1.3%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
47.6M46.7M46.8M47.1M47.3M47.4M47.3M47.3M47.1M44.7M44.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$39.21$45.99$52.31$55.11$53.65$59.24$59.00$36.20$36.09$44.56$48.05Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.98$3.27$4.29$9.80$7.09$10.23$7.68$7.53$1.48$-20.25$-22.79EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.50$7.62$7.57$7.10$7.33$12.24$5.57$3.38$4.49$0.03$0.58Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.50$7.62$7.57$7.10$7.33$12.24$5.57$3.38$4.49$0.03$0.58Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.24$1.31$1.33$1.33$1.34$1.34$1.35$1.35$1.35$1.35$1.36Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.12$1.52$1.73$2.18$1.92$1.51$1.67$0.98$1.92$2.13$2.03Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$44.86$52.09$54.27$63.27$70.56$79.17$85.01$93.88$90.84$69.87$69.69Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.4%/yr−3.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−45.4%/yr−66.2%/yr
Dividends / share+1.0%/yr+0.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.5%/yr+2.1%/yr
Book value / share+5.0%/yr−0.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+17.2%
    “Revenues 2025 2024 2023 Net Revenues $ 1,992.7 $ 1,699.5 $ 1,712.4 Net revenues for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased by $293.2 million, or 17.2%, compared to the prior year, primarily due to net revenues of $202.4 million generated by the acquired VI Business, a $35.7 million increase in sales volumes of existing products and $24.2 million in sales of new products.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Americas+10.6%
    “Americas net revenues for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased $122.3 million, or 10.6%, compared to the prior year, which was primarily attributable to net revenues of $49.0 million generated by the acquired VI Business, a $39.0 million increase in sales volumes of existing products, sales of new products and, to a lesser extent, price increases.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Asia+19.2%
    “Asia net revenues for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased $38.8 million, or 19.2%, compared to the prior year, which was primarily attributable to net revenues of $51.1 million generated by the acquired VI Business, partially offset by price decreases primarily due to the implementation of volume-based procurement programs in China.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
45Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
2%low FY2024
Gross margin
56%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1564.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1Mowner earningsvs.($906M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $906M loss into $1M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($906M)$70M$356M$363M$485M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$178M+$162M+$148M+$231M+$237M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$26M+$26M+$27M+$27M+$23M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$799M+$45M−$326M−$278M−$94M
Cash from operations$97M$302M$206M$343M$652M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$95M−$90M−$46M−$79M−$72M
Owner earnings$1M$211M$160M$264M$581M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue0%12%9%9%21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer ($24M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $118M ÷ interest expense $100M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.3B · 19.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $379M − debt $2.6B
    What this means

    Netting $379M of cash and short-term investments against $2.6B of debt leaves $2.3B owed, about 19.1× a year's operating profit (22.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 63 + DIO 169 − DPO 55 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 2%–12%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–21%; latest $1M = operating cash $97M − maintenance capex $95M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves ($24M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($906M) · cash from operations $97M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $360M ÷ Owner Earnings $1M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $1M of Owner Earnings, $360M (24915%) went back to shareholders, $60M dividends, $300M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $26M stock comp, the real buyback was about $274M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.54×
    Harvesting
    Capex $95M ÷ depreciation $178M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.54×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.6B vs $1.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −181%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.61/share (latest year $-20.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $70.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 16% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 9% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −13%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 13% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 5.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B
  • Cash & short-term investments$309M
  • Receivables$366M
  • Inventory$381M
  • Other current assets$804M
Current liabilities$728M
  • Debt due within a year$103M
  • Accounts payable$144M
  • Other current liabilities$481M
Current ratio2.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.03×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$103M due · $309M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+32.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 2.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($699M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.8B$163M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0
'27$500M
'28$500M
'29$0
'30$0

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$500Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$500Min 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.0Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$781M · 21%
  • Dividends$624M · 17%
  • Buybacks$500M · 13%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.8B · 49%
  • Returned to owners$1.1B

    38% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $624M as dividends and $500M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.6B and cash and short-term investments fell $234M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $500M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−7.1%

    The diluted count fell from 48M to 44M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.35/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−37%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($633M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $232M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.37 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.8B55% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity74%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $781M of capital spent building

$240M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Liam J. Kelly$8.7M$4.2M$581M
2022Liam J. Kelly$8.2M$5.0M$264M
2023Liam J. Kelly$9.0M$9.3M$160M
2024Liam J. Kelly$9.2M$2.7M$211M
2025Liam J. Kelly$6.7M$1.8M$1M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership0.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$26M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 22% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Teleflex is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.3% vs 16.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 16.7% early in the record and 7.3% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.0B → $2.6B

    Debt rose from $1.0B to $2.6B while owner earnings went from about $356M to $124M — about 2.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 21 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $455M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Medical Devices & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MMEDMiniMed Group Inc.$3.1B56%-5.4%-3%-4%
GMEDGlobus Medical$2.9B75%19.9%11%17%
PODDInsulet Corporation$2.7B65%6.2%5%5%
TFXTeleflex$2.0B55%16.6%7%13%
IARTIntegra Lifesciences Holdings Corp$1.6B62%7.4%4%8%
PENPenumbra$1.4B65%0.5%0%3%
HAEHaemonetics$1.3B50%10.4%7%11%
TNDMTandem Diabetes Care$1.0B52%-15.0%-24%-1%
Group median59%6.8%5%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Teleflex has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Teleflex earns about $264M on its 13.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.1% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $26M on 44M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $2.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Teleflex (TFX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TFX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TFSL its page in the Manual TGLS →

Industry order: ← TCMD the Medical Devices & Equipment chapter TMDX →