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FLGT, Fulgent Genetics Inc.
We are a technology-based company with a well-established laboratory services business and a therapeutic development business.
Our laboratory services business includes technical laboratory and testing services and professional interpretation of laboratory results by licensed physicians.
Our therapeutic development business is focused on developing product candidates for treating a broad range of cancers using a novel nanoencapsulation and targeted therapy platform designed to improve the therapeutic window and pharmacokinetic profile, or PK profile, of new and existing cancer drugs.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 69% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −19%) on a 59% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on volume, payer mix and reimbursement. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $18M | $19M | $21M | $33M | $422M | $993M | $619M | $289M | $283M | $323M | $320M | RevenueRevenue |
| 63% | 54% | — | — | 79% | 78% | 59% | 36% | 38% | 41% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 25% | 28% | 26% | 20% | 4% | 5% | 18% | 31% | 31% | 36% | 37% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 19% | 23% | 26% | 20% | 3% | 2% | 5% | 14% | 17% | 17% | 17% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $918K | ($3M) | ($5M) | ($428K) | $290M | $676M | $179M | ($196M) | ($74M) | ($91M) | ($106M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.0% | −18.6% | −23.7% | −1.3% | 68.8% | 68.1% | 28.8% | −67.6% | −26.1% | −28.2% | −33.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($5M) | ($3M) | ($6M) | ($411K) | $214M | $507M | $143M | ($168M) | ($43M) | ($61M) | ($74M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | 25% | 26% | 23% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $4M | $1M | ($675K) | $6M | $141M | $539M | $254M | $27M | $21M | ($102M) | ($90M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $11M | $33M | $26M | $25M | $24M | $24M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $4M | ($6K) | $465K | $612K | ($85M) | $4M | $45M | $126M | ($6M) | ($105M) | ($79M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $4M | $3M | $2M | $1M | $35M | $24M | $19M | $22M | $40M | $23M | $23M | CapexCapex |
| 20.7% | 15.5% | 10.9% | 3.6% | 8.3% | 2.4% | 3.0% | 7.7% | 14.2% | 7.0% | 7.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $3M | ($397K) | ($3M) | $4M | $138M | $528M | $235M | $5M | ($4M) | ($124M) | ($113M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 17.7% | −2.1% | −14.0% | 13.3% | 32.6% | 53.2% | 37.9% | 1.7% | −1.4% | −38.5% | −35.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $617K | ($2M) | ($3M) | $4M | $105M | $515M | $235M | $5M | ($19M) | ($124M) | ($113M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.4% | −8.4% | −14.0% | 13.3% | 25.0% | 51.9% | 37.9% | 1.7% | −6.8% | −38.5% | −35.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | $62M | $173M | $399K | $0 | $0 | $52M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $21K | $62K | — | $74M | $25M | $225K | $11M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 2% | -6% | -9% | -0% | 45% | 51% | 12% | -15% | -5% | -7% | -8% | ROICROIC |
| -10% | -5% | -11% | -0% | 38% | 44% | 11% | -15% | -4% | -5% | -7% | Return on equityROE |
| −10% | −5% | −11% | −0% | 38% | 44% | 11% | −15% | −4% | −5% | −7% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $46M | $41M | $7M | $12M | $87M | $165M | $80M | $97M | $55M | $50M | $58M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $4M | $4M | $6M | $7M | $184M | $139M | $53M | $51M | $69M | $85M | $69M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $2M | $1M | $2M | $26M | $20M | $23M | $15M | $18M | $19M | $21M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $2M | $2M | $5M | $5M | $157M | $118M | $30M | $36M | $51M | $66M | $49M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $26M | $33M | $40M | $37M | $524M | $612M | $628M | $508M | $354M | $550M | $479M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $3M | $3M | $3M | $4M | $130M | $105M | $88M | $73M | $73M | $85M | $90M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 7.9× | 11.0× | 14.4× | 10.0× | 4.0× | 5.8× | 7.1× | 7.0× | 4.9× | 6.5× | 5.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | — | $51M | $143M | $22M | $22M | $25M | $54M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $58M | $57M | $54M | $89M | $700M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | $3M | $3M | $2M | $2M | $1M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ($76M) | ($95M) | ($53M) | ($48M) | ($56M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | 14507.9× | 5777.4× | 516.0× | -400.7× | — | -1214.6× | -1358.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $54M | $54M | $51M | $83M | $569M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 25.5% | 11.3% | 10.8% | 9.9% | 1.9% | 1.6% | 5.3% | 14.8% | 15.7% | 12.3% | 12.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 13.7M | 17.7M | 18.0M | 18.7M | 24.1M | 31.0M | 31.0M | 29.8M | 30.2M | 30.8M | 30.9M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.33 | $1.06 | $1.19 | $1.74 | $17.53 | $32.04 | $19.99 | $9.71 | $9.38 | $10.48 | $10.37 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.39 | $-0.14 | $-0.31 | $-0.02 | $8.91 | $16.38 | $4.63 | $-5.63 | $-1.41 | $-1.97 | $-2.39 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.24 | $-0.02 | $-0.17 | $0.23 | $5.72 | $17.03 | $7.58 | $0.16 | $-0.13 | $-4.04 | $-3.66 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.05 | $-0.09 | $-0.17 | $0.23 | $4.39 | $16.62 | $7.58 | $0.16 | $-0.64 | $-4.04 | $-3.66 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.28 | $0.16 | $0.13 | $0.06 | $1.46 | $0.77 | $0.61 | $0.75 | $1.33 | $0.73 | $0.75 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.97 | $3.05 | $2.85 | $4.42 | $23.67 | $37.41 | $40.91 | $38.14 | $37.48 | $36.13 | $34.00 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +25.8%/yr | −9.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +11.5%/yr | −12.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +27.8%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $61M loss but ($124M) of owner earnings: $64M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($61M) | ($43M) | ($168M) | $143M | $507M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$24M | +$25M | +$26M | +$33M | +$11M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$40M | +$44M | +$43M | +$33M | +$16M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$105M | −$6M | +$126M | +$45M | +$4M |
| Cash from operations | ($102M) | $21M | $27M | $254M | $539M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$23M | −$25M | −$22M | −$19M | −$11M |
| Owner earnings | ($124M) | ($4M) | $5M | $235M | $528M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$15M | — | — | −$13M |
| Free cash flow | ($124M) | ($19M) | $5M | $235M | $515M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -38% | -1% | 2% | 38% | 53% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $40M), owner earnings is nearer ($164M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1214.6×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($91M) ÷ interest expense $75K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash $50M + ST investments $20M − debt $2M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $68M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $15M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $83M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 96 + DIO 0 − DPO 35 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -15%–51%; -7% latest = NOPAT ($72M) ÷ invested capital $1.1BIndustry peers: median -14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -38%–53%; latest ($124M) = operating cash ($102M) − maintenance capex $23MIndustry peers: median -30%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -38% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $40M of SBC) leaves ($164M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($102M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($61M) · cash from operations ($102M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.94×MaintainingCapex $23M ÷ depreciation $24M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $323M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 6.48×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $2M vs $466M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.18/share (latest year $-2.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $39.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −12% → −41% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −12% early to −41% lately, median −19% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2023 · −67.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Ability to Maintain Low Internal Costs and Inflation We have developed various proprietary technologies, including various AI tools, that improve our laboratory efficiency and reduce the costs we incur to perform our tests, including our proprietary gene probes, data algorithms, adaptive learning software and genetic r…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$50M
- Receivables$69M
- Inventory$770K
- Other current assets$359M
- Accounts payable$21M
- Other current liabilities$69M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $890M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$173M · 19%
- Buybacks$111M · 12%
- Retained (debt / cash)$606M · 68%
- Returned to owners$111M
14% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $111M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks$32.41
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $111M, about $32.41 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $18.14 (2025) to $41.30 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($74M).
- Net change in share count125.2%
The diluted count rose from 14M to 31M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−9%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($470M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $41M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$120M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 50% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Ming Hsieh | $5.7M | $5.7M | $528M |
| 2022 | Ming Hsieh | $5.2M | $3.4M | $235M |
| 2023 | Ming Hsieh | $5.3M | $5.0M | $5M |
| 2024 | Ming Hsieh | $6.1M | $4.1M | ($4M) |
| 2025 | Ming Hsieh | $6.2M | $9.5M | ($124M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership36.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio92:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$40M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 12% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Fulgent Genetics Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−12.7% vs 0.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 0.5% early in the record and −12.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?125.2%
Diluted shares grew 125.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $111M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FTREFortrea Holdings Inc. | $2.7B | — | 1.1% | 1% | 5% |
| CAICaris Life Sciences Inc. | $812M | — | -62.4% | — | -62% |
| TOIThe Oncology Institute Inc. | $503M | — | -18.9% | -55% | -10% |
| FLGTFulgent Genetics Inc. | $323M | 57% | -10.0% | -3% | 7% |
| SRTAStrata Critical Medical Inc. | $197M | 19% | -36.6% | -9% | -30% |
| AIRSAirSculpt Technologies Inc. | $152M | — | 1.6% | -1% | 7% |
| GRALGRAIL Inc. Common Stock | $147M | — | -1627.6% | -19% | -464% |
| PSNLPersonalis Inc. | $70M | 26% | -80.7% | -48% | -58% |
| Group median | — | 26% | -27.8% | -9% | -20% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFFulgent Genetics Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered−15%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← FLG its page in the Manual FLNC →
Industry order: ← EYPT the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter FTRE →